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Abstract
Under what conditions do governments view and respond to the arrival of refugees primarily as a
security threat? Comparatively analyzing the securitization of Syrian refugees in two pairs of
countries, Turkey and Lebanon and Germany and France, this dissertation proposes a domestic
political context-based theory and typology of securitization. Based on a quantitative and
qualitative content analysis of the media data including mainstream national newspaper articles,
political speeches, and policy documents, this research differentiates between different levels of
securitization. It finds that moderate securitization was present in Lebanon during the early years
of the refugee crisis (2013–2014) and coincided with an open border policy, inaction, legal
ambiguity, and benign neglect. From 2015 to the present, there was a marked increase in
securitization in Lebanon that coincided with controlled borders, restrictive policies, and
heightened tensions with refugees.

Securitization of Syrian refugees has followed a somewhat different trajectory in Turkey.
Ankara’s policies evolved from non-recognition (2013–2014) to recognition (2014–2016) and
then from recognition to integration (2016–present). A decrease in securitization mapped onto
this policy trajectory despite the opposition’s and the public’s increasing discontentment with the
presence of refugees. This research argues that the low level of securitization in Turkey is an
outcome of the incumbent party’s Islamist political ideology that motivates transnational
religious solidarity, whereas the high level of securitization in Lebanon is a consequence of elite
divisions, the country’s unique historical experiences with Palestinian refugees and the Syrian
occupation, that engender competing security perspectives and agendas on Syrian refugees.
In Germany, the low level of securitization coincided with the attempts to reach a European
solution between 2011-2015 and the September 4, 2015 decision where Chancellor Merkel

decided to keep the country’s borders open to hundreds of thousands of refugees stranded in
Austria. Modest securitization (2016-Present) stimulated legal restrictions on family
reunification, granting of subsidiary protection status rather than refugee status to Syrians, and
increasing political polarization around refugee issues. Whereas in France, modest securitization
(2011-2015) mapped onto ambivalence toward refugees and attempts to externalize humanitarian
protection through the provision of international aid. In the aftermath of the Paris attacks (2016Present), the high level of securitization motivated inaction and avoidance where French
statesmen completely ruled out the admission of refugees in large numbers as a policy option and
introduced a humanitarian visa to sideline France’s obligations toward asylum seekers under the
1951 Refugee Convention and grant asylum only to select individuals.

This research finds that different levels of securitization in Germany and France are closely
linked with electoral competition dynamics and coalition formation dynamics as well as political
leadership. Electoral competition and coalition formation dynamics shaped the expected
outcomes of adopting pro-Syrian refugee policies for political parties in both countries. The risk
posed by the centrist right-wing voters’ shift to the far-right due to the enactment of pro-refugee
policies for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany was eased to a great extent by a
type of cordon sanitaire, other parties’ exclusion of Alternative for Germany (AfD) from
coalitions. However, under the semi-presidential system, the electoral risk posed by the rise of
the far-right party, the National Rally (RN), against the Republic on the Move (LREM) has been
higher in France.
As a result, centrist French Presidents have been electorally more constrained in adopting
generous refugee policies. They feared that voters who were dissatisfied with their refugee
policies would seek comfort in the National Rally that offers an extreme platform, leading to the

fragmentation of the vote. Additionally, unlike Chancellor Merkel, these leaders remained riskaverse and more focused on the electoral costs of refugee policies during the Syrian refugee
crisis. Overall, this study demonstrates how contextual or domestic factors are key to explaining
government attitudes toward refugee groups and contributes to our understanding of the sources
and processes of securitization.
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1
Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: United Nations, 1948.

The Politics of Security: Syrian Refugees in the Middle East and Western Europe
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Syrian civil war (2011-present) and ensuing instability in the Middle East have
brought about the largest population displacement since the Second World War. As of mid-2019,
around 6 million Syrians have fled to other provinces within Syria and an additional 5.5 million
have crossed international borders and become refugees. State responses to the worst
humanitarian crisis of the 21 st century have varied significantly. While some governments have
responded in humanitarian ways by opening their borders and providing safety and assistance for
refugees, others have introduced a wide range of restrictive measures including closing their
borders, treating refugees harshly, and trying to shift the responsibility for the protection of
refugees to other states often in an egregious violation of their commitments under the
international refugee regime.
Most of the governments that have enacted stringent measures justified these measures by
presenting Syrian refugees primarily as a security threat inciting fears of loss of safety on a
variety of grounds. Sometimes refugees have been depicted as posing an existential threat to the
state, or as detrimental to the dominant cultural identity, and straining the country’s welfare
system while aggravating the competition in the low-wage job market. All of these responses
were reflections and indicators of a larger social process: “the securitization of forced
migration,” positioning forced migration primarily as a matter of security through speech acts
justifying actions outside the normal boundaries of policy.
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Although the securitization trend is easy to call attention to, we have a limited
understanding of the factors driving the securitization of forced migration within and across
countries. Under what conditions do governments view and respond to the arrival of refugees
primarily as a security threat? The literature provides a wide range of accounts on state responses
to forced migrants. One stream of theorizing (Loescher and Scanlan, 1986) associates the
attitudes toward forced migrants with the relations with the country of origin. Another stream of
theorizing (Gordenker, 1987) focuses on the role of and pressures from the international
community and institutions operating in the area of forced migration. On the supply side, some
(Tsourapas, 2019) highlight the impact of “Refugee Rentierism,” the phenomenon of using host
status and refugee policy as primary mechanisms of international rent-seeking. Finally, a group
of scholars (Jacobsen, 1996; Bourbeau, 2011) examine the effect of contextual factors such as
exogenous shocks, domestic audiences, and local absorption capacity on the securitization of
forced migrants.
This study builds on and extends this last group of studies that assess how contextual
factors facilitate or constrain the securitization of forced migration. It undertakes a comparative
analysis of the securitization of Syrian refugees in two pairs of countries: Turkey and Lebanon
and Germany and France. The cases have been selected based on the most similar systems
design. The paired countries share many similarities, such as their security environment, regime
type, level of economic prosperity, level of geographical proximity to Syria, level of ethnic and
religious affinity with Syrians, but they differ on the levels, forms, and origins of securitization.
Based on the qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the speeches and policies
concerning Syrian refugees and in-depth study of the pertinent decision-making processes which
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helped this study offer contextual narratives, I argue that Turkey and Germany display a low
level of securitization, whereas Lebanon and France display a high level of securitization.
To account for the variation in the securitization of Syrian refugees across countries, I
propose a domestic political context-based theory of securitization. The theory consists of five
components. The first component is the nature of political elite relations. I contend that whether
political elite relations are stable or unstable meaning whether they are extremely polarized or
divided along ethnic or sectarian lines in a country impacts the securitization of refugees. I
hypothesize that the more divided the political elites are, the more securitized the treatment of
refugees will be in a country. Political elites refer to those who occupy important political posts
and have social or institutional power to influence policymaking in a country. In this regard,
political elites include members of the government, members of political parties, high-ranking
officials and bureaucrats, and individuals who do not hold any formal positions either in the
government or in political parties but have great political prestige and power such as former
politicians, opinion leaders, and religious figures.
The second component of the theory is incumbent party ideology. I argue that while
inclusive party ideology constrains the securitized treatment of refugees, it is facilitated by
exclusive party ideology. It is important to note that the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the
party ideology is not merely a product of traditional right-left, liberal-conservative, or
cosmopolitan-nativist political divides along which politics is contested. Depending on the
ethnic, religious, and cultural characteristics of a refugee group, the expected impact of political
ideology might vary. For example, a conservative party that opposes the admission of refugees,
in general, might adopt a different position for a group that it favors (Werber, 2015). For these
reasons, I adopt a broader view of party ideology and define it as a set of ideas, principles,
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doctrines, myths, and symbols that influence a party’s position on political issues and actors,
including immigration and migrant communities.
The third component of the theory is electoral competition dynamics. With electoral
competition dynamics, I refer to two factors: the issue salience, primary issues on which the
parties with the highest number of members or parliament seats or probability of winning the
elections differed in a given time, and the level of electoral volatility, the degree of change in
vote shares obtained by individual political parties across consecutive elections. I hypothesize
that the more salient immigration is as a political issue, the higher the risk of securitization will
be. Similarly, I theorize that electoral volatility increases the risks involved in adopting any
refugee policy that might upset the targeted group of voters. The policy impacts of electoral risk
involved in adopting pro-refugee policies have been repeatedly observed in recent years,
especially in Europe. In the face of the rise of the far-right, some center-right or left rivals have
responded to growing public anxieties by moving to support a tougher/more restrictive approach
to immigration (Serhan, 2020). To operationalize this concept, I updated the Pederson Electoral
Volatility Index and compared recent election results in case countries.
The fourth component of the theory is coalition formation dynamics. Coalition formation
dynamics refer to the factors that impact the joining together of different political parties for a
particular purpose and time in a country, specifically the probability of a coalition formed with
far-right parties. I hypothesize that the higher the probability the more securitized Syrian refugee
policies will be.
The last component of the theory is the history of relations with other refugee and
immigrant communities. I contend that whether violent or non-violent tensions have occasionally
arisen between existing refugee groups and the state influence the securitization of a new group
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of refugees. Having analyzed a large qualitative data set comprised of newspaper articles, policy
documents, and leader speeches, I closely observed how political elites make references to
different historical contexts, events, memories, and images to justify their preferred policies
toward a new refugee group. Experiences with existing immigrant and refugee communities
provide a collective cognitive basis for rhetorical appeals. I hypothesize that the more amicable a
country’s relations with existing refugee communities are, the less securitized the treatment of
Syrian refugees will be.
The domestic political context characterized in this study rests on a comprehensive view
of politics. It involves the most pertinent dimensions of a political environment that provide
incentives and disincentives for politicians to frame refugee issues in a certain way and introduce
measures in response. As shown in Figure 1, it is underlined by the assumption that meaning and
policymaking on forced migration is an outcome of the interactions between these different
dimensions of a domestic political context.
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Figure 1
Holistic Model of Domestic Political Context Relevant to Meaning and Policymaking on Refugees

Contingent upon the nature of a political system, the salience of each of these dimensions
might differ. In other words, they might influence the securitization of refugees in varying levels
and ways. For instance, in an authoritarian regime, electoral volatility might not have as much
explanatory power as party ideology or elite divisions over the securitization of refugee
communities. Similarly, elite divisions in some countries might not be as influential as they are
in other countries. Through an in-depth study of the cases, I demonstrate how much of influence
different dimensions exert on the securitization of refugee communities.
Starting with Turkey, I argue that a low level of securitization in the country is an
outcome of the incumbent party ideology. AKP (Justice and Development Party) as an Islamist
political party has been strongly motivated by transnational religious solidarity that induced a
pro-active foreign policy toward Syria as well as generous policies toward refugees. Had a
conservative party with transnational religious sensitivities not been in power during the refugee
crisis, Turkey’s policies toward Syria and its refugees could have taken an entirely different

7
direction. As a matter of fact, isolationism had been the hallmark of foreign policymaking toward
the Middle East in the pre-AKP era. I also find support for this argument in the current attitudes
of opposition parties toward Syrian refugees in the country. Most of the opposition parties (CHP,
MHP, and IYI Party) have been extremely critical of the AKP’s pro-refugee policies. The most
important implication of the partisan divide concerning refugees in Turkey is that a government
change may lead to fundamental changes in refugees’ status and conditions.
For Lebanon, I maintain that a high level of securitization is driven by elite divisions and
historical relations with other refugee communities. There are two types of elite divides
characterizing, if not paralyzing, the Lebanese politics: the sectarian divide and the pro vs. antiSyria divide. The sectarian divide deeply shapes the political actors’ stances on Syrian refugees.
While Christian political parties often demand refugees’ immediate return, Sunni political actors
denounce such requests. Situated between these two positions, Shia political powers want the
country to engage in direct negotiations with the Syrian regime to return the refugees but do not
call for their immediate return. The deep divide between the March 8 and March 14 alliances
regarding Syria also complicates the Syrian refugee issues.1 On the one hand, members of the
March 14 alliance assure the international community that Syrian refugees will not be subject to
involuntary repatriation. On the other hand, members of the March 8 alliance negotiate the
conditions of Syrian refugees’ return with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.
Finally, historical experiences with Palestinian refugees influence the political actors’
approaches toward Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Turkey had not been a major refugee-hosting

1
The March 14 Alliance (taḥāluf 14 adhār), named after the date of the Cedar Revolution, is a coalition of political parties and
independents in Lebanon formed in 2005 that are united by their anti-Syrian stance. On the other hand, the March 8
Alliance (taḥāluf 8 adhār) is a coalition of political parties and independents that are united by their pro-Syrian stance and their
opposition to the March 14 Alliance.
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country until the influx of Syrian refugees with a few exceptions and refugees do not conjure up
unpleasant collective memories. Conversely, refugee flows have deeply shaped Lebanon. Within
the early years of its independence, the country opened its borders to Palestinian refugees in the
aftermath of the 1948 Arab Israeli War. The refugee camps in which Palestinians were resettled
became instrumental to recruitment for Al-Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), the offshoots like Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) particularly throughout the Lebanese Civil War
that lasted 15 years and consumed more than 120,000 lives.
Against the background of the 15-year civil war and the subsequent 29-year Syrian
occupation which motivated the formation of the pro-Syrian March 8 and the anti-Syrian March
14 blocs, the Lebanese attitudes toward Syrian refugees materialize. Through social
appropriation and instrumentalization of the history of Palestinians in Lebanon, members of the
March 8 alliance note that Lebanon might experience a similar conflict with Syrian refugees.
They claim that it is very unlikely for a refugee community to return home as the conflict that
motivates their displacement remains unsettled or becomes even more intractable over time.
Furthermore, members of the March 8 alliance oppose the creation of formal refugee camps
because refugee camps may facilitate the armament of extremist groups, the spread of
transnational terrorism, and threaten national security. These deep-seated fears have set in
motion the unequal treatment and racial discrimination of Palestinian refugees as well as the
demands for Syrian refugees’ immediate return. Similar to Palestinians, Syrians are denied any
civil and social rights under the pretext of tawteen, the danger of resettlement. Security rationale
is just one manifestation of systemic and epidemic racism toward Palestinians and Syrians in
Lebanon. Electoral volatility has been low in both countries during these years and therefore has
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not impacted the government policies toward refugees. AKP has remained in power in Turkey
and sectarian elites have continued to dominate Lebanese politics.
Shifting the focus to Europe, I argue that the low level of securitization in Germany and
the high level of securitization in France are closely linked with electoral volatility. Electoral
volatility, the degree of change between election results, has been historically higher in France
than in Germany as shown in Figure 2. Additionally, the risk posed by the centrist right-wing
voters’ shift to the far-right due to the enactment of pro-refugee policies in Germany was eased
to a great extent by a type of cordon sanitaire, other parties’ exclusion of AfD from coalitions.
Therefore, although Chancellor Merkel’s pro-refugee policies decreased the CDU’s popular
support in the 2017 elections and increased the AfD’s vote share, the probability of a coalition
being formed without the CDU in 2021 still seems to be very low in German politics.
Whereas under the semi-presidential system, the risk posed by the rise of the far-right
party, the National Rally (NR), has been higher in France as observed in the second round of
presidential elections in 2017 which was held between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen.
Coupled with the more unfavorable public opinion on receiving refugees in France in general,
French Presidents Francois Hollande and Emmanuel Macron have been constrained by a higher
electoral risk (Fourquet, 2015). As a result, by skillfully managing the pressures coming from the
EU institutions, they have been able to avoid adopting any expansive pro-refugee policy and
remain indifferent toward the plight of refugees. During these years, as shown in Figure 3,
immigration has become the most salient policy issue in Europe evidencing voters’ increased
susceptibility to the issue. This section described the research question and argument of the
study. The following section will discuss the study’s contributions to the securitization literature.
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Figure 2
Electoral Volatility in France and Germany

Figure 3
Issue Salience in the EU between 2010 and 2018
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Securitization
In the literature securitization has been viewed in a wide range of ways: as a heuristic
device, as a rupture or change in the shared understanding of what is to be understood, and
collectively responded to as a threat (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998), and as a form of
governmentality (Bigo, 2002). I concur with the view of securitization as a form of
governmentality. As suggested by the Copenhagen school, public issues might be treated in three
different ways in a political environment: non-politicized, politicized, and securitized (Emmers,
2011).
First, non-politicized issues refer to the issues that are not important to the state and
therefore not included in public debates or political campaigning. Second, politicized issues are
those that entail state involvement such as regulating, controlling, and decision-making. Finally,
securitized issues are those perceived as threatening to the security of a referent object, which
can be the state, borders, society, culture, and environment therefore necessitating extraordinary
measures. Forced migration typically falls under the second category. The process of
securitization moves forced migration from the area of politicized into the area of securitized. A
reverse process called desecuritization in which forced migration is moved from the area of
securitized into the area of politicized might also occur. Figure 4 demonstrates this classification
of public issues along with the processes of securitization and desecuritization.
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Figure 4.
Categorization of Public Issues and Processes of Securitization and Desecuritization

The securitization process involves several actors and is reified through utterance of
securitizing speech acts and the adoption of extraordinary measures. Beginning with the actors,
the securitization process involves a securitizing actor and a relevant audience. The securitizing
actor positions an issue primarily as a matter of security, calling for emergency measures. This
study takes political elites as the main securitizing actors. I characterize political elites as either
proposing competing security conceptions or remaining silent about forced migration. On the
other hand, the audience refers to those the securitizing speech acts attempt to convince to accept
the exceptional procedures (Buzan et al., 1998: 41). Having analyzed a large qualitative data set,
I identify two types of audiences: domestic and international. Domestic audience refers to the
government, public, and political parties. The international audience refers to donor states and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that provide aid and assistance for
refugees.
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My case studies show that audience influences the use of the speech acts concerning
Syrian refugees. For example, Lebanese politicians employ a more securitizing rhetoric that
points to the country’s enduring capacity problem when confronted with an international
audience. The discrepancy between the rhetoric employed in front of international and domestic
audiences is partly related to the Lebanese statesmen’s desire to attract more funding. Finally, the
referent object refers to the entity or sector claimed to be threatened and urged to be protected by
the securitizing actor. I identify five referent objects concerning forced migration: borders, state,
economy, society, and environment.
Regarding the securitizing moves, speech acts and extraordinary measures, this research
describes patterns based on its qualitative content analysis. A securitizing speech act concerning
Syrian refugees consists of two parts. The first part involves a threat claim, and the second part
proposes an extraordinary policy in response. Securitizing speech act is a special type of speech
act whose expected effect is to invoke fear and justify the adoption of exceptional policy
measures. Moreover, I identify desecuritizing speech acts, such speech acts whose expected
effect is humanitarianization. Their linguistic structure is the same, but the content of the claims
made, or the policies suggested is different. The first part of such speech acts includes a
humanitarian claim, and the second part proposes a humanitarian policy.
Speech acts are important for two reasons. First, they serve agenda setting and framing.
Exposure to speech acts increases the salience of an issue among voters. Secondly, they
influence political behavior. The voters exposed to speech acts in an issue area are more likely to
vote for a party that promises to handle that issue. The securitizing and desecuritizing speech acts
are coded simultaneously in this study. The underlying assumption is that they are performed in
relation to or in reaction to one other in a dynamic security field, where actors seek to justify
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their security claims and undermine those of their competitors. Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide
some samples of securitizing and desecuritizing speech acts observed in the collected media data
set.
Figure 5
Securitizing Speech Acts Relevant to Forced Migration

Figure 6
Desecuritizing Speech Acts Relevant to Forced Migration
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The other securitizing move is exceptional policies. Exceptionality refers to the
suspension of regular practices or important changes in regular practices. What constitutes
normal and exceptional policy measures differs based on the context. In a country where refugee
laws have traditionally been generous, it might mean passing a restrictive refugee law or granting
refugees a lesser status because of security concerns. Whereas in a country where refugee laws
have traditionally been stringent, it might mean closing the borders completely, delegating the
management of refugee affairs exclusively to the security apparatus, instituting discriminatory
measures, or confiscating refugees’ properties.
Providing some context-based insights, for example, despite Germany’s overall generous
policies, BAMF’s (German Federal Office for Migration) decision to grant subsidiary protection
to Syrians instead of refugee status based on newly enacted laws in 2016 was a suspension of the
country’s regular practices and exceptional in the German context. This degradation in legal
categorization caused Syrians to obtain a residency permit for only a shorter period and inhibited
their access to family reunification rights. In contrast, in Lebanon, the government’s January
2015 decisions banned the entry of refugees ending the country’s open-door policies, suspended
the UNCHR’s registration of refugees, and brought the requirement of sponsorship for the
renewal of residency permits for those Syrians who have not registered with the UNHCR
(Janmyr, 2016). These measures, mostly applicable to Syrian nationals and much more
restrictive compared to measures introduced in other countries, were the embodiment of
exceptional policymaking in Lebanon.
Additionally, I identify patterns of desecuritizing policies introduced to reverse the
process of securitization concerning Syrian refugees. Similar to securitizing policies,
desecuritizing policies also require context-specific metrics. Nevertheless, a set of policies such
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as introducing inclusive and generous refugee laws, improving compliance with the international
refugee regime, and opening otherwise closed or strictly protected borders to refugees appear to
be some of the most common desecuritizing policies. Table 1 presents some samples of
securitizing and desecuritizing policies and Figure 7 illustrates the actors and components of the
process of securitization.
Table 1
Securitizing and Desecuritizing Policies

Figure 7
Actors and Components of Securitization

To document and trace speech acts and policies concerning Syrian refugees in case
countries, I created a news data set. I searched online databases such as ProQuest, Nexis Uni,
Newsbank, and national newspapers’ archives for a variety of formal and informal keywords
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used to define Syrian refugees such as Syrians, Syrian refugees, displaced Syrians, Syrian
asylum seekers, Syrian immigrants, and Syrian guests in Turkish, Arabic, and English. The
searches helped identify around 5,000 news, commentaries, and editorials. The newspaper
articles were important because they enabled me to locate and document political elites’
discursive and non-discursive practices and understand the context in which these practices were
taking place.
The main unit of observation coded and analyzed in this study is the text. “Text” is best
regarded as a semantic unit: a unit not of form but meaning (Halliday & Hasan, 2014). Through
the combination of a priori knowledge of the research topic and a general understanding of the
content of the sample gained through a close reading of the articles, I coded those texts that
verbalized and revealed an opinion, attitude, or stance toward Syrian refugees or reported a type
of event that involved or concerned them. I used Atlas.ti to create and assign codes. However, I
should note that no lexicon of securitization in the languages that I collected data (English,
Arabic, and Turkish) existed, nor did there exist a qualitative data analysis program that
automatically maps and establishes the degree and frequency of securitization by examining a
text. I, therefore, read the texts in-depth and assigned the codes manually.
Media reflects as well as shapes public opinion and their political behavior. However, in
this study, I only focused on the media’s role as a mechanism, as a communicator, and conveyor
of securitizing practices, and did not characterize it as an independent security actor. Table 2
displays the highly circulated newspapers from which articles were drawn. These newspapers
hold different positions on the political spectrum with their distinct ideologies. To determine
their ideological leanings, I checked the Media Bias Database.
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Table 2
Newspaper Ideologies

This study makes five important contributions to the securitization literature. First, it
operationalizes both linguistic and non-linguistic manifestations of securitization and offers a
coding scheme that allows for a systematic and comparative analysis of the actors and
components of the process of securitization. I code texts in terms of date, source, audience, type,
subject, object, and function. I provide below some samples of coded texts.
Text 1: “France’s parliament signed into a controversial asylum and immigration bill to limit
[Syrian refugee] arrivals” 01.08.2018, France24
Text 2: “German Foreign minister Steinmeier said it is our moral duty to grant refuge to these
people [Syrian refugees] because we need to adhere to our European values against which our
actions will be measured.” 12.19.2015, Der Spiegel
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Table 3
Coding Actors and Components of Process of Securitization

Second, based on quantitative content analysis as shown in Figure 8 2, this study
differentiates between different levels of securitization and offers a typology. I identify four
categories. The first category is “successful securitization,” where actors’ speeches and policies
toward Syrian refugees are primarily driven by security concerns. I argue that Lebanon falls into
this first category of securitization. The second category is “strategic securitization” where there
is not much talk or deliberation on Syrian refugees, but a lot of restrictive policies driven by
security concerns are instituted. I argue that France falls into this second category.
The third category is “failed securitization,” where although some actors’ speeches are
primarily driven by security concerns, they fail to provoke securitizing policies. I argue that
Germany and Turkey fall into this third category of securitization. The fourth category is no
securitization cases where neither speeches nor policies toward Syrian refugees are motivated by
security concerns. These cases could provide important insights when contrasted with successful
and failed cases of securitization. This proposed typology is grounded in a decisionist view of
securitization.3 Although securitization is predominantly framed as a specific form of speech act,

A securitizing move is numerically coded as “1,” and a desecuritizing move as “-1.” Discursive and non-discursive
securitization scores for a country in a specific year are equal to the sum of all of the respective securitizing and
desecuritizing moves divided by the total number of observations.

2

3

This linguistic vs. decisionist conceptualization of securitization has been one of the central themes of securitization literature
(Balzacq, 2005, 2010; McDonald, 2008; Roe, 2008; Salter, 2010; Stritzel, 2007).
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I attach more analytical value to action and only classify those cases in which securitizing speech
acts were accompanied by securitizing policies as successful cases of securitization.
Figure 8
Discursive vs. Non-Discursive Securitization in Case Countries

Table 4
Categories of Securitization

Third, this study broadens the empirical scope of the securitization theory by exploring
non-European contexts. Securitization Theory has been criticized for having little relevance
outside Europe and failing to propose context-specific metrics (Ilgit and Klotz, 2018). The case
studies on Turkey and Lebanon provide context-based securitization narratives and demonstrate
how securitization emerges and evolves in non-European contexts.
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Fourth, this study advances our understanding of the sources of securitization by
proposing a domestic political context-based theory. Securitization theory has identified
conditions for successful securitization but has overlooked contextual factors that constrain and
facilitate the securitization process (Bourbeau 2011). Similar characterizations of domestic and
international political contexts could be beneficial to study complex political phenomena such as
globalization, democratization, authoritarianization, polarization, and others.
Fifth, reflecting the increasing relevance and strength of the securitization theory, this
study reveals how the securitization of forced migration is a multi-actor,4 multi-level, multisectoral, inter-subjective, iterative, contextual, and power-dependent phenomenon. In practical
terms, such an actor (e.g., members of the cabinet or members of the opposition party) may
present the forced migration of one group, but not of other groups, as a security threat. Or such
an event may be portrayed as a security threat by one of the securitizing actors but not others.
Considering this intricate nature of security, the central objective of a security study should not
be to understand whether the threat concerns raised in a specific context are real or imaginary, 5
but rather to elucidate how the logic(s) and conflicts of security shaping the practices and
attitudes of securitizing actors emerge, spread, change, or disappear.

“Multi-actor analysis” here refers to the multiplicity of securitizing actors and referent objects. “Inter-subjectivity” refers to the
idea that securitization is collectively created or, in constructivist terminology, co-constituted by the actions of a group of actors
operating in the same security scene.
5
Just as a side note, analyzing whether threat concerns raised in a situation are real or speculative necessitates ascertaining both
willingness and capacity of the actor claimed to pose a security threat. In cases where actors do not express willingness, or do
express willingness but lack the capacity to inflict damage on a designated enemy, the validity and proportionality of the threat
construction should be called into question.
4
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Policy Implications of the Securitization of Forced Migration and Normative Stance of
Study
Securitization is fundamental to the analysis of states’ forced migration policies for
several reasons. First, it transforms an ordinary situation into an urgent one and causes a state to
suspend its regular policies.6 States do not hesitate to implement extreme measures when they
feel their security is threatened. Second, securitization frames states’ concerns as a zero-sum
game, in which an actor can gain benefits only at the cost of other actors. 7 Third, securitization
silences opposition and gives policymakers opportunities to exploit threat perceptions for
domestic purposes and handle issues with fewer democratic constraints. Fourth, securitization
legitimizes the diversion of resources to preferred issues.
Along with significant empirical interests, this project was driven by a normative stance
that opposes the securitization of refugees, for this threatens human rights, peaceful coexistence,
freedom, and justice (Buonfino, 2004). A state, society, or global community inclined to assess
refugee issues primarily through the prism of national security is not healthy, for this is a
symptom of paranoia produced by an irrational sense of fear, suspicion, and mistrust. Moreover,
securitization hinders fair, united, and coordinated international responses to humanitarian
tragedies. Hence, this study also seeks to offer practical guidelines on how to desecuritize
refugee issues; bring them into the normal sphere of policymaking; and foster a rights-based,
coexistence-oriented, and long-term approach toward refugees. 8
From another angle, one might also problematize the absence of just securitization,
namely, a type of securitization in which only the issues that pose an “objective” security threat

6

The ordering and endangering effect of securitization.
The conditioning effect of securitization.
8
As maintained by Wæver, we, as individuals comprising states and institutions, are responsible for our securitizing attitudes.
7
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are regarded and responded to as such and securitization is made to serve humanitarianism and
human emancipation instead of the power holders and elites (Watson, 2011; Booth, 2007; Floyd,
20119). If that were achieved, then securitization might not be inherently problematic. For
example, framing global climate change as an international security issue rather than as an
environmental problem could help place it on the international agenda and overcome some of the
constraints to devising effective policy responses.
Just securitization at the global level would be a type of securitization in which the issues
that threaten the human conditions and our capabilities to the greatest extent- such as climate
change, hunger, lack of clean water, the outbreak of contagious diseases, social and gender
inequalities, crimes, and uneven outcomes or negative externalities of globalization-are presented
as necessitating priority and immediate consideration and treatment. As it has been made
painfully clear to everyone by the far-reaching effects of the coronavirus pandemic, there is an
extremely high level of security interdependence among states, societies, and individuals in a
globalizing world and newly emerging supranational security threats are different in form, scale,
and speed requiring urgent and coordinated responses from the international community.
Similarly, forced migration is an outcome of global security inequities. A just
securitization would require the international community and host governments to form
alternative narratives, listen to refugees’ stories, and respond to their situations. Despite the
liberal pride in the universality of human rights, the perception of “human” and “culture” is still
highly territorialized and rooted in the nation-state order (Zeno, 2017). We are living in a world

9

Floyd specifies three conditions for just securitization: there must be an objective existential threat (i.e., a threat that endangers
the survival of an actor or order regardless of whether anyone has realized this), the referent object of security must be morally
legitimate (i.e., the referent object is conducive to human well-being, defined as the satisfaction of human needs), and the security
response must be appropriate to the threat in question (i.e., that (a) the security response must be measured in accordance with the
capabilities of the aggressor and (b) the securitizing actor must be sincere in his or her intentions).
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where goods move across international borders far more freely than human beings, which attests
to the triumph of economic liberalism over political liberalism. It is impossible to conceptualize
the ethical responsibilities of human communities and their political practices toward refugees in
any other way under the strict logic of sovereignty. States hold on to the right to regulate entry as
a fundamental concomitant of their sovereignty (Zolberg, 1983) and also, either explicitly or
implicitly, recognize homogeneity as a prerequisite for peace, law, and order (Bigo, 2002).
Absolute justice would require that one’s life chances not be dependent on arbitrary facts,
so the freedom to move across borders would be regarded as a basic right. But this is only
agreeable in theory, for it is a political non-starter within the nation-state system (Price, 2009).
Refugees, hence, provide a sobering reminder of the limits of liberal solidarist change within the
international society (Hurrell, 2007). Displacement only becomes an international issue when it
exceeds a nation’s borders. Consistent with this logic, although Syria now contains 6 million
displaced people internally, the international community has mostly problematized external
displacement, because only it poses an imminent and ostensible threat to the protection of
borders.
Presenting uprootedness, an exceptionally tragic and traumatic human experience, only as
a dominant national security threat manipulates the concept and is a form of modern racism
(Ibrahim, 2005, p. 163) that distorts the public’s perception of refugees and facilitates their
formal and informal exclusion. Securitization of refugees transforms them from victims of events
in one state to targets of the institutions, public, or elites in another, impeding or delaying the
normalization of their human existence in space and time again.
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Terminology
Refuge
“Refuge” is a timeless social phenomenon. However, the way it is understood today is a
consequence of the existing international system, which is composed of nation-states that rule
over clearly demarcated borders, identify themselves with reference to a dominant ethnic group
and culture, and recognize an individual’s existence only in relation to his or her political and
legal membership in a society (Benhabib, 2004; Haddad, 2008). In the absence of the modern
nation-state, all contemporary distinctions such as insider vs. outsider, citizen vs. non-citizen,
legal vs. illegal resident, and internal displacement vs. international displacement would be
inconceivable. Thus refuge, in its modern form, is a direct but unintended consequence of the
Westphalian international system and is created when the link between the state, territory, and
citizen is broken (Haddad, 2008, p. 63). The nation-state’s hierarchical or layered approach
toward human security prioritizes the security of “the citizen” over that of “the non-citizen” and
territorializes protection. In reality, refugeehood deprives individuals of legal personhood in the
sense that they often lose the right to action and speech when they become refugees (Gundogdu,
2015).
With the establishment of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees) in 1950, protecting refugees began to be framed as an international responsibility and
was placed under the mandate and authority of an international organization. Initially, the main
objective of the newly emerging international refugee regime was to resettle World War II
refugees, primarily Jews who had been subjected to war crimes and deported by European
countries. This also marked the beginning of a transition from a group-based to an individualapplication-based refugee admission system. In the meantime, the 1948 Arab Israeli War and the
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June 1967 War engendered one of the most pressing refugee issues, the Palestinian Refugee
Problem. Soon after, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) was founded to address Palestinian refugee issues. Some 5 million
people today remain under its mandate and benefit from its services.
The Cold War competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was also reflected in
their refugee policies. Both countries viewed refugee admission as a means to harm the other’s
image. Loescher and Scanlan’s Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door,
1945–Present (1986) powerfully illustrates how ideological concerns shaped the U.S. refugee
policies throughout this period. They argue that the U.S. treated Cuban refugees more generously
than Haitian refugees because accepting the former was regarded as a victory over communism.
This also presented the U.S. with the means to interfere in a communist state’s domestic affairs.
Notoriously, the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, comprising a group of Cuban refugees and
expatriates, was financed, and trained by the CIA to overthrow Fidel Castro.
In the post–Cold War era, countries overwhelmed by domestic conflict and strife like
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Congo, Somalia, Colombia, Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, and
Ukraine have become the top refugee-sending countries. Syria’s ongoing civil war has produced
the highest number of refugees since the Second World War, almost 6 million people. As of
2022, there were 26.4 million refugees in the world. Developing countries host more than 86% of
them, compared with 70% a decade ago. The country hosting the largest number of refugees in
absolute numbers is Turkey, with close to 4 million refugees. In terms of the refugee-topopulation ratio, the top refugee-hosting countries are Lebanon, Jordan, and Chad (UNHCR,
2021). Due to the escalation of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine, Poland and Romania have also
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begun to host large numbers of refugees. As of this writing, the number of Ukraine refugees is
over 6 million (UNHCR, 2022).
Refugee
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol define
“refugee” as “a person who owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.” It is imperative to note that involuntary migration caused by abject poverty or
climate change is not identified as a legal ground for filing refugee protection claims. Similarly,
non-state-actors-led persecution or gender-based persecution is not one of the five asylum
grounds set out in the convention. For an asylum seeker to obtain refugee status in a signatory
state, they are not only required to meet the conditions established in the convention, but also in
the domestic law of the country in which they applied for asylum.
In practice, the 1951 Convention only provides a refugee with the right to seek asylum
and not to be returned forcefully to their home country until a decision has been made on their
application. It is, therefore, not a guarantee for asylum in any signatory state. All of the 147
countries that have signed it are only obligated to evaluate an asylum seeker’s eligibility for
refugee status when they arrive at their borders.
This process of evaluation is called “refugee status determination” (RSD). It constitutes
the legal backdrop of the obligations and responsibilities of governments as well as the UNHCR
toward refugees. Although the responsibility of, or right to, RSD is principally held by the states,
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the UNHCR may also conduct RSD unilaterally or jointly depending on how much power and
authority the states in question wish to transfer to the organization. During the RSD process, a
refugee application might be solely evaluated on paper or in person. The in-person meeting
might take the form of a casual conversation or be held in a courtroom and feel like a trial
(Hamlin, 2014).
This is the legal ground for individual refugee applications. However, it is important to
note that refuge mostly emerges as the actual and immediate flight of people into neighboring
countries in massive numbers, known as “conflict-induced collective refuge.” Legal responses of
states and non-state actors vary significantly in case of a conflict-induced refugee flow. For
instance, pressured by emergency and time constraints the UNHCR determines the eligibility of
individuals for refugee status on a prima facie basis (based on the first impression) as opposed to
conducting standard RSD. Similarly, neighboring countries facing a crisis prefer to accord
provisional or secondary protection statuses to individuals with refugee claims rather than
conventional refugee status. While providing blanket protection and saving lives, TPS leaves
beneficiaries in “legal limbo” where their residency is not viewed as permanent and is extended
periodically.
In the same way, the refuge of Syrians refers to two discrete processes: individualasylum-application-based admissions and prima facie group-based admissions. To characterize
the nature of the selected countries’ admissions, Germany and France, as periphery countries,
have mostly resettled Syrian refugees based on their applications with the German exception in
September 2015 when the country admitted hundreds of thousands of refugees stranded in
Budapest in massive numbers without conducting individual RSD. Whereas Turkey and
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Lebanon, Syria’s immediate neighbors, have mainly taken in Syrian refugees on a prima facie
basis.
Durable Solutions
After refugees are admitted into a country, a new set of policy options, known as
“durable solutions” (e.g., voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration), become
available for any state that is a party to the refugee convention. Beginning with voluntary
repatriation, refugees may return to their home country if political conditions that caused them to
flee change. Repatriation must be lawful and voluntary. Refugees might not be forced to return
to their country of origin against their own will. However, unfortunately, if refugees refuse to
return, repatriation often takes an involuntary form. Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan as well
as Congolese refugees in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda have all been subjected to
policies of forced repatriation for many years.
As conditions motivating their flight do not easily change, the local integration of
refugees emerges as the most viable policy option right from the beginning. However,
integration is not just another policy option, but rather a complex process that requires
incorporating refugees into the host country’s political and social systems through the provision
of rights and services. Its failure may lead to the political mobilization of refugees. Finally, if
refugees cannot integrate or find appropriate protection in the first country of asylum, then their
transfer to a third country may appear as a viable policy option. However, only a small number
of refugees are resettled every year in developed countries after being subjected to rigorous
screening processes. Resettlement tends to be the primary yet insufficient humanitarian response
of the global North to the refugee crises taking place in the global South.
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Refugees may live in a country with no prospects for the implementation of any of these
durable solutions, known as protracted refugee situations. Representing some of the worst
protracted refugee situations, half a million Somalians have been living in Kenya’s Dadaab
refugee camp for twenty-five years, and 1.5 million Palestinian refugees have been living in
several Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese refugee camps since 1948 (UNHCR, 2011)
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews Securitization theory, which is the central theoretical perspective
that informs this research. The first section surveys the literature on the concept of securitization.
The second section considers the studies on the concept of desecuritization. Finally, the third
section examines the literature on the impacts of refugees on different sectors of security.
Securitization
Security is one of the most contested concepts in the discipline of international relations.
The classical realist notion of security is objective as well as war- and state-centric (Walt, 1991,
p. 3). Realism primarily views states as security-maximizing entities that operate under a selfhelp system. Its proponents, therefore, define security as a state’s capability to defend itself when
its adversaries are threatening its borders and inhabitants. On the contrary, alternative approaches
do not privilege the state and also examine security at the individual and global levels by
considering nonviolent threats to human life (Booth, 2007; Buzan, 1998).
Non-realist approaches do not consider maximizing security by building up arms supplies
a desirable outcome because such attempts are often accompanied by increasing militarization
and heightened nationalism. They also view security as a relative and relational condition that
results from the actions and interactions of a myriad of actors. Applying these approaches to
refugee studies, for example, a state’s policies designed to increase its citizens’ security by
restricting the entry of refugees may decrease the latter’s security because their rejection puts
their lives in grave danger. What Richard Falk asserts for international relations theories is also
accurate for the concept of security: “Security is always for someone and some purpose,” he
explains, and might not be thought of as independent from power and political considerations.
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Human security does not rest on weapons, but on protecting human dignity. In the last
analysis, it is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, an ethnic tension that did not
explode, a dissident who was not silenced, and a human spirit that was not crushed (Haq & Staff,
1995, p. 116). A more secure world can only be constructed by building a global community
among peoples from the bottom up as argued by David Mitrany. 10 In the same vein, the United
Nations Development Program’s 1994 Human Development Report described security both as
freedom from fear and freedom from want. Although the former might be interpreted in military
terms in a narrow sense, the latter is primarily about satisfying people’s essential needs and
reflects the broader conceptualization of security.
A critical approach toward security, one underpinned by an interest in clarifying what
counts as successful and unsuccessful securitization, how security is socially and politically
constructed, and who is empowered or marginalized by securitization in a particular context, is
more essential to understanding the politics of security than the reductionist realist approach,
which restricts security to the material capability to fend off a threat. As claimed by members of
the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, an issue, whether it is military in nature or not, can
be positioned as a security issue through “speech acts”11 and come to be perceived as a threat.
This reflective and interpretive approach is securitization theory’s major contribution to security
studies.

10

This may also be described as building security communities. Prominent political scientist Karl Deutsch coined this concept in
1957 to refer to the situation in which a number of actors reach agreement on at least one point that common social problems
must and can be resolved only by processes of peaceful change. This process is facilitated by mutual trust, sympathy, and interest
conceptualizations. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett applied the security community framework to explain the rise of
international organizations at the regional level such as the EU, NATO, Mercosur, and ASEAN. See Emanuel Adler and Michael
Barnett (1998). Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11
A “securitizing speech act” refers to an utterance that presents something as a threat and calls for an urgent and extraordinary
response. It might also come in the form of a warning to an aggressor or a promise to protect a referent object. Importantly, not
all speech acts are equal. Only when such speech acts are performed by politicians, as well as holders of position and power, they
may serve to establish a political agenda and get things done easily and speedily by putting them into an urgent category.
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This theory has been defined in various ways: as a conceptual move, a specific form of
speech act or heuristic device, a discontinuity, a rupture or change in the shared understanding of
what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde,
1998), governmentality (Bigo, 2002), an empirical theory with specified criteria for successful
securitization, and as a political theory of security (Guzzini, 2011). This study is also grounded
in a conceptualization of securitization as governmentality. The Securitization framework has
been applied to the analysis of a wide range of issues including foreign policy behavior
(Abrahamsen, 2005), the construction of transnational crime (Emmers, 2003), HIV/AIDS (Elbe,
2006), various dimensions of the war on terror (Buzan, 2006), minority rights (Roe, 2004), the
transformation of the UNHCR’s forced migration discourse (Hammerstad, 2010), the impacts of
images on threat perceptions (Hansen, 2011; Williams, 2003; Campbell & Shapiro, 2007), the
impacts of emotional narratives on securitization (Van Rythoven 2015), the bureaucratic
processes underlying securitization (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2011), and social psychology about
securitization (Theiler, 2003).
Desecuritization
Desecuritization is distinct from successful and failed forms of securitization. Hansen
(2012) discusses its various meanings: as the supplement to securitization, 12 as the restoration of
the public sphere for political contestation and deliberation, 13 and as responsibility.14
Notwithstanding, some securitization theorists (Buzan et al., 1998) view it only as a preferred
long-range option or as mostly technical and managerial (Huysmans, 1998).

Derived from Schmittian’s understanding of politics that rests on enemy-friend grouping in a society.
Derived from Arendtian view of politics, in which communicative action is held to be essential to doing politics and building a
community.
14
Derived from Waever’s understanding of desecuritization.
12

13
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I view desecuritization as a form of reaction to securitization, one that might involve
discussing an already securitized issue within the normal boundaries of politics and
policymaking, reversing the extraordinary policy measures enacted in a case, or introducing a
new set of measures to alleviate the impacts of extraordinary measures. As far as refugees are
concerned, successful desecuritization would lead to a situation in which refugee issues would be
predominantly viewed and responded to as a matter of policy. Desecuritization sometimes might
require an actor to change its view of itself and others (Hansen, 2012) or constrain securitizing
actors’ capacity to engender collective fears (Van Rythoven, 2015). Security specialist Lene
Hansen identifies four ways of desecuritization. The first one is change through stabilization in
which an issue gradually moves out of security discourse and thereby causes the friend-enemy
distinction to disappear. This leads to the rise of less militaristic and less violent forms of
political engagement as exemplified by détente during the Cold War.
The second one is replacement in which one securitized issue/actor is replaced with
another. As far as immigration is concerned, after a new immigrant group joins a community,
existing immigrant groups might slowly become less of a target for public criticism and anger.
The historical evolution of religious intolerance toward different communities in the United
States might help illustrate replacement of security issues and actors. For example, antiCatholicism and anti-Semitism were features of American religious rhetoric in the 19th century.
Jews were banned from entering public service and working in certain sectors. Similarly, there
was a widely held belief preached by some of the country’s most prominent ministers, that
Catholics would, if permitted, turn the US over to the Pope (Davis, 2010). Even as late as the
1960s, Catholic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy felt compelled to make a major speech
declaring that he would not accept instructions on public policy from the Pope (Kennedy, 1960).
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Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, anti-Muslim sentiments, and religiously
motivated hate crimes against Muslims in the US skyrocketed. There was a perceptible shift in
the characterization of the threat posed by American Muslims (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa,
2010, p. 8). Today Muslim identity has replaced all other religious identities in terms of its
classification as the primary national security threat as reflected in the Trump administration’s
Muslim bans in 2017.
The third one is rearticulation, which leads to removing an issue from the security
discourse by offering solutions to the threats and grievances raised in reaction to it. The Good
Friday agreement of 1998, which terminated the long-held political and sectarian conflict
in Northern Ireland, is perhaps a good example of this. Although it occurs rarely, rearticulation is
the best solution to securitization.
The fourth one is silencing, which happens when an issue fails to register 15 in the security
discourse mostly because security speech is prevented. As I argue in the next chapter, the
situation in Turkey concerning Syrian refugees, where public and political opposition present
them as a threat in various forms despite the government’s resistance, exemplifies this form of
desecuritization. This form is a short-term and undemocratic solution to securitization, for it
delays the solution and pushes the problem into the background.
The only viable solutions to securitizing refugee issues are rearticulation and change
through stabilization. The case studies will provide more insights into how these divergent forms
might play out as far as refugees are concerned. The existing research mostly identified and
analyzed the conditions of successful securitization. Successful desecuritization is

15
This said, it should be clarified that not every issue that did not register as securitization registers as desecuritization. An issue
might also register as an issue of policy and politics, as discussed in the preceding section.
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undertheorized and understudied, and future studies may seek to identify criteria for it and
thereby contribute to our understanding of the concept.
Note that all these forms of desecuritization are susceptible to setbacks and that a
successfully desecuritized issue might be resecuritized (i.e., recursive securitization). A prime
example of this can be found in the recent episodes of Turkish–Syrian relations. Throughout the
1990s Damascus provided support to the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which Ankara
classifies as a separatist movement, and this brought about the securitization of Turkish–Syrian
relations. The countries came very close to war in 1998. However, this relationship entered a
period of détente in the 2000s, symbolized by the formation of a close friendship between then
Prime Minister Erdogan and President Assad. However, the outbreak of civil war in Syria in
2011 turned the relationship upside down. Ankara supported the Free Syrian Army (FYS) against
President Assad. Rather quickly, their relationship reverted to the status quo ante and entered a
new wave of securitization.
Refugees and Security
According to the Copenhagen School, various sectors, or domains of security (e.g.,
military, political, societal, economic, and environmental) may, when massive human
movements are involved, be presented as threats. Starting with political threats, these arise from
events and developments that disrupt a state’s territorial integrity and institutional stability
(Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 120). Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) contend that the
presence of refugees may pose a political threat to the host country in many ways. First, refugee
flows may bring in combatants, arms, and ideologies from neighboring states and thus facilitate
the conflict’s spread to the host country. Second, refugee populations may provide resources and
support to the host country’s domestic opposition groups of similar ethnicity or political faction.
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Third, refugee flows may change the host country’s ethnic balance and thereby incite discontent
among local populations. Fourth, refugees may become primary targets for recruitment into
militia units or terrorism.
Refugees are also claimed to pose a threat to the host community’s social cohesion by
contributing to people’s fears of losing their identity. In such cases, the referent object of
securitization changes from the state to “we” and the ways in which a culture and an identity are
imagined and lived (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Such securitization is also driven by a decision
regarding who does and does not belong to a society. Often “state” is conflated with “society” as
a referent object. State and societal security would only be the same if their boundaries were
completely fused or blurred (Theiler, 2003, p. 252).
Samuel Huntington is perhaps the most prominent political scientist to argue that cultural
and religious identities would be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. The
Clash of Civilizations depicted non-Western civilizations, particularly Islamic civilization, as a
potential threat to the Western world. On the other hand, his The Hispanic Challenge presented
the high levels of Hispanic immigration as a danger to the country’s Anglo-Protestant national
heritage. Both works proposed societal threat conceptualizations based on a designated other’s
perceived foreignness and differentness. Securitization of refugee identities mostly depends on
whether the holders of a collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or a relatively openminded view of how their identity is constructed and should be maintained (Buzan et al., 1998, p.
23).
Like the political threat perception, the societal threat perception varies from actor to
actor in each society. For example, Lebanese Sunnis did not view Syrian Sunni refugees as a
threat, whereas the Maronite Christian patriarch declared that Syria’s regime was the closest to
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democracy in the Arab world and took a more neutral and cautious position toward them (Betts,
2011, p. 25). Furthermore, political parties take divergent positions on the social impact of
refugee admission. For instance, unlike centrist parties, far-right political parties in Austria,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Hungary have presented refugees as a threat to the national
culture and called for stricter admission policies since the inception of the Syrian refugee crisis.
Lastly, refugees are portrayed as an economic threat for several reasons. First, some
people claim that they destabilize the host country’s economy by dragging down wages,
provoking an abrupt increase in prices, and taking labor-intensive jobs from natives. Second,
they are criticized for placing serious economic burdens on the host government by draining
public resources. There is often little empirical evidence to substantiate these claims, which
mainly draw on a false assumption that refugees affect all of the host country’s economic groups
and sectors in the same way and to the same degree. Nevertheless, while refugee arrivals often
benefit actors on the supply side of an economy (e.g., providers of services, goods, jobs, and
housing), it harms the interests of actors on the demand side (e.g., consumers of services, goods,
jobs, and housing) by intensifying the competition over resources.
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Chapter 3
Research Design
Social scientists investigating sensitive humanitarian issues such as states’ refugee
policies often face a dual imperative: their research should be both academically sound and
policy-relevant (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). The main research question raised herein, as well as
the methods proposed to answer it, are guided by this dual imperative. In the broadest sense, this
study is an exploratory empirical endeavor with specific normative foundations. Although my indepth case studies will be grounded in the quantitative and qualitative assessment of the data
gathered, they are designed to provide causal inference narratives rather than proving causality. I
intend to offer systemic explanations for the variation of securitization as regards Syrian refugees
by investigating the actions and reactions of various securitizing actors in divergent political and
social contexts.
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section provides definitions of the key
empirical concepts of the study. The second section explains the study’s case selection and
pairing methods. The third section details the study’s data collection methods. The fourth section
reports the study’s data coding methods. The fifth section describes the study’s data analysis
methods. Finally, the sixth section introduces the study’s hypothesis testing methods.
Definitions
Despite its gradual development and refinement, securitization theory remains
undertheorized and deprived of conceptual precision and rigor. First of all, the wide range of
scholarship (Baldwin, 1997; Balzacq, 2011; Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998; Ejdus, 2017;
Huysmans, 1998; King, 2012) does not offer any rigorous measures or criteria to differentiate
among the various levels and forms of (de)securitization. They take securitization as a
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dichotomous nominal variable rather than a continuous variable and investigate whether it has
been successful or not in a particular context based on the content of speech acts, the enactment
of extraordinary measures, and the extent to which the targeted audience has accepted the speech
act.
Second, most securitization studies choose to focus on a few securitizing discursive and
non-discursive practices to validate their claims. They do not ascertain whether those practices
hold qualitative and quantitative significance or whether they are consistent with the entirety of
both practices performed within a given context about the same subject matter. A few
securitizing practices or the securitizing practices of a few actors should not be taken as a basis
upon which systemic inferences are built unless they account for most of the change in the level
of securitization. To be able to draw reliable inferences about the securitization of an issue, first
and foremost the quantitative and qualitative significance of the relevant securitizing practices
need to be established.
This study’s conceptualization of successful and failed securitization is developed against
this theoretical and methodological background. I propose three measures to differentiate
successful from failed securitization: checking the intensity and frequency of the securitizing
discursive practices performed by the actors about the subject matter in question, checking the
intensity and frequency of securitizing non-discursive practices, and checking if and to what
extent securitizing discursive practices (speech) were reflected in non-discursive practices
(policy).
According to this framework, securitizing practices might result in four distinct scenarios.
Scenario 1: both securitizing discursive and non-discursive practices might be quantitatively and
qualitatively significant as well as compatible with each other, which I view as an instance of
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successful securitization. Scenario 2: The securitizing discursive practices might be
quantitatively and qualitatively significant, but non-discursive practices might not. In other
words, there might be a lot of sound bites and verbal articulations but not much action. I consider
this an instance of failed securitization, 16 in which securitization is suppressed.
The cases congruent with this scenario are perhaps the most puzzling ones for
securitization theorists, as they warrant an explanation concerning why securitizing discursive
practices failed to provoke action. For instance, despite immense media coverage and
vilification, some issues such as climate change (Atland and Ven Bruusgaard, 2009; McDonald,
2012; Salter, 2011), the spread of infectious diseases, the proliferation of surveillance
technologies, the burgeoning of income disparities, the crisis of liberal democracy, and the lives
of the millions of people on the move have not been designated as significant security threats by
most states (Watson, 2011). Therefore, security issues depicted by the states as deserving the
highest priority do not necessarily reflect the objective circumstances of the world (Balzacq,
Leonard, & Ruzicka, 2016). This is perhaps the most important reason for securitization theory’s
increasing relevance and application today.
Scenario 3: Securitizing non-discursive practices might be quantitatively and
qualitatively significant, but discursive practices might not be on the same level. In such cases
there is no talk or deliberation, but a lot of action. I describe this as an instance of successful
securitization, one in which securitization is imposed. This scenario is grounded in a decisionist
view of securitization. 17 Although securitization is predominantly framed as a specific form of
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Why does securitization fail? In general, securitizing discursive practices may fail for a number of reasons: not knowing how
to invoke security in a given context, not having sufficient power to execute the promise invoked in the speech act, the object
presented as a security threat might not be amenable to securitization, and the audience might reject the securitizing discursive
practices (Ruzicka, 2019, p. 373)
17
This linguistic vs. decisionist conceptualization of securitization has been widely discussed in the literature (Balzacq, 2005,
2010; McDonald, 2008; Roe, 2008; Salter, 2010; Stritzel, 2007).
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speech act, I attach more analytical value to action and thus classify those cases in which
extraordinary measures are enacted even in the absence of discursive securitizing practices as
successful cases of securitization. I contend that invoking security might not be weighted equally
with enacting exceptional security measures. Speech, even when the vocabulary and grammar of
securitizing speech acts, characterized by utterances of survival, panic, and urgency, is perfectly
followed does not establish much without context. Only when security is voiced from a position
of institutional, political, social, and religious power does it have an impact and attain operative
capability.
Scenario 4: Both securitizing discursive and non-discursive practices might not be
quantitatively and qualitatively significant, but nevertheless compatible with each other. I
classify this as a case of no securitization where conditions conducive to securitization are
present but actors do not engage in it. Contrasting the cases of no securitization to the cases of
failed and successful securitization might provide critical insights into securitization. Table 5,
presented below, illustrates these divergent scenarios, all of which might also be generated for
desecuritization.
Table 5
Scenarios or Forms of Securitization
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Third, existing securitization definitions conflate its mechanisms, processes, and
outcomes with securitization itself. Take the following definition as an example: “Securitization
is a set of interrelated practices and processes of their production, diffusion, and reception that
brings threats into being” (Balzacq, 2011, p. 3). Here, it is characterized both as an explanandum
(dependent variable) and explanan (independent variable). The definition is elusive and risks
expanding the analysis of security to an indeterminate degree. To avoid such analytical
obscurity, securitization’s potential function should be clearly indicated in its definition. I,
therefore, treat it only as an effect and define it “as an increasing tendency on the part of the
securitizing actors (government, elites, and public) to discuss an issue primarily with reference to
its potential impacts on different sectors of security (military, political, societal, economic,
environmental) and to take actions against it.”18
The first element of this definition is “discussions” or, in technical terms, “speech acts.”
Such acts are analyzed on three different levels: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. A
locutionary act is what is said and refers to the ostensible meaning of an utterance. An
illocutionary act is what is intended with an utterance – labeling, promising, or commanding.
Finally, a perlocutionary act is the utterance’s expected effect, such as persuasion, fear, or
inspiration. The study of securitizing speech acts is the study of illocutionary acts. As detailed in
the next section, this study codes speech acts and discursive practices in terms of their
illocutionary effect. The second element of this definition is “actions,” namely, all nondiscursive securitizing practices of the state, elites, and public.

18
At the same time, this definition epitomizes the multi-actor and multi-sectoral approach of the Copenhagen School of
Securitization.
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As far as mechanisms, processes, critical junctures, and regimes of securitization are
concerned, I, relying on Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s Contentious Politics (2007), define
mechanism as a delimited class of discursive or non-discursive practices that alter the relations
between specified securitizing actors and securitized objects. In technical terms, it is the type of
securitizing discursive or non-discursive practice, and a securitizing discursive or non-discursive
practice is a unit of a mechanism. Various forms of both securitizing practices constitute the
repertoire of mechanisms. I view admission ceilings, quotas, tightened border controls,
revocation of refugees’ working permits, and their involuntary repatriation as securitizing
mechanisms/practices performed by states; protests, riots, mass demonstrations, public meetings,
strikes, and violent and non-violent tensions as securitizing mechanisms/practices of the public;
and lobbying, agenda setting, and activism that promote the introduction of restrictive admission
and integration policies as securitizing mechanisms/practices of elites.19
On the other hand, I view process as a collection of mechanisms that transform a country’
policies of forced migration. For example, a state’s introduction of a wide range of conservative
and restrictive policies institutionalizes securitization, which I term as a “process of
institutionalization.” The surfacing of different forms of tensions and conflicts between refugee
and local communities sometimes results in the former’s securitization, which I call a “process of
polarization.” When actions motivated by the belief that refugees lead to increased crime rates
turns them into the usual suspects and brings about their securitization, I view this as a “process
of criminalization.” I identify several such processes, among them institutionalization,

19
I am aware that by taking the government, public, and elites as the main securitizing actors, I might risk silencing or
privileging certain voices.
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polarization, manipulation, economization, criminalization, otherization, terrorization, and
instrumentalization, throughout my study. 20
Securitization arises due to a combination of distinct mechanisms and processes that
differ based on the regime type, power configurations, and other context-specific factors. For
instance, in democratic contexts, it is more likely to emerge from negotiated processes, whereas
under authoritarian regimes it is often directly imposed by the state and thus turns the public and
other relevant audiences into passive recipients or observers. I view those events that cause
sudden changes in the local and global perceptions of refugees as critical junctures. For example,
the September 11 attacks and the November 2015 Paris attacks fundamentally impacted the
perception of refugees on the global level, particularly in the West. The ensuing uncertainty after
such terrorist attacks heightens the public’s suspicion of outsiders (Haas & Cunningham, 2014;
Hogg, 2007). The “strange” and “alien” become identified as evil, thereby recycling the desire
for security (Der Derian, 2009).
Lastly, I describe regime as a standardized set of relationships among securitizing actors
concerning a group’s forced migration. For instance, if securitization is largely engendered by
the government’s actions in a particular context and if other securitizing actors (e.g., the public
and elites) have routinized their responses (e.g., inaction, cooptation, or contained/ineffective
opposition), I recognize this as a regime of government-led/top-down securitization. At the
broadest level, I define seven types of (de)securitization regimes: government-led/top-down;
elite-led/top-down; public-led/bottom-up; government and elite-led/top-down; government and

20

The case studies will provide instances of these processes. Just a technical note on instrumentalization: Instrumentalization is a
process in which a securitizing actor benefits from securitization.

46
public-led/parallel; elite and public-led/parallel; and government, elite, and public-led/parallel.
Figure 9 and Figure 10, presented below, illustrate these key concepts of the study.
Figure 9
Practices, Mechanisms, Processes, and Regimes of Securitization

Figure 10
Example of Government, Elite, and Public-led Securitization Regime
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Fourth, harking back to the criticisms of securitization theory, the theory does not also
explain how the audience of a speech act is determined, how its impacts on the audience are
assessed, and how the audience’s acceptance of it is substantiated. Unless securitizing actors
self-report how a securitizing discursive practice 21 has influenced their actions, it is impossible to
trace and locate the actions induced by the speech act. Nevertheless, security specialists
conceptualize securitizing discursive and non-discursive practices both as representative as well
as constitutive of securitization. These two approaches are grounded in divergent epistemologies
and ontologies and therefore require distinct research frameworks.
The former is underlined by the belief that securitizing practices are not independent
from securitization. Therefore, analyzing securitization mostly entails evaluating outside causal
factor(s) or independent variables. Through this perspective, securitization might be observed in
and communicated by a multitude of mediums, including, but not limited to, language.22 This
understanding corresponds with Stritzel’s concept of an externalist reading of securitization that
highlights the need to move beyond its linguistic conceptualizations to make the theory more
comprehensive.
On the other hand, the latter is undergirded by the idea that securitizing practices,
primarily speech acts, both constitute and are independent of securitization. This approach, as
noted above, traces the impact of securitizing discursive practices on securitizing non-discursive
practices and explains how securitizing speech acts motivates the introduction of extraordinary
policies. Through this prism, securitization is characterized as a process activated by the

21
The terms “securitizing discursive practices” and “securitizing speech acts” are used interchangeably in this study. The same is
also valid for “securitizing non-discursive practices” and “securitizing actions.”
22
It is important to note that particular representations of securitization might be less intelligible and communicable. For
example, silence manifests itself as a prevalent form of securitization in cases where individuals might not raise something as a
security problem on the grounds that it could aggravate the threat being faced (Hansen, 2011). As Ken Booth puts is, if security is
a speech act, insecurity is a zipped lip.
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utterance of securitizing speech acts and completed when they engender the pursuit of
exceptional policies. Securitizing speech acts are generally held to function as invitations,
demands, or calls for securitizing actions. This approach corresponds with Stritzel’s concept of
an internalist reading of securitization, which hinges on Derrida’s post-structural linguistic
theory.
The first line of research might better conform to a strict empirical research design that
aims to establish a clear cause and effect relationship among a set of specified variables. It might
also prove invaluable in terms of elucidating the interplay among political conditions, actors,
audiences, and authorities in the constitution of securitization (Guzzini, 2011). A comprehensive
analysis of the context is indeed essential to understanding security’s underlying logic (i.e., what
is understood and presented as a threat that requires collective responses), what the normal
boundaries of policy and politics in each issue area are, who the audience of a securitizing
discursive practice is, and how its acceptance by the audience manifests itself.
The second line of research might deepen our understanding of the performative effects
of language in the field of security by identifying the world of metaphors, historical narratives,
emotions, stereotypes, lies, and dispositions reflected in how the language is used and influences
individuals’ security perceptions and behaviors (Balzacq, 2011). This study intends to contribute
to the first line of empirical research, which regards both discursive and non-discursive
securitizing practices as representative of, rather than constitutive of, securitization.
Securitization is mostly equated with exceptional and extraordinary policies, but what
constitutes this exceptionality and extraordinariness? Security specialists describe these concepts
in distinct ways. Some securitization theory specialists view exceptionality, in a narrow sense,
only as emergency actions that break free of otherwise binding rules (Buzan et al., 1998;
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Williams, 2011; Waever, 2011). However, Floyd (2011), among others, suggests that this
formulation does not apply to liberal democracies, for exceptionality, as far as liberal
democracies are concerned, refers not to the suspension of regular practices altogether, but to
three divergent situations: when new laws are passed, when new emergency powers are granted,
and when a state’s existing security apparatus is employed to deal with an issue that has not been
dealt with previously. Within this framework, non-exceptionality refers to such policies and
measures that are possible within (non-emergency) legislation. This latter approach might be
viewed as a broad conceptualization of exceptionality.23
Insofar as non-democracies are concerned; Floyd maintains that it is hard to understand
what counts as an exception. Although I find her broad conceptualization of exceptionality
framework useful, I disagree that no distinction can be drawn between normal and exceptional
political measures in authoritarian regimes. Although the content and extent of normal politics
might differ in authoritarian regimes, a set of measures would still appear as exceptional and
extraordinary. What constitutes “normal” in a particular context might be considered
“exceptional” in another context. However, to assume that normal is only how things are done in
liberal democracies is a non-starter for the study of exceptionality and extraordinariness in
authoritarian regimes, for it is neither timeless nor universal; but it is temporary, contextual, and
often political. Rather than taking exceptionality for granted, a security study should inspect and
determine what falls within and outside the normal boundaries of politics in each context.

23

A large number of studies discuss how securitization has not been accompanied by exceptional measures in certain cases
(Bigo, 2000; Huysmans, 2006; Trombetta, 2008; Corry, 2012; Waever, 2009; Salter, 2011; Aradau & Van Munster, 2007; Bright,
2012; Leonard, 2012; Sjostedt, 2011). The problem that might arise here is that if we stretch the concept of exceptionality too
much, the subtle distinction between securitization and politicization may become indistinguishable.
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This section presented the key theoretical, empirical, and normative positions of the
study. Table 6, presented below, summarizes the key debates, questions, and challenges of
securitization theory. The next section will explain the strategies and methodologies of case
selection, data collection, and data analysis.
Table 6
Securitization Theory’s Theoretical, Empirical, and Normative Debates and Challenges

Selecting and Pairing the Cases
I have selected four cases – Turkey–Lebanon and Germany–France – based on the mostsimilar-systems-design. These paired countries share key characteristics such as identity, regime
type, level of economic prosperity, and geographical proximity. However, I anticipate that they
will differ in terms of forms, levels, and sources of (de)securitization. Studying them with
multiple variables and divergent variable combinations will help create a typology of
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mechanisms, processes, and regimes of (de)securitization; explain the sources of
(de)securitization; test the proposed hypotheses. Analyzing both failed and successful cases will
yield important insights into the processes of (de)securitization (Ruzicka, 2019). Having a strong
preference for successful cases often leads to a methodological issue in terms of selecting cases
based on their outcome, namely, the dependent variable (Ruzicka, 2019). Another important
determining factor24 was their geographical proximity to Syria. Turkey and Lebanon are
neighboring countries, whereas Germany and France are periphery countries.
Data Collection
Dependent Variable, (De)securitization
To operationalize the concept of (de)securitization, I collected newspaper articles (i.e.,
news, commentaries, and editorials), leader speeches, and policy documents that enabled me to
locate, trace, and document the discursive and non-discursive practices of a wide range of actors
toward Syrian refugees as well as describe the context in which these practices were taking
place. I searched academic databases such as ProQuest, NewsBank, and Nexis Uni R and
newspapers’ online archives, as well as the online databases for a variety of formal and informal
keywords used to define Syrian refugees. I conducted these searches in English and local
languages.
As such, I searched for such key words as Syrians, Syrian refugees, displaced Syrians,
Syrian asylum seekers, Syrian immigrants, and Syrian guests (English); Suriyeliler, Suriyeli
Multeciler, Suriyeli Siginmacilar, Suriyeli Misafirler, and Suriyeli gocmenler (Turkish);
,

24

, and

(Arabic); Syrische Flüchtlinge, Syrische

In methodological terms, geographical proximity is taken as the key control variable in this study.

,

52
Migraten, and Syrer in Deutschland (Germann); and Réfugiés Syriens, Les syriens en France,
and Migrants Syriens (French). The time period for these searches was from January 1, 2012, to
December 31, 2018.
My data collection methodology was the following. First, I searched for the listed
keywords in the news databases and newspapers’ online archives and collected the news that
these searches initially identified. Second, I eliminated those texts that provided no substantive
information about the different actors’ discursive and non-discursive practices toward Syrian
refugees. Third, I removed duplicate or different news that reported the same practices. To avoid
sampling bias and make the sample reflect most of the ideological and political positions adopted
toward Syrian refugees in the case countries, I gathered data from a wide range of newspapers. 25
Independent and Control Variables
As discussed in detail in the introduction chapter, there are five independent variables
that this research proposes to explain the politics of securitization as regards Syrian refugees in
case countries: ideology of the incumbent political party (inclusive vs. exclusive), political elite
relations (stable vs. instable), history of relations with other refugee and immigrant communities
(friendly vs. unfriendly), electoral dynamics (issue salience and electoral volatility), and coalition
formation dynamics (i.e., probability of far-right parties coming to power either as single-party
governments or coalition partners). Additionally, this research identifies a set of control
variables. Although some of these variables were widely studied in the literature, they are not the
primary focus of this research. However, keeping their values constant helps the study establish
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Despite these efforts to avoid a sampling bias, I should note that the media is by no means immune from power relations and
struggles. Nevertheless, the best empirical strategy that the researchers using media data have at their disposal is to expand the
sample. We also lack the means to learn about the opinions and attitudes that the media does not report. This should be kept in
mind while appraising this study’s findings. The media’s independent role in constructing a security discourse is another research
topic that warrants scholarly attention.
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the true relationships between its key independent and dependent variables. Below, I list and
define these control variables.
Geographical Proximity. Currently, 84% of all refugees are hosted by developing
countries in the global South26 that are surrounded by many of the conflict-ridden states from
which the refugees flee. Geographical proximity increases the number of refugees fleeing to that
country and contributes to the prospects of securitization by intensifying the ensuing
demographic pressures. I, therefore, consider geographical proximity a key control variable. The
pairing of the cases was primarily shaped by the case countries’ level of geographical proximity
to Syria.
Affinity. The ethnic, religious, and linguistic affinity between a refugee group and a host
community is generally expected to have a negative effect on the probability of securitizing
refugees. As nobody has created an affinity index to date, I establish the nature of affinity
between a host country and the Syrian refugees on the basis of scholarly and conventional
characterizations of their respective dominant culture, language, and religion.
Regime Type. Given the basic democratic norms that are indispensable for the
functioning of democracy at any time, such as the rule of law, public consent, individual rights,
and checks and balances, one would expect that the more democratic a country is, the less likely
refugees would be securitized. To define a case country’s regime type and level of democracy, I
use Freedom House reports.
Economic Prosperity. Economic prosperity is expected to have a negative effect on the
probability of securitizing a refugee group. The more developed a host country is, the less likely
it is to securitize refugees. The level of economic prosperity was another key control variable

26

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/eighty-four-percent-of-refugees-live-in-developing-countries/
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that impacted the selection and pairing of the cases. To establish a case country’s level of
economic development, I use the Human Development Index score (HDI).
Relations with the Home Country. Granting asylum is regarded as open criticism of
another state’s policies, so states are often quick to accept refugees from their foes but hesitant to
accept them from their friends. Thus, political rivalry between a host country and the country of
origin has a negative effect on the probability of securitizing a refugee group. In other words, if
there is a political rivalry between these two countries, refugees are less likely to be securitized
in the host country. To characterize the nature of relations between the case countries and the
Syrian regime, I examine how the former has responded to the Syrian civil war and whether they
have supported or opposed the regime’s policies.
The tables presented below summarize the central features of the research design
described above. Table 7 compares the case countries’ configurations of control variables. The
case countries’ values on control variables converge to a great extent and therefore enable this
research to hold them constant while investigating the relationship between its primary
independent and dependent variables. Lastly, Table 8 lists the hypotheses of the study.
Table 7
Control Variables
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Table 8
Hypotheses

Data Coding
The main unit of observation coded and analyzed in this study is the text. “Text” is best
regarded as a semantic unit: a unit not of form but of meaning (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). By
combination of a priori knowledge of the research topic and general understanding of the content
of the sample gained through a close reading of the articles, I coded those texts that verbalized
and revealed an opinion, attitude or stance toward Syrian refugees or reported a type of event
that involved or concerned Syrian refugees. I used Atlas.ti to create and assign codes. However, I
should note that no lexicon of securitization in the languages that I collected data (Arabic,
Turkish, English, French and German) existed, nor did exist a qualitative data analysis program
that automatically maps and establishes the degree and frequency of securitization by examining
a text. I, therefore, read the texts in-depth and assign the codes manually.
I code a text in terms of its date, source, audience, type, subject, object, and function.
First two coding categories only require direct data input rather than actual coding. However,
they are critical in controlling how the ideology of a media source might have shaped its position
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on Syrian refugees and how actors’ views might have changed over time. Starting with the first
coded category, I coded an observation in terms of its audience. I created two subcategories for
audience: domestic and international. If the opinion identified in a text was conveyed by an actor
in the presence of an international audience or if it directly targeted an international audience
regardless of where it was uttered, its audience was coded as international. If it was expressed in
the presence of a domestic audience or directly targeted a domestic audience, its audience was
coded as domestic.
The international audience here primarily refers to states and inter-governmental and
non-governmental organizations that provide aid and funding for Syrian refugees such as
UNHCR, Oxfam, UNICEF, Mercy Corps, Relief International, Islamic Relief. Whereas domestic
audience includes all individuals and groups that reside within a case country. The way that
politicians and bureaucrats frame the issues concerning Syrian refugees before different
audiences largely depends on their perceived interests and strategic use of rhetoric in the pursuit
of those interests. For instance, leaders occasionally employ a more securitizing language before
an international audience to attract more donations or to persuade them into a policy proposal
that they favor. Or they sometimes use a more securitizing rhetoric in opposition to the policies
of another political party expecting to enhance their electoral prospects.
The second coding category is the type, and type of observation was coded under two
main categories: discursive and non-discursive. I created subcategories both for discursive as
well as non-discursive practices. Subcategories of discursive practices were assertive,
commissive, directive, and expressive. This categorization was derived from J. R. Searle’s
speech act theory (1969, 1979). First, if a text proposed a claim concerning the impacts of Syrian
refugees, it was coded as assertive. The following explanation of Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader
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of the main opposition party in Turkey, is an example of assertive discursive practice, “muchneeded jobs for locals have gone to Syrian refugees” (CHP’s Campaign Promise, 2018). Second,
if a text generated a commitment regarding Syrian refugees, it was coded as a commissive
discursive practice. The following explanation of Lebanese Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk
is an example of commissive discursive practice, “residency-related fines of those Syrians who
decide to return to Syria will permanently be waived” (Derbas warns against anarchy, 2014).
Third, if a text encouraged or invited a certain audience to take action for or against
Syrian refugees, it was coded as a directive discursive practice. The following statement of
Lebanese Foreign Minister, Gibran Basil is an example of directive discursive practice, “in order
to prevent security problems; municipal police must carry out inspections in the locations where
refugees are gathered” (Bassil, 2016). Fourth, if a text transmitted a feeling about Syrian
refugees, it was coded as an expressive discursive practice. The following statement made by a
local person in an interview in Turkey is an example of expressive discursive practice, “the AKP
government made its worst mistake over the last 15 years by admitting Syrian refugees” (2018).
The coding of discursive observations enables us to capture if there is a particular use of
language that informs (de)securitization. I also created subcategories for non-discursive
observations such as government policies (border policies, visa policies, integration policies,
institutional designing, evictions) local policies (curfews), and civil involvement
(demonstrations, protests, humanitarian projects, social tensions).
The third coding category, “subject,” refers to the actor who performed a discursive or
non-discursive practice. As I do not focus only on the security speeches of government actors, I
created four main subcategories: “government,” “opposition,” “elites,” and “public.” This
designation covers two instances: if either practice was performed by a member of the
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government as well as if the government’s various representatives (e.g., presidents, prime
ministers, cabinet members, bureaucrats, and institutions) performed them on its behalf. Second,
if a member of the opposition parties performed the discursive or non-discursive practice, its
subject was coded as “opposition.” I should note that although it is relatively easy to distinguish
the government and the opposition in such multiparty systems as Turkey, Germany, and France,
this is not possible for Lebanon due to its confessional system, which distributes political powers
and positions along sectarian lines. Hence, I coded the government or other subjects with respect
to their sectarian (e.g., Maronite, Sunni, and Shia) as well as political affiliations (the pro-Syrian
regime March 8 Alliance vs. the anti-Syrian regime March 14 Alliance) for Lebanon (Karyotis,
Georgios and Patrikios Strstos, 2010).27
Third, if a civil society leader, political specialist, owner of a powerful business or
member of a powerful business organization and the like performed either practice, its subject
was coded as “elites.” Finally, if an individual or a group of individuals who are interested in
Syrian refugees only by the virtue of being members of the larger society performed either
practice, its subject was coded as “public.” In other words, every subject who does not officially
represent the interests of a specific religious, ethnic, economic, and political group was coded as
“public.”
The fourth coding category, “object,” refers to the entity whose security was posited to be
impacted by Syrian refugees and thereby depicted as in need of urgent protection. I created six
subcategories for objects: “state,” “borders,” “economy,” “society,” “environment,” and
“infrastructure.” If either practice involved an assertion that Syrian refugees pose a threat to the
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There are many countries in which religious elites are influential.
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very existence of the state for various reasons, its object was coded as “state.” If either practice
communicated a claim that Syrian refugees created challenges for the protection of the country’s
borders and therefore borders should be protected and monitored more strictly, its object was
coded as “state borders.”
If a discursive or non-discursive practice presented a claim that Syrian refugees
destabilized the economy in many ways, its object was coded as “economy.” If either practice
conveyed a claim that Syrian refugees threaten the identity and coexistence of individuals, its
object was coded as “society.” If either practice included a claim that Syrian refugees
endangered the environmental sustainability, its object was coded as “environment.” If either
practice delivered a claim that Syrian refugees created demographic pressures and strained the
host country’s infrastructure, its object was coded as “infrastructure.” Finally, if either practice
pronounced the need for protecting Syrian refugees, its object was coded as “refugees” (Watson,
2011). Given that these six domains of security may occasionally overlap, if either practice
introduced claims concerning multiple sectors and domains, all the relevant sectors invoked were
coded as its objects.
The last coding category, “function,” has two subcategories: “securitizing” and
“desecuritizing.” If a discursive or non-discursive practice portrayed Syrian refugees as a threat
to any of the above-mentioned objects, its function was coded as “securitizing.” If either practice
highlighted Syrian refugees’ contributions to the abovementioned objects, its function was coded
as “desecuritizing.” Table 9, presented below, provides a set of coded texts and illustrates the
coding strategies discussed in this section.
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Table 9
Coding Examples
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Data Analysis
I established the level of (de)securitization based on evaluating and classifying the
discursive and non-discursive practices of the actors (i.e., the government, elites, public) at oneyear intervals. To quantify these functions, I assigned numerical values. The securitization
function was numerically coded as “1,” and desecuritization function as “-1.” An actor’s
securitizing practice score in a specific year was equal to the average of all the discursive and
non-discursive observations recorded for that actor during that year. In the same manner, the
overall level of securitization in a country in a specific year was equal to the average of all the
discursive and non-discursive observations recorded for all actors during that year.
Within this framework, the actors’ securitization scores varied between -1 and 1, where 1
represents the highest frequency of securitizing practices and -1 represents the highest frequency
of desecuritizing practices. I identified six frequency levels: low securitizing practice frequency
(between 0 and 0.33), medium securitizing practice frequency (between 0.33 and 0.67), high
securitizing practice frequency (between 0.67 and 1), low desecuritizing practice frequency
(between 0 and -0.33), medium desecuritizing practice frequency (between -0.33 and -0.67), and
high desecuritizing practice frequency (between -0.67 and -1). The assumption underlying the
parallel coding of both practices was that they were performed simultaneously and iteratively in
reaction to one other in a dynamic security field, where actors sought to justify their security
claims and undermine those of their competitors. As a baseline, no actor’s initial attitude was
deprived of value or, in mathematical terms, equal to zero. The following figure places the
frequency of both practices on a continuum.
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Figure 11
Continuum of Frequency of Securitizing and Desecuritizing Practices

In general, I expected a high level of compatibility between the actors’ discursive and
non-discursive practices. In cases where discourse was not reflected in policy outcomes, I
provided explanations. Based on the findings of the qualitative data analysis, I compared levels,
mechanisms, and processes of securitization across cases to create a securitization regime
typology. As noted above, I defined seven types of regimes: government-led/top-down
(de)securitization, elite-led/top-down (de)securitization, public-led/bottom-up (de)securitization,
government and elite-led/top-down (de)securitization, government and public-led/parallel
(de)securitization, elite and public-led/parallel (de)securitization, and government, elite and
public-led/parallel (de)securitization.
A few limitations and caveats need to be reiterated here. First, this study was limited by
the lack of public or mass opinion surveys on Syrian refugees in most of the case countries
between 2012 and 2018. Thus, I used survey data only when it was available to complement my
inferences on public opinion that were, in turn, derived from my analysis of the public’s
discursive and non-discursive practices. Second, “elites” were not the same in every country, for
those elites that exercised considerable power in one country might not have exercised the same
level of power in another country. For example, in Germany “elites” referred to those people
who directed and managed the largest corporations, banks, insurance companies, giant media
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conglomerates, prestigious law and lobbying firms, heavily endowed foundations and
universities, think-tanks and cultural institutions. But in Lebanon, “elites” were more sectarianbased and thus referred to the leaders of prominent families and ethnoreligious groups that
represented the interests of their well-defined constituencies (Salamey, 2013).
Third, I should note that different levels of decision-making, which were not investigated
in this study, might impact the level of securitization regarding a particular refugee group. At the
individual level, the judges’ RSD (refugee status determination) decisions may increase or
decrease the level of securitization (Musalo, Moore, and Boswell, 2011).28 At the domestic level,
decisions made by local authorities may contribute to the group’s securitization. Finally,
decisions made by international organizations like the EU and the United Nations may influence
the securitization of a refugee group at the international and domestic levels. I am cognizant of
securitization’s multi-leveled nature, but I based my inferences about securitizing the Syrian
refugees in this study solely on the decisions made at the state level. I did not extend my analysis
to individual decision making on asylum because the evaluation of RSD decisions is a subject of
comparative refugee law rather than political science. On the other hand, I did not integrate
decision-making at the international level to not expand the scope of my study indeterminately.
Fourth, although I took a state’s refugee admission figures as one of the indications of its
attitudes toward a refugee group, I should note that these numbers alone do not tell us much
about the quality of its refugee policies. Due to its geographical proximity and limited border
control capability, a state might admit a greater number of refugees. However, the extent to
which refugees benefit from adequate rights and services depends on many factors, including,
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For example, a recent study found that immigration judges granted asylum four to six times as often to applicants with
attorneys in the U.S.
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but not limited to, the state’s absorptive and democratic capacity. In recognition of this, I made a
conscious effort to not reduce my analysis about the securitization of Syrian refugees in the case
countries merely to the analysis of admission figures. In consideration of such limitations, my
findings should be interpreted cautiously.
Hypothesis Testing
I conducted process tracing. This helped identify the causal mechanisms at work and
trace their operations across the cases. It involved the following steps: providing detailed
narratives of the posited dependent variable, securitization, identifying the ways in which the
study’s independent variables shaped it, and assessing the proposed hypotheses in consideration
of the findings produced.
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Chapter 4
Legal Background of Refugee Protection in Case Countries
This chapter describes the legal background of refugee protection in individual countries.
Turkey
Although most of the refugees in Turkey today are from non-European states, Turkey’s
obligations under the convention have a geographical limitation and only apply to European
asylum seekers. The Settlement Laws of 1934 and 2006 provide advantages to persons of
Turkish descent and culture for refugee status and create a legal ground for their resettlement and
potential citizenship. For those who claim refugee status due to tragic political events taking
place outside Europe, different forms of protection are reserved, among them a humanitarian
residence permit and temporary protection.
The more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees now residing in Turkey have temporary
protection status and can stay there until they are provided permanent resettlement in a third
country. The legal backdrop of this status is the second article of the Law on Foreigners and
International Protection (LFIP), which provides temporary protection to foreigners who cannot
return to the country they were forced to leave. State assistance provided to Syrian refugees has
expanded over the years. Most of them today live outside official UNHCR-run refugee camps,
have access to healthcare and education, and can obtain a work permit.
The application for refugee status is made individually at the local offices of the
Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). Any application filed out at the border
is immediately reported to its local offices. An applicant may apply for themselves as well as the
accompanying family members on the same grounds. All the applications and registrations are
handled and monitored with the aid of GOC-NET, an online database and platform. After the
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registrations and applications have been completed, an interview is scheduled. In the meantime,
an identity document valid for a month is issued for the applicant and his or her family members.
After the interview, another identity document, known as International Protection Identity
Document, is issued. It is valid for six months and allows an individual to reside in the country
legally.
As far as conventional refugee status is concerned, Turkey permitted the UNHCR to
operate and conduct RSD jointly with the Ministry of Interior between 2011 and 2013. Between
2013-2018, UNHCR’s responsibility regarding RSD was reduced to assisting to the newly
established migration authority, DGMM, in the country. After 2018, DGMM became the sole
authority with the mandate to conduct RSD. As a result, UNHCR is not currently involved in
RSD in Turkey and its services focus on counselling, informing refugees about their rights and
obligations.
Turkey meets the refugees’ basic needs and provides social services, translation services,
and travel documents. Although refugees have access to primary and secondary education,
almost 350,000 Syrian children (40% of the school-aged Syrian children) do not attend schools
in the country (UNICEF, 2017). Also, despite new legislation passed in 2016 that authorizes
Syrian refugees to apply for a work permit, to date only a few thousand of them have obtained
one.
Lebanon
Refugees comprise one-fourth of Lebanon’s population. Lebanese and UNHCR statistics
differ on the number of Syrian refugees residing in the country. UNHCR reports that 1 million
have registered through the agency, whereas the Lebanese state claims that this number has
already exceeded 1.5 million.
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As Lebanon lacks domestic laws that regulate the admission of refugees, 29 UNHCR
signed a memorandum of understanding with it to help Beirut handle refugee claims. Therefore,
UNHCR reviewed the asylum applications, and Beirut provided temporary three- to nine-month
residence permits with possible extensions for refugees. The General Directorate of General
Security, whose primary functions are to collect intelligence and ensure national security,
became the main state institution responsible for reviewing refugee claims.
Lebanon’s policies have undergone important changes over the years, similar to those of
Turkey. Between 2011-2014, de facto open borders, legal inaction (also known as “the policy of
no-policy” or “benign neglect”), and non-encampment characterized its approach. Most of the
Syrian refugees easily entered the country, registered with the UNHCR, and lived in informal
settlements. Their non-encampment is partly a product of Lebanon’s historical experiences with
the Palestinian refugees. Shadi Karam, senior advisor to then-President Michel Suleiman and
later chief advisor to Prime Minister Tamam Salam, claimed that the Syrian’s non-encampment
was due to fear and paranoia caused by the Palestinian experience.
From 2014 onwards, the Syria-Lebanon border was closed, and Beirut enacted a set of
conservative residency rules. In October 2014, the Council of Ministers made the renewal of
residency permits more difficult and expensive and forced the Syrian refugees into a status of
irregularity (Dionigi, 2017a). According to the new residency rules, they would only be admitted
for reasons of business or trade and with the condition of finding a Lebanese sponsor. On the
other hand, local authorities began to impose curfews on them in response to the increasing
social tensions and restricted their freedom of movement (Davison, 2016). With these new rules,
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The only relevant legislation is the Law on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and Their Exit from the Country that
came into effect in 1962.
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the state did not recognize the Syrians as refugees (lajiun); rather, it called them “displaced
people” (nazihun) to avoid being subjected to or restricted by the relevant international norms
and standards. These policies were very similar to Lebanon’s discriminatory and exclusionary
policies toward Palestinian refugees. Despite their long residence in the country, Palestinians
have not been granted refugee status or citizenship. According to Lebanese law, a Palestinian
man who marries a Lebanese woman cannot obtain citizenship, nor can the children from such
marriage obtain citizenship through their mothers. Also, Lebanese law denies the Palestinians the
right to own property and prevents them from laboring in many sectors such as medicine, law,
and engineering.
Germany
Germany is a signatory of the 1951 convention as well as of many other European-level
agreements governing states’ refugee policies. The German refugee law system is very complex.
The Asylum Act and the Residence Act are the primary legal instruments that create a base for the
administration of refugee claims. The country grants a wide range of humanitarian statuses to
refugees (e.g., political asylum, conventional refugee status, subsidiary protection, temporary
protection-contingent refugee status, ban on deportation, and resettlement) depending on the
applicant’s country of origin and the nature or causes of displacement.
The status that an asylum seeker eventually obtains is of the utmost importance, for it
determines the duration of their stay as well as the set of rights and services to which they will
have access. Within this multi-layered status system, the convention refugees are entitled to the
largest collection of rights. During the early years of the Cold War, most of the people applying
for asylum in Germany were Eastern Europeans fleeing state repression. From the 1970s
onwards, Middle Eastern countries became the top refugee-sending countries. For instance, a
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great number of people from Turkey, Iran, and Iraq facing political persecution applied for
asylum. Furthermore, throughout the Bosnian war of the 1990s, the country granted temporary
protection status to many people subjected to war crimes and persecution.
The increasing number of refugees provoked suspicion among the German public about
the reliability of the country’s refugee admission system. Heavy criticisms leveled at this system
brought the categorization of the source countries as “safe countries of origin” and “safe third
countries.” The German Asylum Act (Asylgesetz) identified EU member states, as well as
Norway and Switzerland, as safe third countries, meaning that any individual who entered
Germany from one of these countries would lose their entitlement to political asylum in
Germany. Although this policy has considerably decreased the number of refugees resettled over
the years, Germany has maintained its position of Europe’s top refugee destination largely due to
the high social security benefits it offers to refugees. Another form of humanitarian protection,
“subsidiary protection status,” is reserved for those who can prove that they are threatened with
serious harm, such as capital punishment or inhumane treatment, in their country of origin.
Finally, a ban on an individual’s deportation that allows them to remain in the country legally,
but without legal status, is issued for those whose potential return to their countries of origin
could lead to health-related complications.
Asylum applicants are required to stay in a reception facility for up to six months after
they arrive. Once a person files an application, they are invited for an in-person interview. Then,
a caseworker assesses all the relevant application documents with interview findings and renders
a final decision. In the meantime, the caseworker may request information from the Federal
Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), the primary institution responsible for
administering refugee claims. Germany uses a quota system to distribute refugees and asylum-
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seekers among its states. Asylum applicants are distributed to each state based on its tax receipts
and population numbers.
France
For a long time, France had liberal refugee laws reflected in the coding of its
constitutions. For example, the 1793 constitution stipulated that the country should provide
asylum to foreigners who have been banished from their homeland for the cause of liberty. The
constitution of 1958 reiterated the same liberal principle. In line with this liberal approach,
French law expanded the grounds for refugee claims and considers both gender-based
persecution as well as persecution by non-state actors as causes of asylum.
Like German refugee law, French refugee law draws on international laws and EU
regulations on refugees. The primary domestic law regulating refugee admissions is the Code of
Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right of Asylum (CESEDA). France grants two
types of humanitarian statuses: conventional refugee status and subsidiary protection. Both
groups have access to a similar set of rights and are permitted to live, work, and reunite with
their families. The only substantive difference is that those who obtain conventional refugee
status can apply for citizenship, whereas holders of subsidiary protection status cannot.
After entering the country, each refugee is required to register at a local Ministry of the
Interior office until it is clarified whether France is under any legal obligation to review their
application. The individual is then expected to file an application to the French Office for the
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA). Upon receiving the application, OFPRA
is expected to report a decision within six months based upon its examination all the materials
presented and the interview conducted. Applicants may take unfavorable OFPRA decisions to
the National Court on Asylum Law (CNDA).
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Like the German practice, the subsidiary protection status is granted to those individuals
who have been subjected to inhuman treatment in their home countries but do not qualify for
conventional refugee status. All individuals, regardless of which status they are eventually
accorded, are required to attend a civic training program and language course and benefit from
nation-wide health insurance, minimum income, family subsidies, and social housing just like
French citizens. The local offices of the French Office for Immigration and Assimilation (OFII)
facilitate communication between the state and the asylum applicants.
However, France’s long-held liberal refugee laws did not motivate generous policies
toward Syrian refugees. The country introduced conservative refugee laws in 2015 at the height
of the refugee crisis. Although President Francois Hollande pledged that the country would admit
30,000 Syrian refugees between 2015-2017, France only admitted around 22,000 altogether since
the start of the civil war.

72
Chapter 5
Securitization of Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries,
Turkey and Lebanon
Imagine a country that grants visas to Syrian students, tourists, and businessmen but
shuns them from Syrian refugees who are fleeing a civil war as the most vulnerable segment of
the Syrian population. This was the legal measure introduced by the Lebanese government in
January 2015 to limit the entry of Syrian refugees. Now imagine another country that denies
refugee status to Syrians due to the reservations it placed on the 1951 Refugee Convention but
considers offering them full citizenship in the wake of an upcoming election. Its leader strikes a
deal with the EU and pledges to keep refugees within the country’s borders in exchange for six
billion Euros. He also threatens the EU that he might send them to Europe by plane or bus if it
does not fulfill its obligations under the deal. This is Erdogan’s Turkey.
Juxtapose all these next to a new law enacted in Syria, resembling the Absentee Property
Law of Israel, which legitimizes the government’s seizure of assets left behind by refugees (Fisk,
2018). Finally, think of all of these in relation to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s remarks at
the opening of a recent international conference that Syria has become healthier and more
homogenous after the civil war (Syrian residing in U.S., 2017). All these attitudes may appear to
be quite ironic and disturbing, but they powerfully illustrate the conditions of Syrian refugees
and how they pertain to populism, electoral prospects, sectarian concerns, and vested political
interests in various contexts.
This chapter, by providing such contextual accounts and discussing this study’s findings,
aims to deepen our understanding of the attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Turkey and
Lebanon. It is divided into three sections. The first section documents the levels, mechanisms,
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processes, and regimes of securitization of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon and reports
the results of the data analysis. The second section presents the narratives of securitization of
Syrian refugees in these countries. Finally, the third section shares this study’s conclusions and
offers guidelines for the desecuritization of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon.
Levels, Mechanisms, Processes, and Regimes of Securitization of Syrian Refugees in
Turkey and Lebanon
Methodology
As described in the first chapter, I searched databases such as ProQuest and Nexis Uni R
as well as newspapers’ online archives to create a news dataset. I did these searches in three
languages: English, Turkish and Arabic. I searched the online databases and archives for a
variety of formal and informal keywords used to define Syrian refugees such as Syrians, Syrian
refugees, displaced Syrians, Syrian asylum seekers, Syrian immigrants, and Syrian guests.30 For
Lebanon, initial searches identified 1,475 texts including news, commentaries, editorials of
which 254 satisfied the selection criteria specified in the preceding chapter and were taken for
coding and analysis. For Turkey, searches identified 1,316 texts of which 271 fitted the selection
criteria and were taken for coding and analysis.
Articles for Turkey were drawn from five highly circulated newspapers: Hurriyet, Daily
Sabah, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, and Today’s Zaman. These newspapers hold different positions on
the political spectrum with their distinct ideologies and relations with the ruling Justice and
Development Party. Cumhuriyet and Today’s Zaman are generally known as anti-government
newspapers, Daily-Sabah is regarded as a pro-government newspaper and Milliyet and Hurriyet
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occupy the middle ground with their moderate secular and liberal ideologies 31. For Lebanon,
articles were collected from the Daily Star, National News Agency, Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Ahed,
YaLibnan, Al-Hayat, Al-Akhbar, and Al-Manar. Likewise, these newspapers differ in terms of
their sectarian and political predispositions. Al-Ahed and Al-Manar are inclined toward Hizbollah
and Shia Bloc, Al-Mustaqbal and Al-Hayat are viewed as voices of the Sunni Bloc, the Daily
Star shares the Maronite community’s positions on issues, and the National News Bulletin
operates as a state-owned agency. I used media bias/fact check index to determine the political
and sectarian leanings of these media sources.
Data and Comparison
Comparing the securitization of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon, the overall level
of securitization in Lebanon (0.57) is much higher than the overall level of securitization in
Turkey (-0.14) as presented in Table 10. The government and elites’ securitization scores are
very low whereas the public and opposition’s securitization scores are high in Turkey. Given that
securitizing and desecuritizing practices are performed simultaneously and iteratively in reaction
to one other in a dynamic security field, this demonstrates how the government and elites
respond to the public’s increasingly hostile sentiments against Syrian refugees and the opposition
parties’ warnings against the country’s ability to host 3.6 million Syrian refugees. In
consideration of this, I argue that the partisan attitudes and approaches adopted toward Syrian
refugees in Turkey characterize a regime of government and elites-led desecuritization. On the
contrary, the government and elites’ securitization scores are high and the public’s securitization
score is low in Lebanon. In other words, not the public but members of the government and

31

It should be noted that Milliyet Newspaper changed ownership in 2018 and was sold to a more pro-government media group.
This does not impact its classification as an anti-government newspaper prior to 2018. On the other hand, Today’s Zaman was
shut down in 2016 by an executive decree of President Erdogan after the July 15 coup attempt.

75
sectarian elites securitize the presence of Syrian refugees. These sectarian attitudes toward
Syrian refugees in Lebanon, I maintain, embody a regime of government and elites-led
securitization.
Table 10
Securitization in Turkey and Lebanon (Discursive and Non-Discursive together for all actors)

Table 11
Discursive Securitization in Turkey and Lebanon by Actors (Speech Analysis)

Table 12
Non-Discursive Securitization in Turkey and Lebanon by actors (Policy Analysis)

My findings reveal several tendencies characterizing the attitudes toward Syrian refugees
in these countries. First, one characteristic shared by the media representations of Syrian
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refugees in Lebanon and Turkey is that refugee voices are largely absent in the media accounts
on their experiences, living conditions, and integration. For example, a section of political actors
in Lebanon, members of the March 8 movement, continuously request Syrian refugees’ return to
some of the regime-controlled areas, claimed to be safe but not accepted as safe by the
international community, and majority of Syrian refugees resist that they cannot return to Syria
for obvious reasons (Vohra 2019). However, their resistance to such demands is often not heard
by the politicians nor reported by the Lebanese media outlets. Since 2011, the March 14 and
March 8 Alliances have split into respectively anti- and pro-Assad regime camps, with
assassinations and targeted bombings associated with both sides of the Syrian conflict drawing
forceful statements from political elites. Hezbollah has professed its support for the Assad
regime and called for a negotiated solution, while the Future Movement has criticized the regime
and called for the removal of President Bashar al-Assad.
Secondly, most of the actors in Lebanon and Turkey still view the presence of refugees as
a temporary and provisional condition. This shapes the legal approaches adopted toward Syrian
refugees in these countries. For example, in Turkey, Syrian refugees had been viewed as misafir
(guest) between 2011 and 2014. With the new asylum law enacted in 2014, they were granted
temporary protection status. However, Syrians still do not hold conventional refugee status due
to the geographical limitation placed on the refugee convention. In contrast, Syrian refugees in
Lebanon were allowed to register with the UNHCR between 2011 and 2015 and given a chance
to renew their residency. However, after new legal measures introduced in 2015, UNHCR’s
refugee registration was suspended. In the following years, unregistered 32 Syrians were
informally categorized as nazihun (displaced) (NRC,2017). These categories produce various
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forms of ordering with a set of implications for what Syrians may do, and what types of rights
and protections they have access to (Janmyr, 2016). Table 13 presented below illustrates this
wide array of formal and informal labels assigned to different groups of people in need of
humanitarian protection in Turkey and Lebanon.
Table 13
Categories of Humanitarian Protection in Turkey and Lebanon

Thirdly, a negative relationship exists between actors’ approaches toward Syrian refugees
and the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. As illustrated in figures 12 and 13, despite some
exceptions, the actors that oppose Assad’s government tend to have a pro-refugee stance,
whereas the actors that support the regime tend to have an anti-refugee stance. This correlation is
an indicator of the strong connection and alignment between actors’ domestic and transnational
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threat perceptions. However, there are also exceptions to this correlation. For example, as shown
in figures 12 and 13, Kataeb and Lebanese Forces are anti-Assad but not necessarily pro-refugee.
In other words, they oppose both the Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and the policies that
might encourage the resettlement of Syrian refugees.
Figure 12
Transnational Political Attitudes toward the Syrian Regime

Figure 13
Transnational Political Attitudes toward Syrian Refugees
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Fourthly, as shown in Table 14, actors’ discursive securitization scores are largely
consistent with their non-discursive securitization scores in both countries. Meaning that the
actors who frame the presence of Syrian refugees as a security threat also take securitized actions
against them and the actors who view the presence of Syrian refugees as a humanitarian issue
pursue humanitarian policies. This shows that the securitizing actors in both countries are
equipped with the capability to turn their words into action and they are not just some nonmainstream parties or marginalized groups that lack institutional power and social legitimacy to
execute what they speak.
Table 14
Overall Discursive and Non-Discursive Securitization in Turkey and Lebanon

Fifthly, as shown in Table 15, most of the discursive practices performed by the actors in
both countries are assertive. Most of their speech acts come in the form of claims focusing solely
on the positive and negative impacts of the presence of Syrian refugees. This demonstrates how
contested and polarized the attitudes toward Syrian refugees are in both countries. Such
polarization observed mainly along partisan lines in Turkey and sectarian lines in Lebanon is not
only dangerous but also hampers the actors’ willingness and ability to produce long-term policies
for Syrian refugees.
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Table 15
Means of Discursive Securitization in Turkey and Lebanon

Sixthly, domestic actors’ securitization scores vary considerably in both countries as
shown in Tables 16 and 17. Starting with Turkey, while cabinet members, state officials, and
pro-government media do not consider the presence of Syrian refugees an important security
threat in any form, most of the opposition parties (CHP, MHP, and IYI party) and antigovernment media portray it as a critical security issue. Similarly, these political parties’
positions toward the regime of President Bashar al-Assad differ substantially as shown in Figure
12. For example, while the ruling AKP government does not recognize President Bashar alAssad as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people anymore, CHP recommends the AKP
government resume its diplomatic relations with Damascus to help resolve the conflict (Firat,
2018).
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Table 16
Discursive Securitization by Subjects in Lebanon
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Table 17
Discursive Securitization by Subjects in Turkey

Furthermore, the opposition parties identify distinct national security objectives in Syria.
For instance, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) views the Turkmen community (Syrian
citizens of Turkish origin residing in Northwest Syria near the border) as the only strategic group
that Turkey should support in Syria. On the other end of the political spectrum, the Peoples’
Democratic Party (HDP), mainly recognized as the defender of the rights of the Kurdish minority
in the country, prioritizes the protection of the Kurdish Autonomous region, known as Rojava.
The YPG (People’s Defense Units), in their view, successfully battled against all the radical and
authoritarian forces in Syria including ISIS and the Syrian regime, and carved out its own selfgoverning entity, which is anti-sectarian, pluralistic, and democratic. From the YPG’s
perspective, Erdogan’s government has aggravated sectarian violence in Syria by supporting
radical groups and by fomenting hatred against the Alawite sect. To justify their preferred
policies and strategies toward Syrian refugees in particular and the Syrian civil war in general, all
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these political parties make references to different historical contexts, events, memories, and
images. For instance, in line with its pro-refugee stance, the ruling party (AKP) employs
religious analogies and likens the Syrian refugees to Muhajirun (early Muslims who migrated
from Mecca to Medina due to oppression) and themselves to Ansar (early Muslims from Medina
who offered help to Muhajirun) (Davutoglu: Onlar Muhacir, 2014). Whereas CHP and MHP
view the Syrian Civil War as the next phase of the US’s Greater Middle East Project, which, in
their opinion, began with the disintegration of Iraq, and critique the government for partaking in
it. These parties maintain that by activating the process that may culminate in a total breakdown
of the Syrian regime and the rise of a wide range of non-state or pre-state actors such as ISIS,
YPG, and FSA in the region, the AKP has increased Turkey’s vulnerability to ethnic insurgency
and terrorist attacks.
Unlike in Turkey, actors’ attitudes toward Syrian refugees are a product of the triangular
sectarian balance of power in Lebanon. Christian political parties often demand refugees’
immediate return by reconstructing or instrumentalizing the experiences of Lebanon with
Palestinian refugees. In so doing, they blame Palestinians for violence in Lebanon and take no
responsibility for their systemic deprivation of fundamental economic, social, and political
rights. Whereas Sunni political actors denounce the requests for Syrians’ immediate return by
claiming that conditions in Syria are not suitable for the safe and dignified return of refugees.
Situated between these two positions, Shia political powers want the country to engage in direct
negotiations with the Syrian regime to return the refugees but do not call for their immediate
return. The deep divide between the March 8 and March 14 alliances concerning Syria’s
involvement in Lebanese politics complicates the Syrian refugee issues. On the one hand,
members of the March 14 alliance assure the international community that Syrian refugees will
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not be subjected to involuntary repatriation. On the other hand, members of the March 8 alliance
want to negotiate the conditions of Syrian refugees’ return with Damascus.
Political actors in Lebanon also emphasize certain historical moments and lessons to
endorse their policy preferences. For example, the Free Patriotic Movement and Kataeb Party
refer to the Palestinian refugee experience in opposition to the creation of formal refugee camps
for Syrians. In contrast, the Future Movement and Progressive Socialist Party remind the
Lebanese public of the Syrian hospitality during the Israeli aggression in 2006 inviting them to
return the favor. The relativity and multiplicity of security and insecurity conceptions and
historical narratives in these countries demonstrate the elusiveness of the notion of national
security. The assumption that all groups and individuals within a society necessarily view certain
issues as collectively threatening does not hold. The meaning of security for an actor is rather
intersubjective and derived from how it conceives of its identity in relation to other domestic
actors operating on the same political scene.
Despite these shared characteristics, there are also key differences between the
securitization of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon that need to be noted. First, although the
anti-Syrian refugee bloc does not endorse the integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey, they do
not also go as far as calling for their return unless a political solution is reached in Syria. Yet, the
anti-Syrian refugee bloc in Lebanon requests refugees’ immediate return regardless of a political
solution. Although it is not labeled as such, what the anti-Syrian refugee bloc demands in
Lebanon is tantamount to involuntary repatriation (awdeh kasri or refoulment), which is a
violation of the general principles of customary international law on refugees.
This difference is partly driven by these countries’ stances toward international laws and
norms governing refugee issues. For example, as noted, Turkey signed the 1951 Refugee
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Convention and 1967 Protocol, and its refugee policies are primarily guided by its obligations
under these international treaties. However, Lebanon is not a part of the convention and has been
extremely critical of the UNHCR’s activities since the beginning of the refugee crisis. President
Michel Aoun, Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri, and Foreign Minister Gibran Basil accuse
the UNCHR and EU of violating Lebanon’s sovereignty and having a secret agenda to
permanently resettle Syrian refugees in Lebanon. They emphasize that Lebanon is not a country
of asylum, resettlement, or final destination for refugees (Janmyr, 2018). The country suspended
the UNHCR’s Syrian refugee registration in 2015. Furthermore, to punish the UNHCR for
allegedly encouraging Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon, Foreign Minister Gibran Basil ordered
a freeze on residency permits for UNHCR staff in June 2018. Responding to the Lebanese
statesmen’s increasing repatriation demands, representatives of the UNHCR and EU cautioned
Lebanon that the return of Syrian refugees must be safe, voluntary, and only applied as a final
resort (“Aoun, Berri, Basil slam U.N.”, 2018).
The difference in the degree of opposition to Syrian refugees between these countries is
also related to their unique historical experiences. For instance, prior to the Syrian civil war,
Turkey was not a major refugee-hosting country.33 Refugees do not conjure up unpleasant
collective memories in the Turkish conscience nor are they viewed dominantly through a
national security prism by the government and elites. Conversely, refugee flows have deeply
shaped Lebanon. Within the early years of its independence, the country had porous borders and
a large number of Palestinian refugees entered during and after the 1948 Arab Israeli War. The

33
Constituting the first major refugee influx, three hundred thousand people of Turkish origin fled to Turkey from Bulgaria
between 1953 and 1975. Secondly, almost half a million Kurds left Iraq for Turkey fearing from state repression and persecution
in 1988. They have not instigated grave political tensions in Turkey. The integration of these refugees in the following years did
not pose an insurmountable challenge to the state.
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refugee camps in which Palestinians were resettled became instrumental to recruitment for AlFatah and PLO particularly throughout the Lebanese Civil War.
Against this historical background, a range of Lebanese attitudes toward Syrian refugees
materialized. Lebanese politicians, especially members of the March 8 alliance, instrumentalize
their perspective on Palestinians in Lebanon to oppose the presence and resettlement of Syrian
refugees. These politicians claim that Lebanon might experience another civil war and it is very
unlikely for a refugee community to return home as the conflict that motivates their displacement
often remains unsettled or becomes even more intractable over time. Again, manipulating the
country’s experiences with Palestinian refugees, they oppose the creation of formal refugee
camps. They suggest that refugee camps may facilitate the armament of extremist groups, the
spread of transnational terrorism, and threaten national security. These deep-seated fears and
biases set in motion the unequal treatment of Palestinian refugees34 as well as the demands of the
pro-Syrian regime political forces for Syrian refugees’ immediate return.
Secondly, objects 35 of securitization are different in Turkey and Lebanon. As shown in
Tables 18 and 19, in Lebanon, actors dominantly view Syrian refugees as a threat to the
existence of the Lebanese state. Majority Sunni refugees are believed to endanger al aysh almushtarak (mutual coexistence), and sihhah at-tamthil as-siyasi (healthy political representation)
in the country by tipping the sectarian balance of power in favor of the Sunnis. The delicate
sectarian balance of power combined with a lack of resources and mounting infrastructure

34

There are several degrees of citizenship as well as refugeehood. Palestinian refugees, who have been living in the refugee
camps for many decades, are not only viewed as second-class citizens but also as second-class refugees in Lebanon. They only
benefit from UNRWA services. UNHCR lists three durable solutions for refugees as a part of its core mandate such as voluntary
repatriation, resettlement in another country, and integration within the host community. Unlike UNHCR, UNRWA is not
mandated to promote durable solutions for Palestinian refugees and it is designed for the exclusive purpose of providing
assistance. Confronted and incapacitated with structural and institutional discrimination and lack of international aid, Palestinian
refugees condemn the inaction and indifference of the Lebanese government and international humanitarian institutions toward
their plight (El-Yassir, 2013).
35
The entities or sectors to which the presence of Syrian refugees is claimed to pose a threat.
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problems render Lebanon more vulnerable to the impacts of the Syrian refugee influx. In
contrast, actors in Turkey do not consider the presence of refugees an existential threat to the
state. Refugees are rather presented as an economic threat and reprehended for working for very
low wages, creating unfair competition for small businesses, leading to an increase in rent prices,
and undermining the tourism industry.
Table 18
Discursive Securitization by Objects in Turkey and Lebanon

Table 19
Non-Discursive Securitization by Objects in Turkey and Lebanon

Congruent with these threat conceptualizations, the state is the main subject 36 of nondiscursive securitization in Lebanon whereas the public is the primary subject of non-discursive
securitization in Turkey as shown in Table 20. The state and local authorities in Lebanon through
the enactment of policies that restrict refugees’ entry, registration, and movement (curfews) have
institutionalized the securitization of Syrian refugees. On the other hand, the public in Turkey

36

The entity that performs a discursive or non-discursive practice and contributes to (de)securitization of an issue or a group of
people.
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with its increasingly hostile sentiments, occasionally accompanied by the incidents of violent
inter-communal conflicts, has motivated the non-discursive securitization of Syrian refugees.
Table 20
Non-Discursive Securitization by Subjects in Turkey and Lebanon

Table 21
Non-Discursive Desecuritization by Subjects in Turkey and Lebanon

Table 22
Audience and Discursive Securitization in Turkey and Lebanon

Third, as shown in Table 22, the audience impacts discursive securitization in distinct
ways in Turkey and Lebanon. Lebanese politicians use more securitizing rhetoric pointing to the
country’s enduring capacity problem when confronted with an international audience. The main
factor leading to this discrepancy between the language employed in front of international and
domestic audiences is the Lebanese statesmen’s desire to attract more funding. The underlying
belief is that the more securitizing the rhetoric employed to describe the Syrian refugee issues is
the more international donation may be attracted. This might also be viewed as “refugee

89
rentierism,” the phenomenon of using host status and refugee policy as primary mechanisms of
international rent-seeking. Attending donor conferences and requesting donations from actors
within and outside the region perhaps is the only aspect of refugee politics that different sectarian
groups agree on in Lebanon. Despite the global donor fatigue, Lebanese statesmen’s fundraising
efforts have largely borne fruit. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan received more than one
billion dollars in donations and became the second-best funded response plan in the world in
2017.37
In contrast, Turkish politicians use less securitizing language to characterize the country’s
Syrian refugee experience in the presence of an international audience. Although the Erdogan
government signed a deal with the EU to receive six billion Euros in the form of humanitarian
assistance, the government officials often avoid associating Syrian refugee issues with national
security. Because the portrayal of Syrian refugees as a national security threat by the government
may be viewed as tacit acknowledgment of the failure of its foreign policy in Syria and harm its
public image and electoral prospects.

37
Even these donations generated some tensions between the local people and refugees as the donations were only earmarked for
refugee services and not directed toward impoverished local communities in the country.
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Table 23
Discursive Desecuritization by Subjects in Turkey
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Table 24
Discursive Desecuritization by Subjects in Lebanon
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Fourth, whereas state and elite-led desecuritization is the general trend in Turkey,
desecuritization is mostly a minority effort in Lebanon. Only 63 out of 341 discursive practices
are desecuritizing in Lebanon. However, most discursive practices, 125 out of 219, are
desecuritizing in Turkey. Additionally, as shown in Table 25, discourses highlighting the Syrian
refugees’ economic contributions and promoting their prospective citizenship constitute a
significant portion (around 40%) of desecuritizing discursive practices in Turkey. On the other
hand, criticisms directed at repatriation calls and the spread of manipulative news targeting
Syrian refugees emerge as the most important source of discursive desecuritization in Lebanon.
Table 25
Means of Discursive Desecuritization in Turkey and Lebanon
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Table 26
Means/Mechanisms of Non-Discursive Desecuritization in Turkey and Lebanon

Finally, actors’ non-discursive desecuritizing practices come in different forms in Turkey
and Lebanon. As shown in Table 26, 77% of the non-discursive desecuritizing practices are
humanitarian projects in Turkey, and the state and public are equally involved in these projects.
Yet, non-discursive desecuritizing practices are very limited in number and scope in Lebanon as
shown in Table 26. Only a small number of state policies such as the opening of reception
centers, creation of a new ministry for the management of refugee affairs and demonstrations
organized by the public against the mistreatment of refugees have contributed to desecuritization
of their presence. This section discussed the results of the data analysis on the securitization of
Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon, and Table 27 below synthesizes all these results into the
conceptual framework introduced in the first chapter.
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Table 27
Summary - Securitization and Desecuritization in Turkey and Lebanon

Narratives
Turkey from Hospitality to Hostility
Turkey is now the top refugee-hosting country in the world. It hosts around 3.6 million
refugees comprising 5% of its population. Turkey’s policies toward refugees and the Syrian
conflict have gradually changed over the course of last eight years (2011-2019). Its legal
approach has transformed from non-recognition (2011-2014) to recognition (2014-2016) and
from recognition to integration (2016-Present). Likewise, its military strategy has grown from
one of limited engagement into one of active engagement in the face of ISIS attacks and YPG’s
consolidation of power in northern Syria.
The country has also rearranged its alliance preferences based on new political realities.
At the start of the conflict, it had formed an informal alliance with the U.S. and European
countries pressuring President Assad to step down from power. However, as the U.S. and Europe
withdrew their support from the Free Syrian Army, Ankara attempted to broker a peace deal with
the international sponsors of the Syrian regime, Moscow and Tehran. In parallel with their
foreign policy positions, domestic actors promoted different sets of policies toward Syrian
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refugees. The following part provides a narrative of these domestic and foreign policy changes in
relation to the securitization of Syrian refugees.
2011-2014, Non-Recognition, Restraint Military Approach. The Justice and
Development Party pursued an open-door policy toward Syrian refugees between 2011 and
2014. The party admitted refugees en masse and built tent cities on the country’s southern border
for their accommodation. However, most of the refugees moved out of these tent cities wishing
to improve their living conditions in urban areas. During these years, the country allocated 4.5
billion dollars to meet the needs of refugees (Orhan and Gundogar, 2015). This period was also
marked by AKP’s increasing political influence over the country. The party won its third
consecutive victory in 2011 and Erdogan was re-elected as Prime Minister with 49.8% of the
vote. Growing public support heartened the government to pursue stronger foreign policies in
Syria. At this stage of the conflict, Erdogan’s government was confident that the war would soon
come to an end and that the refugees would return home. Ahmet Davutoglu, then the foreign
minister of the country, declared that the government would call for an international intervention
by the UN if the number of Syrian refugees fleeing to the country ever exceeded 100,000.
Davutoglu also requested the creation of a safe zone in Syria from the international community
to offer refuge and humanitarian aid to the displaced Syrians. Nevertheless, none of these foreign
policy objectives were accomplished due to the Russian intransigence in the UN Security
Council.
Viewing the presence of refugees only as a temporary condition, the government did not
grant them the conventional refugee status or any type of protection status during this period.
Refugees were only recognized as “misafir” (guests). The management of the refugee population
did not threaten the political stability of Turkey as there were only 14,000 thousand refugees in
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the country as of 2012. Moreover, the government was strongly motivated by the humanitarian
aspect of saving “its Syrian brothers” from the repression of the Assad regime. Had a
conservative party with transnational religious sensitivities not been in power during these early
years, the country’s policies toward Syria and refugees could have taken an entirely different
direction. A coalition government or an ultra-nationalist or secularist government could have
pursued more isolationist and restrictive foreign policies toward Syria as this had been the
hallmark of Kemalist foreign policymaking toward the Middle East in the pre-AKP era.
Another key political issue of this period was the Kurdish-Turkish peace process aimed at
ending the 30-year-old insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In March 2013,
following the talks between the Turkish government and jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan
announced the end of the armed struggle and declared a ceasefire. Although the state entered a
period of détente with the PKK with the ceasefire, its involvement in the Syrian civil war
brought a new set of security complexities. The country was shaken by the car bombings in
Reyhanli that resulted in 52 civilian deaths and 146 injuries in 2013. This was the second
bloodiest terrorist attack recorded in the history of the country. Although Al-Nusra Front claimed
responsibility for the bombings, the government officials blamed the groups that had close ties
with the Syrian Mukhabarat, intelligent services (“Reyhanli saldirisinin”, 2013). The increase in
the overall securitization score of the country from 0.13 to 0.28 in 2014 may well be attributed to
these bombings. Massive terrorist attacks claimed to have been perpetrated by some members of
a refugee and migrant population, alter the public perception of these groups. In a similar
manner, the Reyhanli Bombings harmed the public perception of Syrian refugees. Fears
concerning the spillover of the Syrian Civil War started to be widely expressed. Many people in
Hatay and other surrounding cities protested the government’s Syria policies and their effects on
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the country. Thousands of people gathered in Kahramanmaras, another city in Southern Turkey
where there is a substantial refugee population, chanted “We do not want Syrians anymore” and
vandalized some of the vehicles and stores owned by Syrian refugees (Yalcin, 2014).
Moreover, the AKP’s emphasis on “Islamic brotherhood” with Syrian refugees has also
led to the politicization of the refugee issue. Turkey’s Alevi community and its secular
constituency protest what they call the “Sunnification” policy (Tastekin, 2016), while
Kurds perceive a political plot in the resettlement of large numbers of Sunni Arabs in the
Kurdish-majority southeast (Hintz & Feehan, 2017). In fact, after a large number of refugee
settlements, Turkey’s ethnic and sectarian composition in border cities is rapidly changing.
Alawites—called “Arab Alevi” citizens of Turkey—are no longer the largest Arab group in the
Hatay province, for example, as the demography has changed (Cagaptay & Yalkin, 2018).
Discussions on the spillover of the Syrian Civil War became an integral part of the
dominant security discourse in the ensuing years. Another important issue of concern was the
YPG (People’s Protection Unit). Recognizing the YPG as an extension of the PKK (the
Kurdistan Worker’s Party), the Turkish government perceived its consolidation of power and
mobilization of Syria’s Kurdish population in Northern Syria as an emerging security threat. In
their view, Kurdish autonomy in Syria would encourage Kurdish secessionism in Turkey
(Cagaptay and Yalkin, 2018).
Amid rising foreign policy threats, the Erdogan government was challenged by a series of
mass anti-government protests in May 2013. People contesting the demolition of
Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park started a sit-in at the park. The civil resistance quickly turned into
nationwide civil unrest posing perhaps the most serious threat to the Erdogan government over
the course of its ten-year rule. This civilian opposition to the government policies was followed
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by a bureaucratic challenge in December 2013. A corruption scandal involving several key
people in the government broke and resulted in the reshuffle of ten cabinet members. Perceiving
this as a judicial coup attempt, the government initiated a massive purge and dismissed
thousands of police officers, judges, and prosecutors including those leading the investigation on
the grounds that they were a part of the Gulen movement, an international social and religious
movement accused of being behind the corruption scandal.
The scandal transformed the hierarchy of national security threats in Turkey. The Gulen
movement, once a strong ally of the government, was labeled as the top security threat by the
government replacing the issues of Kurdish insurgency and spillover of the Syrian Civil War. In
the subsequent years, the government intensified its crackdown on the movement by confiscating
the businesses owned by its members and pressuring other countries to close the schools and
institutions run by the movement. In the meantime, many journalists critical of the government’s
policies were jailed and social media platforms such as Twitter and YouTube were temporarily
banned.
During these early years, the Syrian Civil War and the refugee influx had mixed
economic impacts. It improved the economic fortunes of some actors while harming others. For
example, bordering cities of Turkey such as Hatay and Gaziantep became alternative providers
of manufacturing goods as the manufacturing sector deteriorated in Syria. In particular, the
export of basic medical supplies skyrocketed. Wealth transfer was another positive impact of the
Syrian refugee influx. 1.5 billion dollars have been transferred to Turkish banks by Syrian
businessmen in Antakya only in 2012. Furthermore, landowners vastly profited from raising rent
prices as the demand for housing experienced a dramatic surge.
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Nevertheless, some other actors such as truck drivers transporting products to Syria, or
different places through Syria on a regular basis lost their businesses. Another sector that was
hampered by the Syrian Civil War was the tourism industry. For example, the number of tourists
who visited Hatay, another bordering city, dropped from 280,000 to 55,000 in 2012.
Furthermore, rising rent prices in many cities harmed low-income families. Finally, local shop
owners in some cities were enraged due to the unfair competition caused by Syrians who had
allegedly not properly registered their businesses and not paid regular taxes. Many Syrian
businesses were shut down because of the increasing public dissatisfaction. Overall, as discussed
in the first chapter, the Syrian Civil War and the ensuing refugee influx mostly helped advance
the economic fortunes of the actors on the supply side of the economy (providers of services,
goods, jobs, and housing), while harming those of the actors on its demand side (consumers of
services, goods, jobs, and housing) by intensifying the competition over resources. Thus, the
assertion that refugees affect all economic groups and sectors in the same way or in a negative
way does not have much analytical validity.
Meanwhile, the opposition parties such as Republican People’s Party and Nationalist
Movement Party, and Peoples’ Democratic Party criticized the government’s pro-refugee
policies. For instance, Hursit Gunes, a deputy from the main opposition party, CHP, maintained
that the state should not issue work permits for Syrian refugees because it would only bring a
further influx of Syrian refugees into the country and aggravate the existing hostilities between
locals and Syrian refugees. Moreover, Gunes claimed that some of the refugee camps in Turkey
have already turned into bases for the recruitment of anti-Assad militants. Lastly, Gunes
denounced the government’s plans to grant citizenship to Syrian refugees. Citizenship, he
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claimed, would only incentivize the Syrian refugees to not return to Syria even if the civil war
came to an end.
The influx of refugees also influenced the social practices and gender dynamics in the
bordering cities. For instance, some Syrian families, viewing it as an interim solution to the
problems of financial instability and social isolation, married off their young daughters to
Turkish men. These marriages often ending with divorce rendered Syrian women more
vulnerable with children to look after before achieving financial independence through
education. Meanwhile, Turkish women from low-income families in these cities felt threatened
by the stories of Turkish men divorcing their wives to marry underage Syrian girls or taking
them as second wives (Nawa & Sebzeci, 2016).
Although polygamy was outlawed in Turkey with the adoption of the Turkish Civil Code
in 1926, it is still an informal practice in rural areas. Between 2012 and 2014, 4,000 marriages
were officiated between Turkish men and Syrian women only in Kilis (Pitel, 2017; Letsch,
2014). This tendency is a manifest instantiation of male opportunism enabled by the
demographic makeup of Syrian refugees. Women and children, who are in need of psychosocial
support the most, compose 75% of the Syrian refugee population. Feminist studies focusing on
such changing social practices could provide important insights into the gendered dimensions of
the refugee experience in Turkey and Lebanon.
With the increasing refugee presence and perceptibility, an array of disturbing
misconceptions, myths, and accusations came to be circulated in the country. Among these were
“Syrians commit more crimes than Turkish citizens on average”; “Syrians get a salary from the
government”; “Syrians’ bills are paid by the government”; “Syrians do not pay tax”; “Syrians
vote in the elections”; “Syrians should have stayed in Syria and defended their country instead of
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fleeing” (“Suriyelilele ilgili bilinen”, n.d.). All these myths contributed to the securitization of
public attitudes toward Syrian refugees generating a social atmosphere that facilitates their
marginalization and discrimination.
In addition to the civil unrest, corruption allegations, transnational security challenges,
and pressing refugee issues, the country went through important political changes during this
period. In August 2014, in line with the constitutional reforms of 2007 that introduced a direct
national vote instead of an election by the members of the parliament, Turkey held its first
popular presidential elections. Prime Minister Erdogan managed to become the country’s first
popularly elected president by getting 52% of the vote in the first round of the elections. The new
executive presidential system equipped him with unprecedented powers and reduced the power
of the prime minister in Turkish politics. In conclusion, this first period was characterized by
four general trends: civil and institutional challenges to the ruling Justice and Development
Party, its electoral victories, the spillover of the Syrian Civil War, and growing public reactions
toward refugees.
2014 – 2016, Recognition and Low-Intensity Military Engagement. At the end of
2014, the total number of Syrian refugees entering Turkey reached 1.5 million. It was evident
that the government’s initial calculations were untenable; the war in Syria would not end soon
and refugees would not return home. The emerging political realities forced the government to
revise its short-term logic of action and address some of the legal uncertainties surrounding
Syrian refugee affairs in Turkey. To that end, the government introduced a set of asylum laws
such as the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LIFP) and the Temporary Protection
Directive. These measures provided Syrian refugees with temporary protection status (TPS).
Another important regulation, the Regulation on Work Permit for Foreigners under Temporary
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Protection, introduced in 2016, granted the temporary protection beneficiaries the right to apply
for a work permit. Furthermore, the Ministry of National Education issued a circular letter in
September 2014 emphasizing that Syrian children who fled Syria were guaranteed primary and
high school education and could enroll in public schools and education centers. In the following
months, the country’s higher education council also announced that Syrians would be able to
enter eight Turkish universities without examination. All these regulations were the initial steps
taken toward refugees’ integration into the country’s legal, educational and economic system.
During these years, the impacts of the Syrian refugee influx on the European countries
began to alter the dynamics of Turkish-European relations. Given that thousands of Syrians were
trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea and reach European shores, the humanitarian pressures and
border security concerns drew the EU closer to Turkey. Although the EU-Turkey membership
negotiations were at a standstill, the strategic need for collaboration motivated the signing of a
deal in March 2016 between the EU and Turkey. Under the agreement, the EU agreed to return
every illegal refugee who reached the Greek islands to Turkey and resettle the same number of
vetted Syrian refugees in Europe. Moreover, the EU pledged to provide six billion euros in
humanitarian aid to Turkey, lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens, and resume the EUTurkey membership negotiations.
While the number of Syrian refugees going to European countries dropped enormously
after the signing of the deal, the deal has not aided Turkey in any meaningful way. The number
of Syrian refugees who have left Turkey for Europe since 2016 is around 12,000, which
comprises only 0.35% of the entire Syrian refugee population residing in the country. On the
other hand, the advances of YPG and ISIS on the country’s southern border became a significant
security concern. Fifty-one people in Reyhanli, thirty-three people in Suruc, and a hundred and
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seven people in Ankara lost their lives in the attacks perpetrated by ISIS. Despite these largescale terrorist attacks, Ankara did not engage in any cross-border military campaigns against
YPG and ISIS and only launched instantaneous airstrikes between 2011 and 2015. Under the
weight of tensions aggravated by the Syrian Civil War and the role of both Turkey and Kurds in
the war, the ceasefire declared by jailed PKK leader in 2013 crumbled in July 2015.
Moreover, Ankara’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War undermined its relations with
regional powers such as Russia and Iran which partnered in providing unconditional support to
the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad. In particular, the downing of a Russian fighter
Jet in November 2015 seriously affected Turkey-Russia relations. This occurred right after
Turkey changed its rules of engagement in Syria and declared that it would begin to view all
military elements approaching from Syria as an enemy threat. This was the first time a NATO
member has shot down a Russian warplane in the post-Cold War era. This led to a situation
where an active NATO member could be attacked by another country causing the collective
defense guarantees of the NATO agreement to be invoked. Thus, NATO acted immediately to
defuse the tensions between Russia and Turkey (Borger, 2015). Both Russia and Turkey stated
that they would not initiate a war, but the Kremlin eventually decided to retaliate by imposing a
series of economic sanctions on Turkey.
Caught between a rock and a hard place, Ankara’s long strategic partnership with
Washington also weakened due to the disagreement on the status and legitimacy of the People’s
Protection Units (YPG). While the U.S. viewed the YPG as a key ally in its fight against ISIS in
the region and provided it with logistical and military support, Turkey considered the YPG an
extension of PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which it deems a terrorist organization and has
been fighting for more than three decades. Although ISIS was a fundamental threat for Ankara,
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the YPG was an existential one. Due to these conflicting security priorities in Syria, TurkishAmerican relations entered a period of stagnation.
This was also partly driven by the failure of the U.S.’s attempts to build an opposition
force, which left Turkey among the few actors assisting the Syrian opposition alongside UAE,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan. The strategic need for Ankara to strongly identify with
American leadership in the region dissipated over the years. Considering the complete picture of
the AKP’s foreign policy, the Syrian Civil War forced the AKP government to change its “zero
problems with neighbors foreign policy,” which had motivated a rapprochement with Syria, Iran,
Iraq, and even Armenia in the preceding years. “Good neighbor policies” became dysfunctional
and irrelevant as the Middle East entered a period of intense political fragmentation with a wave
of uprisings and rebellions against the old oppressive regimes, popularly known as the Arab
Spring. Importantly, the ensuing sectarian tensions in the region caused Turkey’s longsuppressed Islamic identity to become an important aspect of its foreign policy.
The involvement in Syria combined with the economic slowdown, political conflict with
the Gulen Movement, failure of the peace process with PKK, allegations of corruption, and
growing authoritarianism cost a significant loss of public support to the AKP and President
Erdogan. In the June 2015 elections, the party won only 258 out of 550 seats and lost its majority
in the parliament. This was the first serious electoral challenge to the AKP’s more than a decade
long political supremacy. In the aftermath of the elections, Davutoglu could not form a coalition
government, and the government decided to hold snap elections. Although the AKP regained its
majority in the parliament in the snap elections, the June 2015 election results remained a strong
indicator of the AKP’s declining public support.
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One of the most controversial events in Turkish political history transpired in July 2016.
A faction within the Turkish Armed Forces attempted a military coup on the grounds that the
ruling government was undermining secularism and rule of law in the country. Many
government buildings including the Turkish Parliament and the Presidential Palace were bombed
and more than two hundred people lost their lives (“Turkey’s failed coup”, 2017). As a country
that periodically suffered from coups and succumbed to military tutelage, the attempted coup
united all the political actors in Turkey in the condemnation of the attempt.
The coup attempt added another layer of complexity to Turkish-American relations.
President Erdogan blamed the Gulen movement for having orchestrated the coup attempt in
tandem with the CIA and requested Gulen’s extradition. Washington rejected Ankara’s
accusations and extradition requests on the grounds that the evidence provided by Ankara was
insufficient and inconclusive (Wilks, 2019). In the aftermath of the coup attempt, Ankara labeled
the Gulen Movement as a terrorist organization and declared a state of emergency. The state of
emergency brought the suspension of democratic practices in the country for the next two years
and motivated massive purges and crackdowns on the media and opposition.
During this period, the number of organizations on Ankara’s terrorist list posing an
imminent security threat increased from one (PKK) to four (Gulen Movement, the YPG, PKK,
and ISIS). This period was characterized by developments in the legal status and conditions of
Syrian refugees, multiplication of security threats inside and outside the country, deterioration of
relations with the US and Russia, and the weakening of the public support for the AKP and
President Erdogan.
2016-Present, Integration and High-Intensity Military Engagement. The Turkish
government’s objectives from 2016 onwards shifted to integrate Syrian refugees into the larger
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Turkish society and protect its borders against YPG and ISIS. President Erdogan declared that
Turkey would grant full citizenship to highly skilled Syrian refugees in July 2016 (Pitel, 2016).
As only ten percent of the Syrian refugees had a university degree, this policy could rather easily
devolve into a legal duality creating a situation like that of Syrian and Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon. Erdogan’s citizenship proposal was initially viewed as a reflection of his desire to
create a new support base rather than a pillar of any long-term integration policy. Although more
than fifty thousand Syrians, mainly those working in the industry, science, and education,
acquired citizenship between 2016 and 2018, not every Syrian holding temporary protection
status was entitled to apply for citizenship (Pekkendir, 2018).
Still, under the shock of the July 15 coup attempt, the AKP with the ultra-nationalist
party (MHP) passed a highly critical referendum proposal in January 2017. The referendum had
18 constitutional amendments designed to turn the country’s political system from a
parliamentary democracy into a presidential one. In the referendum, held in April 2017 under a
state of emergency, 51 percent of the public voted in favor of the constitutional reforms.
President Erdogan now was the head of government as well as the head of state holding powers
to issue executive decrees, appoint judges, and heads of state institutions. All political power was
virtually concentrated in the office of the president with the new political system. In retrospect,
the coup attempt of July 15 motivated the process that started with massive purges from state
institutions, mainly the army and police forces and ended with a referendum that turned the
country’s parliamentary system into an executive presidency. During these years, the Turkish
army also played a more active role in Syria and carried out several cross-border operations. The
first operation, known as Operation Euphrates Shield, was launched against the YPG and ISIS in
2016. At the end of the operation, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army captured Manbij, and
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some 50,000 refugees returned home. The other large-scale military operation, Operation Olive
Branch, was conducted in January 2018 and led to the fall of YPG-controlled Afrin to Turkish
forces.
By 2016, Turkey’s overall military objectives in Syria have shifted from eliminating
President Bashar al-Assad to securing its own borders and preventing a new influx of refugees.
The country moved from a policy of maximum gain to a policy of minimum loss attesting to the
failure of AKP’s foreign policy in Syria. Increasing Iranian and Russian support for the regime
of President Bashar al-Assad was also an important deterring factor. In particular, the fall of
Aleppo in 2016 gave clear supremacy to the Syrian regime over the opposition forces. In the face
of these developments, diplomatic engagement with Moscow and Tehran came to be the only
viable solution to the conflict for Ankara. Therefore, Turkey focused its efforts on diplomatic
talks with Iran and Russia. The three countries reiterated their commitment to Syria’ territorial
integrity, but failed to propose any tangible plans to end the ongoing conflict.
Meanwhile, Turkish-American relations faced another challenge toward the end of 2016.
Andrew Craig Brunson, an American pastor, was arrested and jailed during the purges in the
aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt for allegedly being a member of the Gulenist Terrorist
Network (FETO). Erdogan proposed to exchange Brunson for Fethullah Gulen, the Turkish
cleric claimed to have been the mastermind of the coup attempt. However, Washington did not
accept Erdogan’s request and responded by imposing economic sanctions on Turkey (Keating,
2018). This was the second time since 2011 that Ankara was facing economic sanctions imposed
by an important trade partner.
The sanctions combined with the overall economic slowdown caused the Turkish lira to
lose forty percent of its value against the American dollar and brought the country to the verge of
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an economic crisis. Fearing the long-term electoral consequences of the economic slowdown, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its ally, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) called for
early elections.
Prior to the June 2018 election, two alliance blocks emerged in Turkey; the People’s
Alliance that included AKP and MHP and Nation’s Alliance that included CHP, IYI Party, and
Felicity Party. The HDP (People’s Democratic Party) entered the elections with its own
presidential candidate. The People’s Alliance won the presidential elections in the first round of
the elections by getting 52% of the general vote. After the elections, the two-year-long state of
emergency was lifted in July 2018. However, these snap elections did not save the AKP from the
long-term effects of the economic recession. In the June 2019 local elections, the AKP suffered a
major setback and lost the elections in almost all the metropolitan cities including Istanbul and
Ankara. Like Lebanon, political contestation began to take place between alliance blocks in
Turkey under the new system of executive presidency.
In the run-up to the local elections, some opposition parties, capitalizing on the public’s
discontent with refugees, promised to restore the country’s relations with Syria and send refugees
back (“Iyi Party leader”, 2018). The rhetoric employed by these opposition parties during their
election campaigns revealed the main problem with the country’s refugee affairs. The partisan
attitudes showed that the future of Syrians should not be left to the discretion of the political
parties or figures but be taken under legal and institutional guarantees. The public’s growing
anti-refugee sentiments, as supported by the polling data, impact the political party discourses as
well as the election results in Turkey (Idiz, 2019). Some maintain that the refugee question
helped Ekrem Imamoglu, CHP’s candidate for mayor of Istanbul, in winning the election
(“UNHCR Lebanon”, n.d.). In conclusion, in the post-2016 period, Turkish politics has been
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shaped by high-intensity military engagement with ISIS and YPG on the country’s southern
border, entry of integration into the refugee policies discourse, mounting tensions with the US,
and politicization of the presence of Syrian refugees by the opposition parties.
Lebanon from Inaction to Reaction
Lebanon has the highest number of refugees per capita, and refugees make up a quarter of
its population (Yurdakul, 2019). Until the January Policy of 2015, the Lebanese government
maintained open borders with Syria in compliance with the 1993 bilateral agreement that
allowed for free movement between these two countries. A series of inactions characterized
Lebanon’s early response to the Syrian refugee influx such as non-encampment, no policy, and
disassociation (Mourad, 2017). During the early years of the conflict, the presence of Syrian
refugees was not presented or perceived as an existential security threat in Lebanon. On the other
hand, in the face of state inaction, the international institutions, mainly the UNHCR, emerged as
a surrogate state addressing Syrian refugee issues. However, as the war intensified and the
number of refugees fleeing to Lebanon increased, the inaction of the state was replaced with its
reactionary policies, which resulted in the securitization of the Syrian refugee presence in
Lebanon. Among these policies were strict entry regulations, limitations on the sectors in which
Syrians could work, high residency permit renewal fees, suspension of UNHCR’s registration of
Syrian refugees, and perennial demands for refugees’ return to Syria. The following part
provides a narrative of these changing attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
2011-2014, Inaction and the Ideal of Disassociation from the Syrian Conflict. The
pre-Syrian Civil War Lebanon was a Lebanon where stability rested on the 1989 Taif Accord,
which ended the country’s fifteen-year-long civil war, and was ensured by Syria’s continuing
occupation. Unlike the 1943 National Pact that privileged the country’s Christian politico-
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economic elites, the 1989 agreement provided a 50:50 power-sharing ratio between Christians
and Muslims in Lebanon (Taif Agreement). However, the political contest between Israel, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran over the control of Lebanon continued to turn the country into a site of
regional and international contests.
The country remained under Syrian occupation until 2005 despite the UN Security
Council Resolution 1559 calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, the
disarming of Hizbollah, and holding elections without Syrian interference. The Syrian troops
withdrew amid popular protests, known as the Cedar Revolution, in the aftermath of Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri’s assassination in February 2005. In post-Syria Lebanon, two
multisectarian political blocs: the anti-Syrian March 14 movement and the pro-Syrian March 8
movement emerged. The political parties in post-Syria Lebanon often failed to reach a consensus
over the formation of a cabinet and the election of the president. When the serving president
Emile Lahoud’s term ended in November 2007, the election of Michel Suleiman as the
consensus president took more than six months.
In the face of the Syrian Civil War, some observers suggested that the socio-economic
and political pressures generated by the spillover effects of the war in Syria produced a context
resembling the pre-1975 civil war context in Lebanon (Salloukh 2017:62). The delicate sectarian
balance of power and Syria’s history of involvement in Lebanese politics made the country
extremely vulnerable to the spillover effects of the civil war. The war began to spill over
Lebanon resulting in deadly skirmishes between Sunni Muslims and Alawites in Tripoli in the
summer of 2011.
Alarmed by the spillover of the civil war, the Lebanese National Dialogue Committee led
by President Michel Suleiman issued a foreign policy declaration, known as the Baabda
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Declaration, in 2012 in which disassociation from the conflict and the desire of the government
for the protection of national unity in responding to regional tensions was stated in strongest
terms (Ziade, 2012). However, the policy of disassociation did not last long and by May 2013
Hizbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah acknowledged that his group was sending fighters to Syria, a
clear violation of the Baabda Declaration (Hazbun 2016:1063). However, it is important to note
that other fighters were also going into Syria from Lebanon. Attacks and abductions of Lebanese
troops and kidnapping of Lebanese Shi’a pilgrims were taking place on the border.
Furthermore, Lebanon lacked a stable government between 2011 and 2014 as it went
through three cabinet changes. The cabinet formed by Saad Hariri in 2009 collapsed in 2011
when Hizbollah and allied ministers resigned. Then, the government formed by Najib Mikati, a
moderately pro-Syrian politician, resigned amid tensions over upcoming elections in March
2013. Tammam Salam, a politician tasked with the creation of the new government, formed the
cabinet after 10 months of negotiations in April 2014.
The Syrian Civil War provoked the re-emergence of the competing security agendas in
Lebanon. These different security interests and priorities of the domestic actors were reflected in
their political rhetoric. For example, in order to justify Hizbollah’s involvement in the civil war,
Nasrallah framed the Syrian conflict as being between a supporter of the resistance (the Syrian
regime) against Israel, the US, and Saudi-backed takfiri extremists, such as al-Qaeda affiliates,
who could threaten Lebanon without Hizbollah’s protection (Hazbun 2016:1063). This was an
example of the strategic employment of the security language where a securitizing actor made a
particular audience (Lebanese Shi’a communities) accept a potential political outcome (the fall
of the Syrian regime) as a significant security threat.
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Nasrallah’s success in drawing the support of the Shi’a communities resulted from the
compatibility of his threat conception with the dominant threat conceptions (Israeli threat and
Takfiri threat) and with the audience’s religious and political dispositions. Key events such as the
ISIS bombings near the Sayyidah Zaynab Shrine, Syria’s holiest Shia Shrine, also provided
validity to Nasrallah’s framing of the security threats in Syria. Had he framed Hizbollah’s
involvement in the Syrian civil war as an attempt to provide support for a key sectarian ally in
the region against predominantly mainstream Sunni forces, his threat conception perhaps would
not have been as successful. The replacement of the regime in Damascus with a pro-Saudi Sunnidominated one would certainly deprive Hizbollah of a pivotal regional ally and access to its main
weapons and logistic supply routes from Iran (Salloukh 2017:68)
Nevertheless, Hizbollah’s inter-sectarian power consolidation efforts were not as successful
as its intra-sectarian power consolidation efforts. Nasrallah’s framing of the Hizbollah’s
involvement in the civil war did not convince the Sunni community of Lebanon and led to the
loss of the prestige and support. Hizbollah’s reputation as an important force battling against
Israel was replaced with a sectarian view of the group within non-Shia groups. On the other
hand, members of March 14 alliance viewed Lebanon’s inability to control and contain
Hizbollah as the basis of Lebanon’s vulnerability (Hazbun 2016:1059).
Although the Syrian war has impacted the out-group relations for the Shia community, it
has rather transformed the in-group relations for the Sunni community. Small Sunni militia
groups, despite the mainstream Sunnis leaders’ efforts to pursue their community’s interests
through increased political engagement, formed in hotspots such as Sidon, Tripoli, and the Bekaa
Valley. These militia groups battled against local Alawites, provided support to Syrian rebels,
and occasionally engaged in bombing campaigns against Hizbollah. Due to the military
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imbalance between Hizbollah and these small militia groups, these initial battles did not
transform into a nationwide conflict. In post-Syrian Lebanon, Hizbollah was the only military
power that had credible deterrence capability in the country.
The hostage crisis and attacks in August 2014, where ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra took 26
Lebanese soldiers hostage in Arsal, temporarily altered the security environment in Lebanon.
Many elements of the Lebanese security apparatus including the LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces),
the ISF (International Security Forces), Hizbollah, and others found themselves cooperating
despite their political divisions (Hazbun 2016:1064). Such moments of unity did not suffice to
bridge these actors’ competing understandings of security. Institutionalized sectarian identities
continued to dictate the actors’ degree and way of involvement in the Syrian Civil War as well as
their attitudes toward refugees.
An important refugee-related issue that divided the Lebanese actors during these early
years was the creation of formal camps. Members of the March 14 Alliance, the Future
Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party, supported the idea of creating formal camps for
Syrian refugees, while the Free Patriotic Movement and Kataeb Party rejected the idea by
reminding the public of the Lebanese experience with Palestinian refugees. The positions of
Hizbollah and the Amal Movement were rather unclear on the issue of the encampment of Syrian
refugees. Self-settlement of refugees placed disproportionate pressure on the local communities
and municipal governments (Mourad, 2017).
The inaction of the state also provided more discretion to the local authorities in the
management of refugee affairs. Lebanese municipalities regularly imposed curfews on Syrian
refugees. Human Rights Watch identified at least 45 municipalities across the country that
imposed such curfews in 2013 (“Lebanon: At least”, 2014). In sum, these early years (2011-

114
2014) of the Syrian refugee influx in Lebanon were characterized by a lack of coherent refugee
policies, political deadlocks, and struggle of the domestic actors over rival security interests and
priorities despite attempts to ensure Lebanon’s disassociation from the conflict.
2015-Present, Reaction and Forcing Refugees to Return. The 2015 January Policy
changed the country’s initial open-door policies and placed significant restrictions on refugees’
entry into Lebanon and renewal of residency permits. The rules adopted put Syrian refugees
under two categories: those who are registered with the UNHCR and those who are not and must
find a Lebanese sponsor to remain in the country. These regulations also required Syrians over
the age of 15 to pay $200 every year to renew their residency. As most of the Syrian refugees
were living below the poverty line in Lebanon, these regulations pushed them to live in the
shadows rather than normalizing and regulating their presence. Furthermore, these regulations
required refugees to sign a notarized pledge banning them to work in Lebanon. Some Syrians
were also requested to sign documents vowing to return to Syria following the expiration of their
residency documents (“Akkar residents”, 2017).
The differences between actors’ approaches toward the refugees and the Syrian Civil War
were incommensurable. Hizbollah was now fully involved in the war monopolizing Lebanon’s
external security discourse and assuming the responsibilities and prerogatives of state security
agencies. Christian political parties were presenting the presence of Syrian refugees as an
existential threat, pressuring the UNHCR to facilitate the return of refugees and negotiating with
the Syrian regime the terms, conditions, and timing of refugees’ return. Sunni political figures
were criticizing Hizbollah for bringing the war to Lebanon and resisting the calls for refugees’
forced return.
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Blaming the UNHCR for Syrian refugees’ stay in Lebanon, the government suspended its
registration activities in May 2015. To appease rising tensions in some host communities and
appeal to their sectarian voter bases, many politicians endorsed the idea of forcing refugees to
return to Syria. Among these, Gebran Bassil, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leader of the
largest Christian party in the parliament, was perhaps the most vehement opponent of Syrian
refugees’ presence in Lebanon. He blamed Syrians for a wide range of social ills and promoted a
set of restrictive and discriminatory refugee policies including their involuntary repatriation
(Chehayeb, 2019). Continuing to accuse the UNHCR of obstructing the refugees’ return to
Syria, Gebran Bassil ordered a freeze on residency permits for UNHCR staff in June 2018.
Negotiating with the Syrian regime for the return of refugees has become another divisive
issue in the face of increasing demands for refugees’ return. While the Free Patriotic Movement
and Hizbollah were open to negotiations with the regime for the return of refugees, the Future
Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party opposed the normalization of ties with Syria
accusing the Syrian regime of its involvement in a series of political assassinations, including
that of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The March 14 alliance refuted the claims by the
March 8 movement that Syria was safe and ready for the refugees’ return. To conclude, the
attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Lebanon in the post-2015 period have been characterized by
the enactment of restrictive and discriminatory policies, increasing demands for refugees’ return,
and the total collapse of the policy of disassociation due to the sectarian actors’ competing
security interests. All of these have substantially contributed to the securitization of the Syrian
refugee presence in Lebanon as documented in the second section of this chapter.
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Conclusions and Guidelines for Desecuritization
The gap between actuality and what the Lebanese and Turkish governments desire to be
true regarding the conditions of Syrian refugees is increasingly widening. Despite the fact that
Lebanon hosts over 400,000 Palestinian refugees, a million Syrian refugees and thousands of
Iraqi refugees, a section of Lebanese politicians continue to claim that Lebanon is not a country
of asylum or resettlement. Similarly, the Turkish government tends to ignore the growing
discontentment with refugees that occasionally results in violent inter-communal conflicts.
I argue that the desecuritization of Syrian refugees in Turkey conforms to Hansen’s
category of desecuritization as a form of silencing where the solution to a securitized problem is
delayed and relevant critical issues are pushed into the background. Government-and-elite-led
desecuritization is only a temporary solution and a possible government change may lead to
fundamental changes in the status and conditions of Syrian refugees. Given that most of the AKP
voters are also dissatisfied with the presence of refugees and the government’s pro-refugee
policies, voter hostility might push the government to reconsider its policies. Due to these
reasons, the politicization of Syrian refugees, and the use of anti-refugee rhetoric to appeal to
voters, has become a theme of politics in Turkey. The 2019 local elections where the opposition
parties widely employed anti-refugee rhetoric marked the entry of anti-refugee rhetoric into the
language of electoral campaigning (Ozkir, 2019).
Although many politicians recognize that Syrian refugees are unlikely and unable to return
home, they avoid identifying their integration as a possible course of action due to fears of public
reaction. Instead, they focus on refugees’ possible return to Syria. In both countries, the public is
not ready to hear that Syrian refugees might stay permanently, and this prevents the emergence
of serious discussions around long-term coexistence with refugees. Lebanon’s historical legacy
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with Palestinian refugees and the delicate sectarian balance of power system have produced a
cross-party opposition to the naturalization and permanent residency of Syrian refugees.
Residency and naturalization are essential to the legal integration of refugee communities but
might become sensitive in Lebanon by undermining the country’s sectarian and ideological
power-sharing system.
Political structures shape actors’ identities and interests. The Lebanese political system
breeds a perennial state of insecurity as it incentivizes political parties and movements to become
the dominant representatives of their respective sectarian communities and distribute rights and
services along sectarian lines (Cammett, 2013). Under this system, Syrian refugees only
reinforce the sectarian identities and divisions and test the country’s fault lines. The question
often for Syrian refugees in Lebanon is not naturalization or integration but maintaining good
relations with the Lebanese state and public. Any long-term solution to the refugee predicament
in Lebanon would require the reconfiguration of the confessional power-sharing model, and the
depoliticization of sectarian identities where the distribution of political and bureaucratic posts
no longer relies on sectarian membership, and political parties offer social benefits across
different groups and operate as national actors. However, it is more likely refugees will be
repatriated than the political elites will abandon their privileges.
Political issues might be resolved through elections, preference shifting, or alliance
formation, but identity-based conflicts are very resistant to change (Chandra 2012:1). Although
multi-sectarian coalitions (Pro-Syrian Regime March 8 and Anti-Syrian Regime March 14
alliances) have shown the variability of the political salience of sectarian identity in Lebanon,
this variation has been the exception rather than the rule. Additionally, transnational sectarian
loyalties undermine Lebanon’s autonomy turning it into a geopolitical battleground for foreign
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powers and their non-state or sub-state proxies (Hazbun, 2016). Therefore, Lebanon and
refugees’ primary security interests lie in the centralization of authority and expansion of the
coercive powers of the state (Hazbun, 2016).
On the other hand, Turkey still lacks a grand strategy for the integration of Syrian
refugees. The solutions are temporary arising from necessities of the moment. For example,
hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, who were initially allowed to leave the bordering
cities and refugee camps, where they were registered, and reside in the metropolitan cities, are
ordered to return to the cities where they were registered by August 20, 2019, or face forcible
transfer by the governor’s office in Istanbul, which produced a new set of anxieties for internal
displacement within a host country (“Turkey orders thousands”, 2019). Such temporary
measures hinder the economic and social integration of refugees and push them toward legal
invisibility. Many Western countries have claimed that integration of Syrian refugees could be
easier in the neighboring countries as they share cultural similarities with refugees. However,
they overlooked how sectarian fault lines and the economic incapacity of neighboring states
could impede refugees’ integration.
The Syrian conflict has not resulted in an all-out war in Lebanon but transformed the ingroup and out-group relations. For the Sunni community, Hizbollah’s reputation as an important
force battling against Israel was replaced with a force pursuing a sectarian agenda in Syria and in
the region. On the other hand, the civil war has led to political fragmentation within the Sunni
community in Lebanon where political opponents and radical groups have emerged. These
included established organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood; local strongmen in Sidon,
Tripoli, and other predominantly Sunni areas; various hardline groups, some of which are linked
to al-Qaida; and marginal Arab nationalist and leftist organizations such as the SSNP and Baath
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party (Melani, 2013). Some of these challengers, such as Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir in Sidon, have
employed violence, a tactic that the Future Movement has largely avoided, in clashes with
Hizbollah and its allies (Melani, 2013).
In both countries, domestic actors have proposed and prioritized different conceptions of
security throughout the war. For example, Hizbollah maintained that Israel, its allies, and takfiris
(radical Sunni groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra) were posing an existential threat to the
Lebanese sovereignty and security, and if these forces were not defeated, they would also destroy
Lebanon. Although Hizbollah’s allies in the March 8 movement, primarily the Free Patriotic
Movement, did not share its anti-Westernism, they supported its pro-Syrian regime policies.
Whereas the members of the March 14 alliance viewed Hizbollah’s militarization and
participation in the Syrian civil war as the most important security threat to Lebanon’s integrity
as well as a violation of its policy of dissociation.
In a similar way, Turkish political parties differed in terms of their security priorities in
Syria. The ruling party supported the opposition to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad, the
ultra-nationalist party promoted a policy of limited engagement focusing on the protection of
Syrian Turkmens, and the Kurdish minority party focused on the protection of the autonomous
Kurdish region in Rojava. Throughout the civil war, ISIS has emerged as an important security
threat for both countries and they suffered several deadly attacks perpetrated by ISIS members.
Additionally, as explained in the preceding sections, YPG and FETO have been categorized as
critical security threats by the Turkish government causing a rift between Ankara and
Washington.
Considering these conclusions, I offer six guidelines for the desecuritization of the
presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Turkey all of which are a part of a comprehensive
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and holistic approach to refugee resettlement and integration. First is institution-building. Both in
Turkey and Lebanon, there is a significant need for the formation of institutions at the municipal
and national levels to help facilitate the management of refugee affairs as well as refugees’
integration into the host communities. Although these countries created central institutions with
the purpose of addressing the refugee concerns in a timely manner such as the Directorate
General of Migration Management (DGMM) in Turkey and the Ministry for Displaced Affairs in
Lebanon, there is a strong need to provide services and support to refugee communities at the
local and municipal levels. Not only because some refugees arrive with physical and mental
health issues but also because they need systematic support to overcome economic illiteracy and
lack of knowledge of the culture and knowledge of the host society.
Second is the development of grand strategies based on a realistic conception of the
current status of the Syrian civil war and Syria’s level of security. Given the powerful alliance
between Syria, Iran, and Russia, and the imbalance of power between the sides of the conflict, a
regime change does not seem to be likely in Syria. Nobody can also provide security guarantees
to refugees if they return amid an ongoing war. Furthermore, although how post-war Syria will
be structured will have a greater impact on the return of refugees, Law 10 enacted by the Assad
government, authorizing refugees’ dispossession of their rightfully owned properties, has already
signaled that economic persecution would be a part of their lives if they return. Refugees’ return
is not a feasible policy option, and it is rather employed as a discursive tool to appease the public
both in Lebanon and Turkey. These countries should focus their efforts on producing long-term
settlement and integration strategies and change their temporary logic of action.
Third is an increased involvement of the civil society or public-private partnership in the
management of refugee affairs. As discussed, civil society organizations are more active in
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Turkey conducting humanitarian projects in coordination with the government. Charitable
organizations and volunteers help refugees with a wide variety of issues from teaching refugees
about culture and language to assisting them to find jobs and place their children in school.
However, civil society contributions to humanitarian projects appear to be very limited in
number and scope in Lebanon. Civil society’s involvement would not only help improve the
conditions of refugees but also the level of communication between refugees and the host
community and thereby decreasing the securitization of Syrian refugees by the societal actors.
Moreover, the involvement of civil society democratizes the process of reception and integration
because it also allows refugees to become active participants in the processes that shape their
futures. A political system that does not create avenues for healthy and constructive interactions
between refugees and host communities unintentionally serves to their marginalization and
exclusion.
Fourth is the prevention of false news and mischaracterizations of refugees and their
impacts on the host society. The language we use to talk about refugees matters. How an issue is
framed reflects how we think about it as well as shapes how we deal with it. In both countries,
thousands of news articles that contain hate speeches and false news concerning Syrian refugees
are published every year. For example, although statistics on Syrian refugees and their impacts
on Lebanon are almost non-existent, a widely circulated article claimed that 300,000 refugees
were pregnant to evoke fears of demographic pressures on the part of the public (“Debunked”,
2017). Fabrication of false news or mischaracterization of Syrian refugees is also a product of
media polarization. The media is divided along anti-government vs. pro-government lines in
Turkey and sectarian lines in Lebanon.
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Fifth is evidence-based or research-informed advocacy. This is an indispensable ethical
responsibility for anyone conducting research on forced migrants. Evidence-based refugee
advocacy can take different forms. First, it can come in the form of campaigns aimed at
correcting misinformation about the effects of refugees on the host communities by presenting
factual data. Second, it can come in the form of individual refugee stories that provide a
comprehensive view of the refugee journey, reception, and resettlement and mobilize people for
action. By doing so, refugee voices will be heard rather than refugees becoming passive
recipients of power discourses or dominant framing. Third, it can come in the form of
information about the rights and freedoms of refugees and consequences of their violation.
Fourth it can come in the form of criticism of ineffective refugee policies and strategies and
suggesting solutions in a host country. Increased public awareness of the refugee issues through
media coverage, social media engagement, and public education contributes to the
desecuritization of refugee issues: fostering a rights-based, coexistence-oriented, and long-term
approach toward refugees.
Sixth is non-territorial conceptions of human rights. This is not a domestic but systemic
solution to the securitization of refugee communities. As discussed in the first chapter, refugee
problems are a direct but unintended consequence of the existing international system, which is
composed of nation-states that rule over clearly demarcated borders, identify themselves with
reference to a dominant ethnic group and culture, and recognize an individual’s existence only in
relation to his or her political and legal membership in a society (Benhabib, 2004; Haddad,
2008). Due to this, refugeehood deprives individuals of their legal personhood in the sense that
they often lose the right to action and speech when they become refugees (Gundogdu, 2015).
Although this might seem to be only agreeable in theory, refugees would not be viewed as
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security problems, if the freedom to move across borders were regarded as a basic right, ethical
responsibilities of human communities were conceptualized in a universal way, and all
categorical inventions of the nation-state such as insider vs. outsider, citizen vs. non-citizen,
legal vs. illegal resident were abandoned.
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Chapter 6
Securitization of Syrian Refugees in Germany and France
In recent years, the Syrian refugee crisis has dominated the debates and contributed to a
new transnational cleavage in European politics. Few topics today lead to as much heated and
passionate debate as the issue of immigration. The refugee crisis has gradually altered the focus
of party politics in Europe. Riding the populist wave, far-right parties which previously focused
on the economy and economic sovereignty shifted their focus to immigration and refugees
(Gedmin, 2019). Center-right parties associated both with progressive and nativist tendencies
struggled to adapt to the current context and revised their approaches to European integration,
immigration, and welfare (Bale and Kaltwasser, 2021). Emphasizing the crisis of social
democracy in Europe, some argued that center-right parties have radicalized and moved toward
the far-right (Van Spanje 2010; Han 2015; Wagner and Meyer 2017; Abou Chadi and Krause
2020). Some argued that these changes were not significant (Alonso and da Fonseca, 2012;
Rooduijn, de Lange and Van der Brug, 2012; Mudde, 2013; Akkerman, 2015). Others
maintained that they varied across cases and there was no uniform movement of the center-right
toward the far-right (Bale 2003; Odmalm and Bale 2015; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen
2016).
Puzzled by this contested nature of party politics, this chapter investigates the impact of
electoral dynamics, coalition formation dynamics, and political leadership on the Syrian refugee
politics in two European countries: Germany and France. Among European countries, whereas
Germany with generous refugee laws bore the biggest burden similar to what it experienced after
the civil war in Yugoslavia, its main partner within the EU, France, shunned refugees to a great
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extent. Moreover, France resisted and criticized German demands for a common European
policy toward refugees despite the growing security interdependence that entailed collective
policy responses (“French PM Walls”, 2015).
The refugee crisis caught these two countries at different historical junctures. On the one
hand, it coincided with Germany’s coming to terms with its immigration history and identifying
integration as the primary immigration policy under the Merkel administration. This was the
process started with the new Citizenship Law passed in 1999 by which the birth-right citizenship
(jus soli) replaced the ethnocultural citizenship model (jus sanguinis) and “the foreigner
problem” (Auslanderproblem) took an inclusive turn. On the other hand, France has primarily
focused on stemming and deterring immigration after implementing a series of worker
recruitment programs in the 1970s. One-quarter of the foreigners who have entered France since
1990 have since left the country (220,000 out of 850,000 entries since 1990) (Guiraudon, 2001).
The refugee crisis coincided with the emergence of a political consensus that privileged a
restrictive approach toward immigration in France. As a recent reflection of that, the entire 2022
electoral campaign has markedly shifted to the right, with all front-runners (Macron, Le Pen, and
Zemmour) taking a tough line to varying degrees on immigration (Amaro, 2021).
Why and how did these two divergent approaches toward Syrian refugees emerge? I
argue that these approaches are directly related to electoral competition dynamics, coalition
formation dynamics, and political leadership. With electoral competition dynamics, I refer to two
factors: the primary issues on which the parties with the highest number of members or
parliament seats or probability of winning the elections differ, and the level of electoral
volatility, the degree of change in vote shares obtained by individual political parties across
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consecutive elections. With coalition formation dynamics, I refer to the factors that impact the
alliance or cooperation of different political parties for a particular purpose and time in a country.
Finally, with political leadership, I refer to the nature of a leader’s decision-making and
their level of risk acceptance or aversion. What is meant by political leadership in general are the
ways in which leaders relate to those around them (i.e., constituents, advisers, or other leaders)
and how they structure political interactions (Hermann 2002). I argue that political leaders
sought to balance domestic electoral pressures and international humanitarian pressures in order
to realize a satisfying win-set for all their constituents. They negotiated their preferred set of
Syrian refugee policies simultaneously at the international level with the EU and its member
states and at the national level with societal and political actors.
Explaining the impact of electoral competition dynamics on refugee politics in these
countries, Germany is a federal parliamentary democracy and uses proportional voting system
which facilitates the election and representation of a greater number of parties in government.
Although elections primarily feature competition between two large parties, Christian and Social
Democrats, they also provide a wide range of coalition options. Immigration has not been an
issue of great divergence between the principal competitors throughout the Syrian refugee crisis.
Contrarily, Christian and Social Democrats’ approaches toward immigration and many other
issues have converged through their coalition partnerships. In contrast, France is a semipresidential democracy and uses plurality two-round electoral system. Under this system,
cohabitation where the president is from a different political party than the majority of the
members of the legislature is possible. In other words, the system allows for a far-right
presidential candidate to gain control of the executive branch without the support of other
political parties. As a result of this, French electoral system and constitution did not provide any
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mechanisms or structural barriers to contain the rise of far-right parties. In fact, the presidential
elections of 2017 and 2022 featured close competition between Emmanuel Macron’s centrist
Republic on the Move (LREM) and Le Pen’s far-right National Rally (RN). Immigration was an
issue on which these parties differed in principle and constituted the basis of Le Pen’s electoral
campaigning. However, in an attempt to prevent the move of center-right voters to the far-right,
Emmanuel Macron gradually adopted a more restrictive rhetoric on immigration like Le Pen.
Electoral volatility has also historically been higher in France compared to Germany as
shown in Figure 2.38 This meant that all other things being equal, French voters were more likely
than German voters to shift their party preferences in response to their parties’ perceived
competence in resolving the issues to which they attach great importance. Electoral volatility is
important because it shows voters’ tendency for dealignment: whether they continue to strongly
identify with the parties they always supported or change their voting preferences based on the
issues of the day. High electoral volatility is caused by, and contributes to, economic and
political instability (Powell & Tucker 2013; Mainwaring & Zoco 2007). Expectedly, with high
electoral volatility comes a high probability of voters switching between parties due to their
refugee policies. Therefore, electoral volatility increases the risks involved in adopting any
refugee policy that might upset a targeted group of voters.
Insofar as the coalition dynamics are concerned, AfD is systematically excluded from
coalitions in Germany due to the country’s unique historical experiences of World War II and the
Holocaust. Although Chancellor Merkel’s pro-refugee policies resulted in a decrease in CDU’s
popular support in 2017 and 2021 elections and an overall increase in AfD’s vote share, no
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To operationalize this concept, I updated the Pederson Electoral Volatility Index.

128
coalition has been formed with AfD and the probability of one being formed with the far-right
party in the future still seems very low. Conversely, there are no electoral, constitutional, and
structural barriers to the far-right party’s control over executive branch.
The National Rally has indeed become the main contender of President Macron’s Republic
on the Move in recent years as observed in the second round of presidential elections in 2017 and
2022 which was held between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen. As a result of this, French
Presidents, both Socialist Francois Hollande and Centrist Emmanuel Macron, have been
constrained by a higher electoral risk in adopting any generous policy toward Syrian refugees. In
other words, resettling refugees in large numbers or making bold moves could lead to the loss of
significant political support. This is not to say that these politicians had genuine humanitarian
agendas in the first place that became impossible to implement after a while, but it elucidates that
electoral politics provided an additional set of incentives for stringent policies.
Finally, regarding the role of political leadership, during the refugee crisis. Although
Merkel was known for her pragmatism and slow negotiation style, she risked her political career
and decided to keep the country’s borders open to the stranded refugees on September 4, 2015.
The decision was controversial because the Dublin agreement, which required refugees to
request asylum in the country they first entered in the European Union, was suspended. Also, the
decision-making process was very insulated as Chancellor Merkel did not consult with CDU’s
coalition partner, CSU, and its leader Horst Seehofer. Contrarily, focusing more on their
individual political success, French Presidents Hollande and Macron remained risk-averse and
avoided any large-scale pro-refugee policy that could upset their targeted group of voters during
the Syrian refugee crisis.
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Overall, the findings of this chapter provide support for theories of issue-based vote
choice (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996) and the contagion effect (Van Spanje 2010;
Schain 2006). According to the issue-based vote choice theory, voters are more likely to vote for
a party that has a reputation or promise of handling the issue(s) to which they attach great
importance. The electoral performance of AfD and Le Pen and the shift in President Macron’s
immigration rhetoric in recent years may be in part attributed to the issue ownership.
Additionally, contagion effect means that electoral success of fringe parties might influence
other parties’ policy positions even if these parties are not in the parliament and therefore do not
have the institutional means to influence policy (Williams & Whitten 2015; Spanje 2010).
Likewise, far-right parties have influenced the positions of other parties on the issues that they
try to mobilize the voters on, most notably, immigration in recent years (Spanje 2010). In
addition to electoral competition dynamics, the change in President Macron’s rhetoric and his
calls for stricter policies on immigration may be attributed to the contagion effect of Le Pen’s
National Rally.
By comparatively analyzing the impact of electoral competition dynamics, coalition
formation dynamics, and political leadership on refugee politics in two liberal democracies, this
study contributes to this last group of studies. Methodologically, the comparisons draw on
qualitative analysis of a large media dataset and an in-depth study of the political contexts.
Qualitative analysis of the media data is conducted with the help of some automated software
(i.e., Atlas.ti and NVivo), and an in-depth study of the contexts is ensured by weaving together
relevant facts from the political contexts of France and Germany between 2011-2021.
An in-depth study of the contexts helped formulate narratives on the historical
transformation of Syrian refugee politics in these countries. These narratives are an attempt to
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reconstruct the social world in which these countries’ refugee policies and politics were enacted
and therefore conducive to understanding the factors, mechanisms, and processes that shaped
them. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the data,
methodology, and results. The following section provides the mentioned narratives on Syrian
refugee policies and politics in Germany and France between 2011 and 2021. Finally, the last
section presents this study's overall conclusions.
Levels, Mechanisms, Processes, and Regimes of Securitization of Syrian Refugees in
Germany and France
Methodology
The cases, Germany and France, have been selected based on the most similar systems
design. These countries are similar in terms of their security environment, stances on the
international refugee law, regime type, economic prosperity, and geographical proximity to Syria
but they adopted entirely different policies toward Syrian refugees during the European refugee
crisis. A multiple case study or cross-case design allows us to explore a phenomenon in
appropriate depth within a case as well as facilitates a comparison of differences across cases
(Gerring 2007, Bartlett, and Vavrus, 2017). Therefore, a comparison of these cases will enable
this study to investigate how electoral competition dynamics, coalition formation dynamics, and
political leadership impacted refugee politics in an in-depth manner.
To study the domestic sources of Syrian refugee politics in Germany and France, I
created a news dataset. I preferred using newspaper articles rather than other types of qualitative
data because these media sources enabled me to systematically locate and document the
discursive (speech) and non-discursive (action) practices of a wide range of actors (i.e.,
politicians, civil society leaders, and public) on Syrian refugees as well as understand the context
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in which these were taking place. I searched the databases such as ProQuest and Nexis Uni R as
well as national newspapers’ online archives.
I conducted these searches in English, German, and French. I searched the online
databases and archives for a wide variety of formal and informal keywords used to define Syrian
refugees such as Syrians, Syrian refugees, displaced Syrians, Syrian asylum seekers, Syrian
immigrants, and Syrian guests. For Germany, initial searches identified 2,355 texts including
news, commentaries, and editorials of which 547 satisfied the selection criteria and were taken
for coding and analysis. For France, searches identified 3,126 texts of which 750 met the
selection criteria and were taken for coding and analysis.
Articles for Germany were drawn from five highly circulated newspapers: Die Zeit, Der
Spiegel, Die Welt, Bild, and the Local. These newspapers hold different positions on the political
spectrum with their distinct ideologies. Der Spiegel is left and liberal, Die Welt and Bild are right
and conservative, Die Zeit is centrist and liberal, and the Local is independent and multiregional.
For France, articles were collected from Le Monde, Le Figaro, Les Echos, France24, and the
Local. Likewise, these newspapers differ in terms of their political affiliations or predispositions.
Le Monde is left, Le Figaro is right, Les Echos is liberal, the Local is independent and
multiregional, and France24 is a state-owned agency.
I used the media bias/fact check index to determine the political leanings of these media
sources. The newspaper articles were very helpful in tracing the changes and continuities in
rhetoric and policy toward Syrian refugees and understanding the context in which they were
occurring. Then, I systematically coded all the news data that documented the attitudes of a wide
range of actors toward Syrian refugees. I used Atlas.ti and NVivo to create and assign codes. The
main unit of observation was the smallest semantic unit (i.e., word, sentence, paragraph) from a
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newspaper article that revealed an opinion or documented an action concerning Syrian refugees.
A semantic unit is a unit not of form but of meaning (Halliday and Hasan 2014).
Finally, I conducted a qualitative content analysis to identify the major themes and
patterns in the coded data. Overall, I drew on six techniques to ensure the rigor of this study’s
findings: case selection with a clear rationale, data saturation, internal validation, external
validation, triangulation, and methodological transparency. Case selection was based on the most
similar systems design to control the variables that do not have much explanatory power and to
focus the study on the variables (i.e., electoral competition dynamics, coalition formation
dynamics, and political leadership) that explain the change in the dependent variable (i.e.,
refugee politics).
Data saturation required to collect data until a new and important pattern or theme was no
longer emerging from it. It would be a poor methodological decision to base the data saturation
solely on the quantity of data collected without considering whether the data allowed this study
to answer the questions it raised in a satisfactory manner. Internal validation was maintained
through iterative use of the same coding schemes and categories. External validation was
achieved through the coding of media data obtained from sources with diverse ideological
leanings and dispositions. Triangulation was established through the amalgamation of different
types of theories, methods, and sources in the study.
Finally, to achieve methodological transparency, I elucidated how data was collected or
generated and interpreted or analyzed in compliance with the American Political Science
Association’s conceptualization of transparency. In doing so, I tried to provide answers to three
reflective questions in pursuit of transparency: what I did, how I did it, and why I did it
(Kapiszewski and Karcher 2020).
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Data and Comparison
Comparing the securitization of Syrian refugees in Germany and France, the overall level
of securitization in France (0.37) is higher than the overall level of securitization in Germany (0.41) as presented in Table 2839. The government and other elites’ securitization scores are very
low whereas the opposition’s securitization score is high in Germany. In consideration of this
party identity-based polarization, I argue that a regime of government and elites-led
desecuritization has developed in Germany like Turkey. On the contrary, the government and
other elites’ securitization scores are medium and the opposition’s securitization score is high in
France. In other words, all actors’ (government, opposition, and elites) discursive and nondiscursive practices contribute to the securitization of Syrian refugee affairs albeit to various
degrees. These attitudes toward Syrian refugees in France, I maintain, form a form of collective
securitization.
Table 28
Securitization in Germany and France (Discursive and Non-Discursive together)

Actors’ rhetoric and actions are primarily driven by a perception of Syrian refugee identity
as a national security threat in France. However, in Germany, although some of the actors’
rhetoric is primarily motivated by security threat perceptions, this rhetoric does not influence or

A securitizing move is numerically coded as “1,” and a desecuritizing move as “−1.” Overall securitization score for a country
is equal to the sum of all of the securitizing and desecuritizing moves divided by the total number of observations.
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translate into policymaking and political campaigning to the same extent. Additionally, as
presented in Table 29, there are differences between discursive and non-discursive securitization
scores in both countries. However, these differences are greater in France which reveals the gap
or rather contradiction between speech and action. Although President Hollande and Macron
employed a predominantly humanitarian rhetoric toward Syrian refugees, the policies adopted
have been quite restrictive and have not reflected their humanitarian rhetoric.
Table 29
Discursive vs. Non-discursive Securitization in Germany and France

I attribute this to the divergence between the domestic and international incentive structures
faced by center-right French presidents when making decisions regarding Syrian refugees. On
the one hand, they have been constrained by an imminent electoral risk in adopting expansive
pro-refugee policies domestically and opted for securitizing policies. On the other hand, they
have been constrained by liberal institutionalist pressures internationally, within and beyond the
EU, and espoused a humanitarian rhetoric. Although the EU and the international community
lacked the electoral power that the French public had which could be exercised to vote
politicians into or out of office in response to their refugee policies. These politicians balanced
concurrent domestic and international pressures and strategically fashioned their policy and
rhetoric to achieve a satisfying win-set for all their constituents. French statesmen negotiated
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their preferred set of Syrian refugee policies simultaneously at the international level with the EU
and its member states and at the national level with societal and political actors.
Furthermore, comparing the nature of the rhetoric (discursive practices) employed, most
of the discursive practices performed by the actors in Germany were commissive as shown in
Table 30. Commissive speech acts are those kinds of speech acts that speakers utter to commit
themselves to some future action. Conversely, most discursive practices were directive in France.
Such speech acts are aimed at provoking action from others. This demonstrates the stark contrast
between French and German approaches toward Syrian refugees. German elites and
policymakers believed in the independent moral responsibility of their country in addressing the
consequences of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Syria and urged their country to take
action. Whereas French elites and policymakers did not believe in their country’s independent
humanitarian role and rather called the international community, the EU, UN, and Syria’s
neighbors, to take measures to avoid the responsibility for humanitarian protection.
Expectedly, such attitudes impacted the demand side of the equation. Whereas Germany
with its generous refugee policies was confronted with high demand and became the primary
refugee destination in Europe, France with stricter policies and geographical advantage
succeeded at directing the refugee flows to other countries (Tasch, 2016).
Table 30
Means of Discursive Securitization in Germany and France
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With respect to the objects or reference points of securitizing practices, as presented in
Table 31, the securitizing actors in France viewed Syrian refugees primarily as a threat to the
borders. In contrast, the securitizing actors in Germany presented them mainly as a threat to the
welfare state. At the same time, securitizing actors in both countries were almost equally
concerned about the impacts of the refugee presence on their culture.
Table 31
Securitization by Objects in Germany and France

There are also some other major differences between the attitudes adopted toward Syrian
refugees in these countries that need to be noted. First, refugee voices were largely absent in the
media accounts on their experiences, living conditions, and integration in France like Lebanon
and Turkey. However, refugee stories and opinions were represented extensively in the German
media. Secondly, the legal terminology used to refer to Syrian refugees in these countries
differed significantly. The term “migrants” (“crise migratoire” or “crise des migrants”) was
more widely used in France than “refugees” who deserve special protection under the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In Germany, Syrians were mostly referred to as
“refugees” (“Syrische flüchtlinge”) by the media and state institutions. This had a positive impact
over the set of rights and services they could be entitled to. It is important to understand that
these labels or legal categories function as mechanisms of inclusion or exclusion and are
essential to the analysis of securitization in refugee-hosting countries.
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Thirdly, the relationship between refugee flows and terrorism was framed differently in
Germany and France. For example, although several incidents (i.e., Christmas Market Attack,
New Year’s Eve Sexual Assaults), political elites by and large did not link terrorism with
refugees and fears of violence did not gain much traction in the country. Contrarily, Paris attacks
changed the discourse on the refugee crisis completely in France and reinforced the idea that the
refugee crisis was not manageable, and refugees would constitute an important national security
threat if admitted. Amid the growing public anxieties, a group of mayors even went so far as
declaring that they would only accept Christian refugees (“France blasts”, 2015). Although all
claims concerning refugee involvement in the attacks relied on forged Syrian passports, the
attacks created a social and political atmosphere in France where national security concerns were
easily and frequently invoked to create a system that denied refugees the opportunity to enter the
country (Eckardt,2016).
The discourse on refugees in Germany centered on the idea of whether the number of
refugees that can be resettled in the country every year should be capped (Connolly, 2017). In
contrast, in France, it focused on how refugee flows could be stopped. French politicians often
proposed measures to step up the security of the EU’s external borders in the Mediterranean
(Hamann, 2016). Their infrequent promises to take in refugees or meet the refugee quotas set up
by the EU often went unfulfilled. For example, despite François Hollande promising in the
summer of 2015 that his country would receive 30,000 refugees (Maurice, 2015), France has
only admitted around 22,000 over the last nine years (UNHCR, 2021).
Fourthly, the political trajectory of right-wing populism in the wake of the Syrian refugee
crisis varied in these countries. As briefly discussed, the far-right party (FN) has become less
fringe and more mainstream and far-right candidate Le Pen reached the second and final round
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of the presidential elections in 2017 and 2022 in France. Although Le Pen lost the 2017
elections, she is still the most likely opponent of President Macron in the 2022 presidential
elections and continues to increase her public support (Mallet, 2020). Contrarily, modern
Germany has proven relatively resistant to right-wing populism despite AfD’s increasing power.
Germany’s resilience to populist movements can be explained by the country’s historical
experience with Nazism, a robust economy, and public support for international institutions
(Friedman, 2017).
Finally, a negative relationship between political parties’ approaches toward Syrian
refugees and their approaches toward the regime of President Bashar al-Assad exists both in
Germany and France. Merkel’s CDU and Macron’s France on the Move, as principally prorefugee parties, have been critical of the rule of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria. However, their foreign
policy positions have transformed from a Syria without Assad into a Syria with Assad in the long
term (Carrel, 2015). In contrast, AfD (“Far-right German AfD”, 2019) and National Rally
(“European far-right leader”, 2017) have met and supported the Assad government as well as the
Kremlin to facilitate the return of refugees to Syria. Contrary to the widely held perception that
far-right parties are parochial and domestically focused, AfD and NR have been quite active and
successful in finding partners and spreading their anti-refugee agenda across international
borders.
Narratives
Germany between Courage and Fear
The opening of the borders in the face of the European refugee crisis was perhaps the
most important decision in German politics since the reunification of Germany in the 1990s.
German attitudes and policies toward Syrian refugees have undergone important changes over
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time. Between 2011 and 2015, in agreement with other European countries, Germany utilized
donations and engaged with host countries in the region to protect its borders as well as the
borders cross Europe. The admission of refugees in massive numbers was viewed as an
undesirable policy option during these years. However, with hundreds of thousands of Syrians
fleeing and crossing the Mediterranean in August 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel found herself
pressured to make a critical decision. While several European countries immediately set up
border controls and suspended the Schengen system, Chancellor Merkel chose to keep German
borders open and did not subject Syrians to the Dublin Regulation which requires asylum seekers
to apply for protection in the countries of first entry and allows other EU countries to return
asylum seekers to the countries of first entry.
The suspension of the Dublin regulation resulted in the rapid entry of half a million
Syrian refugees into Germany. A wide range of actors within Germany as well as across the EU
criticized Merkel’s actions. With the rising political opposition to refugees, this historic and
exceptional generosity was replaced by a more controlled or restrained approach a few months
later that remains in force today. This is only a brief overview of the policies adopted toward
Syrian refugees in Germany between 2011 and 2021 and the following part provides a detailed
narrative.
2011-2015, Failure of the Attempts to Reach a European Solution. Germany’s
immigration policies have historically been driven by economic needs as well as humanitarian
sentiments. Offering haven to Aussiedler and Ubersiedler (ethnic Germans) fleeing persecution
from Eastern European countries or the Soviet-controlled East Germany in the post-World War
II era and opening the borders to the victims of the war from former Yugoslavia and Syria in the
post-Cold War era have largely been motivated by humanitarian sentiments. Meanwhile,
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beginning in the 1950s, Germany implemented labor recruitment programs that encouraged
Italian, Spanish, and Turkish immigration and were formalized through bilateral treaties.
Although the widespread perception was that the guest worker (Gastarbeiter) community
would leave after the recruitment programs ended in 1973, most of the guest workers did not
return to their country of origin and sought to obtain residency and citizenship. The number of
non-EU immigrants also continued to increase through family reunification. With the bans on
guest workers and family reunifications in the following decades, the former guests became
undesirable aliens (Zambonini, 2009). This marked the beginning of “the foreigner problem”
(Auslanderproblem) and showed that sociopolitical ramifications of worker recruitment
programs were widely underestimated by the former German governments.
The term “Gastarbeiter” is no longer accurate to describe these communities as they are
now permanent residents or citizens of Germany. It is important to note that the path to residency
and citizenship for these immigrant communities had not been without hurdles. It was not until
the late 1990s that a national policy on integration was developed (Anil 2007, p. 443). Until that
time integration was not considered a legitimate policy topic because foreigners were not
recognized as part of German society (Faist, 1994). For a long time, no immigrant groups other
than ethnic Germans had a legal right to claim and retain citizenship 40 which created a legal
status divide between “foreign Germans” and “native foreigners.” The governments in general
did not encourage the naturalization of non-ethnic German immigrants. For example, the Federal
Naturalization Guidelines of 1977 openly declared that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a
country of immigration and does not strive to increase the number of German citizens by way of
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Ethnic Germans were defined as "Status Germans" by Article 116 of the German Constitution
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naturalization (Hailbronner 1991). “The boat is full” (Das Boot ist voll) was a common slogan
uttered in the public debates on immigration and integration.
With European integration gaining momentum in the 1990s, the differences between EU
and non-EU immigrants in their access to certain rights and services deepened. Unlike non-EU
immigrants, EU nationals were able to reside permanently, vote in local elections, and work
without permits. This restrictive turn toward immigration was reflected in the Dublin Regulation
and London Resolutions. In the absence of internal borders, these measures were put in place to
facilitate or regulate the protection of EU’s external borders. The Dublin Regulation stipulated
that the first entry state was responsible for processing asylum applications. The London
Resolutions stated that refugees could be returned to safe third countries 41 designated by the
member states on a case-by-case basis (European Union, 1992).
The Dublin Regulation placed the burden of refugee management primarily on the
member states at the external borders and the London Resolutions placed it on the countries of
transit within Europe. Both measures minimized the role of Western European states and
transferred the responsibility of refugee status determination to other states. Asylum laws were
extremely conservative during these years. Article 16 of the German Constitution which
guaranteed an absolute right to asylum based on political persecution was amended in 1993 and
the right to asylum was severely restricted. The media also contributed to the growing public
fears concerning refugees and immigrants. As far as Muslim immigrants were concerned, the
media primarily chose to focus on sensational and controversial topics such as honor killings,
domestic violence, and arranged marriages. As discussed by Hafez and Richter (2009), the media

“Safe third country” here means all the countries in which an applicant stayed or travelled or had the opportunity to request
effective protection or has relatives or has been extradited while seeking asylum. Even transit or a short stay might be sufficient
for designation.
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coverage on Islam and Muslim communities during those years mostly featured exceptional
topics with negative connotations neglecting the plurality of Muslim lives and experiences.
The election of the first SPD–Green federal government under Gerhard Schröder in 1998
led to the fall of the illusion that Germany was not a “country of immigration.” As a major
development, a new Citizenship Law was passed in 1999, which redefined the basis on which
citizenship could be obtained in Germany. With the new law, the birth-right citizenship (jus soli)
replaced the ethnocultural citizenship model (jus sanguinis) and “the foreigner problem”
(Auslanderproblem) took an inclusive turn. For the first time, children of immigrants who were
born in Germany were automatically granted German citizenship.
Under Angela Merkel's leadership, the CDU preserved the policies initiated by the SPD
and Greens and defined integration as the primary immigration policy and challenge. However,
different wings of the CDU developed different attitudes toward immigration over time. Its
economic wing argued in favor of liberalization, its social conservative wing emphasized the
cultural challenges of integration, and its Christian wing highlighted the party's humanitarian
obligations (Hess and Green 2016). Germany’s acknowledgement of its identity as a country of
immigration marked a sea change and motivated a paradigm shift in the domestic political debate
on migration. Both the federal government’s National Integration Plan as well as private sector
integration initiatives such as “the Charta for Diversity” characterized integration as a necessary
task for Germany’s future and diversity as a resource (Zambonini 2009, p.4).
The European refugee crisis, therefore, coincided with Germany coming to terms with its
immigration history and identifying integration as the primary immigration policy. When the
UNHCR announced its Syria Regional Response Plan that it was seeking 10,000 places for
humanitarian admission and 2,000 places for resettlement of Syrians in acute need, Germany
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immediately committed places for humanitarian assistance. Under its humanitarian program, first
group of 107 Syrian refugees were admitted into the country in September 2013 (“First Group of
Syrian”, 2013).
Although the overall number of Syrian refugees had already exceeded one million by the
end of 2013, only a few thousands of these refugees were in Europe. The majority were hosted
by neighboring countries. Therefore, in the eyes of European public, the refugee crisis was still a
Middle Eastern issue where a European response was tangential and restricted to the small-scale
humanitarian aid campaigns. However, with hundreds of thousands of people trying to cross the
Mediterranean into Europe, the refugee crisis increasingly required a more sophisticated
European response. This brought the characterization of the crisis as a “European crisis” rather
than a “humanitarian crisis” exposing the anxieties as well as priorities of European countries.
European countries initially permitted the migrants to board trains without registering them or
checking their paperwork. However, with a spike in the numbers, they chose to limit refugee
arrivals by closing train stations or building razor-wire fences. The decision to build fences sent
the wrong message to the refugees that if they wanted to reach Europe, they better hurry. These
policies also created a situation where refugees became increasingly dependent on human
smugglers, undertook perilous journeys, and suffered humanitarian tragedies.
In August 2015, 71 refugees were found dead in a truck on an Austrian highway (Angerer
and Jamieson, 2015). Hundreds of people drowned in the Mediterranean. The photos of Aylan
Kurdi in particular, a Syrian toddler who washed up on a Turkish beach after their boat capsized
at sea, evoked humanitarian sentiments and outrage. Public opinion began to favor generous
refugee policies (BBC/ComRes 2015; Slovic et al. 2017). In the face of increasing humanitarian
pressures and disgruntlement of some member states, the European Commission adopted two

144
emergency schemes in May 2015 to relocate 160,000 people in clear need of international
protection from the member states most affected by the flow to other EU member states (“State
of Play”, 2016). The European Commission’s emergency schemes were short-term and
unenforceable. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic violated the commission’s
action plan by refusing to take in their share of asylum seekers. Asking the European Court of
Justice to annul the emergency schemes, Hungary and Slovakia claimed that quotas were
procedural mistakes and not a suitable response to the crisis.
The failure of the EU to implement an effective plan did not pose a huge threat to Central
and Eastern European countries. However, it caused distress among the countries at the external
borders, Southern European countries, such as Italy and Greece. In the absence of a
comprehensive policy, the responses of individual states varied significantly. Whereas some EU
countries tried to prevent the refugee arrivals and externalize the responsibility of processing
asylum applications, others sought to strike a balance between humanitarianism and protection of
borders. The tensions and issues escalated during and in the aftermath of the 2015 Refugee Crisis
exposed the shortcomings of the Dublin system, which was put in place in 1994 with the idea of
sending asylum seekers back to the countries on the margins of Europe. The Dublin system
produces unfair and and ineffective outcomes and may come under scrutiny in the near future
(Garcés-Mascareñas 2015; Mouzourakis, 2014).
Sep-Nov 2015, Angela Merkel and Critical Decision-making. Although the attempts to
reach a European solution failed, the plight of refugees began to alter public opinion in Germany
in favor of refugees in 2015. A politbarometer poll conducted in September 2015 found that 66%
of Germans felt allowing large refugee flows was the right thing to do (Keita and Dempster,
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2020). Some incidents put a human face on the refugee crisis and were critical in shifting public
opinion as well as Chancellor Merkel’s approach toward refugees.
The first incident was a public event “Good life in Germany” in the northern city of
Rostock where Reem Sahwil, a Palestinian high school girl, told Merkel that she and her family,
who arrived in Rostock from a Lebanese refugee camp four years ago, face the threat of
deportation and she wants to study like everyone else, and finds it very unpleasant to see how
others enjoy life while she cannot (Connolly, 2015). Although the Chancellor claimed that
Germany might not accept everybody, she was unable to provide an explanation for why Reem
and her family were facing the threat of deportation. This was perhaps a rare opportunity for the
Chancellor to observe the real consequences of German asylum policies over people’s lives. The
second incident was the discovery of a lorry on an Austrian motorway with the decomposing
bodies of 71 people, including a baby girl inside on August 28, 2015. The last incident was the
drowning of three-year-old Alan Kurdi in the Mediterranean Sea on September 2, 2015, whose
image made global headlines and powerfully exposed the deafening silence of the international
community in the face of worst humanitarian tragedies.
These tragic events laid bare the refugee conundrum: being stuck between states and
smugglers neither of which had a genuine interest in their well-being (Harding, 2015). Although
European states blamed human smugglers and traffickers for the drowning of the refugees in the
Mediterranean, they were equally guilty of the same crime for denying them entry in the first
place (Breville, 2016). The mainstream media that was always quick to associate refugees with
every terrorist attack never called into question the state practices that produced the conditions
for human smuggling. EU countries do not have an obligation to admit all refugees who might
wish to travel to their borders. However, they have an obligation not to actively take non-entree
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measures (Leiserson, 2017). Non-entrée measures refer to state practices such as visa controls,
carrier sanctions, and high seas interdiction that prevent refugees from ever reaching their
jurisdiction by which they become entitled to non-refoulement and other rights guaranteed by the
Refugee Convention. Under international law, refugees are entitled to arrive of their own
initiative, may not be penalized for unlawful arrival or presence, and must be protected for the
duration of risk in their home country (Hathaway, 2021).
In the absence of a common European policy, hundreds of thousands of refugees using
the Balkan route and making their way into Central Europe were stranded at the borders of
Serbia and Hungary during the turbulent summer of 2015. This triggered a crisis characterized
by tremendous uncertainty, confusion, and complexity. Chancellor Merkel was pressured to
make a quick decision and had few policy choices before her. The first choice was doing nothing
as few refugees were able to legally travel to Germany under the Dublin system. The second
choice was a preemptive restrained approach: erecting a fence, closing borders, and suspending
the Schengen rules. However, this approach could run counter to the humanitarian norms as well
as emerging public support for refugees in Germany.
The third choice was to have refugees redistributed among European countries. However,
the failure of the 2014 refugee quota system revealed that such attempts were unlikely to make a
difference. The fourth and last choice was keeping the borders open which could have a lasting
impact on the country and Chancellor Merkel’s political career. Considering the domestic
political dynamics of the country, generous policies could be endorsed by the left and Merkel’s
major coalition partner, the SPD, but opposed by its sister-party Christian Social Union (CSU)
and other right-wing parties. Generous policies could heighten the growing populist, anti-
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immigration, and anti-EU political agenda of the new far-right party, AfD (Alternative for
Germany).
Merkel, known for her pragmatism, respect for constraints, and skills in compromise and
building bridges across different political camps, decided to keep the country’s borders open to
the stranded refugees on September 4, 2015. The decision was controversial because not only the
Dublin agreement, which required refugees to request asylum in the country they first entered the
EU, was suspended but also the decision-making process was very insulated as Chancellor
Merkel did not consult with CDU’s coalition partner, CSU leader Horst Seehofer. She perhaps
operated on the assumption that her coalition partner would not turn against her for keeping the
borders open. The planned phone calls with Seehofer on the day of the decision were canceled.
Angela Merkel exercised her authority and told Austria’s Chancellor Kurz that Germany would
keep its borders open (“Bavaria threatens”, 2015). She declared that Germany was ready to admit
the refugees “we can do this” (wir schaffen das).
The crucial moment came on the weekend of September 12-13, 2015 when thousands of
refugees stranded in Austria began to head for Germany. Following the orders by the Ministry of
Interior, the police prepared for border closures, putting officers and equipment within range of
the border. But the go-ahead never came from Berlin despite the security preparations and the
September 4 decisions eventually became effective. As a matter of fact, it was quite evident that
strict border protection measures and resulting photos of rejected refugees could do more harm
than good to the country’s image and contradict Merkel’s historical legacy at this stage of the
crisis.
Between September and November 2015, 500,000 refugees entered Germany around
300,000 of which were Syrian. The decision engendered a fracture between the CDU and its
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allies. Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, and the
leader of its sister party CSU, Horst Seehofer called for a more effective limit on the number of
refugees and other migrants (Thomas, 2015). Horst Seehofer offered establishing zones on the
margins of Europe and threatened Merkel that if the country continues to refuse putting an upper
limit, his party will file a complaint with the German constitutional court (“Bavaria threatens”,
2015).
The reactions towards Merkel’s decision by her EU partners were mixed. She was
abandoned by Eastern European countries and the UK for turning Syrian refugees into a
“European problem.” However, her decision was applauded by some Central European countries
for saving the EU’s commitment to human rights and humanitarianism. Despite criticisms,
Merkel maintained her bold approach and responded to those demanding an apology in the
aftermath of her September 4 decision by declaring that “If we need to start excusing ourselves
for showing a friendly face in emergency situations, then this is no longer my country.” (Gibbs,
2015). Although it was only for a very short time, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to keep the
borders open in the face of rising populism and nativism in Europe was exceptional and deserves
an explanation. A few explanations have been proposed to make sense of Merkel’s September 4
decision: political leadership, economic pragmatism, and historical guilt conscience.
Starting with the leadership explanation, Mushaben (2017) contends that the decision was
a product of Merkel’s decades-long policies encouraging integration and intercultural opening.
Merkel had a migrant background and became Germany’s first female chancellor in 2005. She
introduced a series of reforms including a National Integration Plan to alter Helmut Kohl’s
restrictive asylum policies. She also had stable political power during the refugee crisis as it was
her third consecutive term as chancellor. In a way, Merkel’s political ideology, personal
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background, and institutional power combined to well-position her to make the September 4
decision.
Another explanation is derived from viewing refugees in utilitarian and economic terms.
Germany has a chronic shortage of skilled labor with moderate qualifications and keeping the
borders open could help mitigate this labor shortage. Indeed, Germany’s demographic deficit
presents a major challenge. It is estimated that one in three Germans will be over 65 by 2060
(Ferguson, 2019). The German labor market sees a net loss of 300,000 employees per year
(Schulz, 2019). At the height of the crisis, many people cited the argument from a study
conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation that refugees were an opportunity because Germany
would not have enough workers without the arrival of 500,000 non-EU residents per year (“The
Makings of Merkel’s”, 2016). Although this utilitarian explanation might have some merit, it
overlooks the cost of integrating immigrant and refugee communities into the economic and
social fabric of a host country. Refugees often do not immediately start working and need to go
through intensive language and vocational training before becoming fully employable.
Additionally, there is an ethical deficiency in this argument that Syrians traumatized by the longlasting civil war did not flee to Germany to resolve the country’s labor shortage but to find peace
and security first and foremost.
Finally, some attributed the September 4 decision to the historical guilt that Germans
developed due to the memory of the Holocaust and World War II. As German political scientist
Petra Bendel contends, German citizens know that the Refugee Convention came out of the
historical experience of Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust. They feel ready to atone for the
country’s collective sins and reform and restore the country’s image (Horn, 2015). Antimilitarism that came out of Germany’s World War II experience also causes the country to rule
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out the option of military action when engaging with refugee issues. As far as coalition dynamics
are concerned, these historical experiences motivate a type of cordon sanitaire, other parties’
exclusion of AfD from coalitions. Some other countries that had a similar type of cordon
sanitaire against far-right parties failed to maintain it in the face of the increasing public support
for these parties. For example, Norway’s Conservative Party dropped its ban on partnering with
the far right and joined the hardline Progress Party in a coalition in 2008 (Bennhold, Taub, and
Fisher, 2019).
This systemic isolation and exclusion of the far-right party along with the exceptional
leadership of Chancellor Merkel, I argue, made Germany more resilient to the appeal of
xenophobia and authoritarian populism and keep its borders open during the refugee crisis. Had a
leader with immigration background and principled pragmatism not been in power during these
years, Germany’s policies toward Syria and refugees could have taken an entirely different
direction. A different leader or coalition government could have pursued more isolationist and
protectionist policies similar to those of France and the UK.
This collective consciousness also inspired activism and volunteerism for refugees.
People from all different walks of life, students, workers, and the retired, were asking what they
could do to help from donating clothes to providing rides and guiding immigrants through the
German bureaucracy (“How many refugees”, 2015). They were moved by the images of floating
coffins in the Mediterranean as well as by their ability to do good and provide hope to people
who experienced a civil war and a plethora of ensuing social and emotional traumas (“How
many refugees”, 2015). The most active pro-refugee grassroots movement was the Welcoming
Alliance for Refugees (Willkommensbündnis für Flüchtlinge) which was established in the
upper-middle-class Berlin quarter of Steglitz- Zehlendorf. The alliance had thousands of
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supporters and more than 300 volunteers (“Which side will prevail”, 2015). Intrigued by this
increasing activism, Karakayali and Kleist (2016) conducted surveys with the volunteers and
argued that the volunteers, predominantly female in their twenties or over sixty and more often
with a migrant background and non-religious than the societal average, were not only interested
in improving the living conditions of refugees but also taking on state responsibilities and
becoming a force for integration.
These two sections discussed the policy and political challenges faced by Germany as
well as provided insights into Chancellor Merkel’s decision-making during the early stages of
the refugee crisis. They helped crystalize the role of coalition-formation dynamics and Merkel’s
leadership over the September 4 decision. The decision marked the beginning of mass Syrian
refugee presence in Germany. Although Germany’s asylum policies were predominantly
generous during these years, they began to manifest both progressive and restrictive tendencies
in the following years (Ilgit and Klotz, 2018, p. 615). The next section discusses these varying
tendencies with an emphasis on the factors that shaped the country’s refugee politics.
2016- Present, Political Polarization and Restrained Approach. Amid increasing
pressures, the prevailing positive attitudes changed, and border controls and Dublin rules were
reinstituted in November 2015. Overall, the open-door policies lasted less than two months
between September 2015 and November 2015. BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees) offered the admitted Syrians conventional refugee status on a prima facie basis. With
conventional refugee status, they received full protection for three years as well as travel
documents. They were also eligible to apply for family reunification. Eligibility for family
reunification did not also last long and the CDU & SDP government introduced a set of
restrictive policies on February 3, 2016.
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With these new policies, BAMF began to grant subsidiary protection status to Syrian
refugees instead of conventional refugee status. Subsidiary protection allowed refugees to obtain
residency only for one year and required them to wait 2 years to apply for family reunification.
Additionally, the country would admit only up to 1,000 families each month under subsidiary
protection. Family reunification was suspended altogether between mid-2016 and 2018.
Suffering the consequences of this new legal categorization, Syrians appealed to the
administrative courts and courts often ruled in favor of them giving them full protection under
the Refugee Convention (Law Library of Congress).
Despite this, those with a subsidiary protection status still make up the majority of the
Syrian refugee population in Germany (al-Jablawi, 2019). This legal shift was partly due to an
illusion or misconception that the Syrian civil war was being fought between ISIS and other
forces in Syria. With the downfall of ISIS, Syrians would no longer face persecution and
therefore no longer deserve conventional refugee status. Contrary to this perception, the bulk of
Syrian displacement preceded the rise of ISIS and was caused by the violence perpetrated by the
Assad regime which maintained its stronghold over most of Syria’s territory to this day.
Family reunification generated tensions among political parties. AfD demanded Syrian
refugees be resettled and reunited with their families in the to-be formed safety zones in Syria,
whereas Greens, Left Party, and SPD opposed the suspension of family reunification and argued
that allowing refugees to settle in Germany with their families is not a privilege but a human
right (Germany’s Bundestag votes”, 2018). The other issue that political parties disagreed on was
whether to put a cap on the number of refugees who could enter Germany. The leader of CSU
repeatedly called for a cap on the number of refugees accepted yearly and one possible number
he suggested was 200,000. Chancellor Merkel rejected the calls to limit the number of refugees
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Germany could receive fearing that it would be random and difficult to enforce (“Merkel under
fire”, 2015).
Refugee issues gradually became a source of political cleavage and strengthened the
position of anti-refugee parties. AfD increased its seat share in the German Parliament and took
third place after it won 13% of the votes in 2017 (al-Jablawi, 2019). Public support for the
government’s asylum policies also waned. For instance, a survey conducted in 2016 showed that
60% of Germans backed a fixed limit on refugees, while 35% opposed it. In the survey, 81% of
people who identified themselves as supporters of the populist Alternative for Germany (AfD)
were particularly enthusiastic about the idea of a cap. Support for a cap was also high, 64%,
among the followers of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
followed by the Free Democratic Party (57%), the Left Party (54%), and the Social Democrats
(52%) (“Opinion poll shows”, 2016). Additionally, there was increasing opposition to Chancellor
Merkel’s refugee policies from some of the social organizations on the fringes of German
society. Far-right social movements such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization
of the West) and neo-Nazi organization NPD protested and engaged in a disinformation
campaign against refugees.
Amidst these reactions and pressures, Chancellor Merkel brokered a refugee deal with
Turkey in November 2015 seeking to control the crossing of refugees from Turkey to the Greek
islands and prevent the massive refugee flows into Europe. Under the deal, irregular refugees
who arrived in Greece would be returned to Turkey and for every irregular refugee returned, one
refugee would be resettled in Europe. This contradicted Merkel’s earlier humanitarian policies as
the deal blocked an important travel route for refugees.

154
A few incidents served as catalysts in transforming public support into opposition and
skepticism during these years. The first incident involved a Syrian teenager, Anas Modamani,
who took a selfie with Chancellor Merkel while Merkel was visiting the accommodation facility
in which he was living. The image taken on September 10, 2015, went viral in a matter of hours
and dominated the news coverage. It was quickly picked up by far-right activists and groups in
hateful social media posts that evolved into fake news stories on Facebook, accusing Anas of
terrorism and attempted murder (Dearden, 2017). The photo was used to link Anas with attacks
across Europe, including the deadly truck attack at a Berlin Christmas Market and Brussel
Bombings in March 2016 (Ott, 2017). These fake stories spawned a legal case when Mr.
Modamani sued Facebook in a court in Würzburg, in the southern German state of Bavaria.
Far-right posts dominated social media. Some studies documented that while support for
AfD was between 11% and 15%, 85% of all shared political posts were associated with it. The
remaining 15% belonged to the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), the pro-environment
Greens, the Left Party, the pro-business FDP, and the conservatives. Germany’s big-tent parties,
SPD and CDU, accounted only for 2% to 3% of social media activism (Davis, Livingston, &
Hindman, 2019).
Another critical event was New Year’s Eve in Cologne where hundreds of women were
mobbed and sexually assaulted during celebrations. Despite insufficient evidence, the media was
quick to blame the refugees and immigrants for the assaults (“New Year’s Eve”, 2020). This
again put Chancellor Merkel’s liberal policies under tremendous pressure and motivated some
changes in German asylum policies. German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière formalized
an existing plan to place Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia on the list of “safe countries of origin” to
facilitate the deportation of immigrants from these countries. Safe countries are considered free
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of political persecution and therefore applications of asylum seekers coming from or through one
of these countries are declared manifestly unfounded.
Furthermore, the parliament voted to approve an Asylum law that suspended refugees’
right to family reunification for 2 years. These measures were not necessarily products of the
Cologne incident but of the political climate that followed it (Blenner and Ohlendorf, 2016).
Finally, the Berlin truck attack on 19 December 2016, where a stolen truck was allegedly driven
into a Christmas market by an ISIS member in Berlin leaving 12 people dead and 56 others
injured (“Germany searches for”, 2018) changed the attitudes toward refugees. Some studies
argued that although the attack primarily affected the people with a right-wing political ideology
in its immediate aftermath, the worsening of attitudes toward refugees were observed in the
general population as well (Nagel & Lutter, 2020). German security officials admitted that they
had no reliable evidence about whether the attack was planned by terrorists who entered Europe
by blending into refugee groups (Diehl and Reimann, 2015). Chancellor Merkel highlighted that
such terrorist attacks aim to destroy the German people and refugees’ ability to live
harmoniously by sowing hate and fear between them (“After rampages”, 2016).
Capitalizing on these tragic incidents, militant anti-refugee groups acted to aggravate the
popular discontent over refugees. One of the most shocking events involved a German lieutenant
who posed as a refugee and was caught while planning a violent attack against prominent
politicians. After checking his fingerprints in a database, authorities discovered that he was
registered as a Syrian refugee in Bavaria although he hardly spoke any Arabic and was supposed
to be serving full-time at a Bundeswehr base in Alsace (Knight and Grunau, 2022). This incident
showed the extent that right-wing extremists would go in their pursuit of xenophobic ideals. Far-
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right groups also blew up the car of a pro-refugee left Linke party member, Michael Richter in
July 2015 in a suburb of Dresden (“Blast damages pro-refugee”, 2015).
Finally, a tragicomic event that took place on March 16, 2016, exposed the social oddities
of the far-right attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Germany. Stefan Jagsch, a far-right politician,
and member of the neo-Nazi NPD, crashed his car into a tree, injured himself, and was rescued
by two refugees. The far-right politician was less than grateful to the refugees who saved him
from a car crash claiming that at the time of the rescue he was not conscious and could neither
confirm nor deny that the refugees got him out of the car. He attempted to cast doubt on the
reports produced by multiple media outlets (“No thanks from neo-Nazi”, 2016). Nevertheless,
the regional government officials and the local fire department soon confirmed that the two main
rescuers were refugees, one from Syria and the other from Sudan (“No thanks from neo-Nazi,
2016).
Stoking xenophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments, AfD viewed the refugee presence as
potentially leading to a conflict of identity and culture. It promoted the idea of core culture
(leitculture) to counter Merkel’s policy of welcoming culture (willkommenskultur). The party
also helped spread a plethora of myths about refugees such as “There are too many refugees and
German is longer the standard language,” “German taxpayers are financing their own
dispossession,” “Integration is genocide,” “Refugees are going on vacations to their home
country,” “Syrians are being allowed to bring their second wives,” “Terrorists are among the
asylum seekers,” “Terror cells discovered,” etc (Dier, Lehberger, Müller, and Philipp, 2019).
Unfortunately, these myths appealed to the public and helped AfD enter the national
parliament by gaining 12.6 percent of the vote and 92 seats in the Bundestag in the September
2017 elections. Although it is improbable for AfD to be included in a coalition due to the
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country’s unique history and exclusion of far-right parties from coalitions, AfD and its antiimmigrant/anti-Muslim agenda influence the broader asylum policy debate as well as the debate
on what it means to be German. The context in which support for the Far-Right Republikaner
Party increased during the Bosnian refugee crisis in the 1990s is almost identical to the context in
which support for AfD during the Syrian refugee crisis increased in the 2010s. Republikaner
Party gradually weakened and the support for the party had fallen to 2% between 1990 and 1994
(Steiner, 2000, p. 65). The ascent of the far-right might be a cyclical trend rather than a
permanent one in German politics. Hence, despite its current popularity, AfD might also face a
similar fate as refugee issues become less salient and relevant for the voters over time. The 2021
national elections where AfD lost 2 percent of its vote share and 11 seats in the parliament
showed that the support for AfD was on the decline.
In line with their racist and Islamophobic rhetoric, AfD opposed open borders and
demanded the EU’s external borders be completely closed. An AfD politician in North RhineWestphalia declared that, if need be, Germany's borders must be protected using the force of
arms authorizing the armed forces to shoot the refugees (Feldenkirchen, 2015). Ratcheting up
their anti-Syrian refugee agenda, AfD members visited Damascus in 2019 and met with the
representatives of the Assad government to make a case for why war-torn Syria was safe for the
return of refugees and why the sanctions imposed on Damascus should be lifted (“Far-right
German AfD”, 2019). The transnational anti-refugee activism of far-right political parties is less
known and understudied. Nonetheless, such efforts have been neither uncommon nor tangential
to these parties’ attempts to capitalize on the bureaucratic chaos and cultural fears activated by
the refugee crisis. The primary goal of far-right parties was to designate Syria as a safe country
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not only to facilitate the return of refugees to Syria but also to deny them refugee status and
humanitarian protection in host countries.
This is a shared strategy among far-right political parties across Europe. Similarly,
Marine Le Pen met with Lebanese President Michel Aoun and Foreign Minister Gibran Basil
who consistently claim Syria is safe for the return of Syrian refugees. She also visited Russian
President Vladimir Putin to show her support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (“Meeting
with Marine le Pen”, 2017). These parties calling for the immediate return of refugees overlook
the fact that refugees fled the persecution committed by the very regime that these parties claim
is fit to provide them with humanitarian protection.
As estimated by the Minister of Interior, the number of Syrian refugees living in
Germany reached 800,000 by 2018 (Sonntag, 2022). Public unrest with refugees as well as the
violence against refugee centers and hostels gradually escalated. Arson attacks hit an all-time
high in 2020 (“Minister ‘attempts putsch’”, 2015). Anti-refugee protests have drawn thousands
onto the streets in some cities. The gap between local authorities’ policies toward refugees and
those of the federal government also widened. For instance, protesting Germany’s refugee
policies, a local Bavarian administrator, Peter Dreier, has sent 31 refugees by bus from his rural
district to the chancellery in Berlin (“A Bavarian brings”, 2016). Germany’s decades-old system
for distributing refugees across German states based on each state’s wealth and population broke
down.
This section discussed the legal, social, and political challenges that surfaced in the
aftermath of Chancellor Merkel’s Sep 4 decisions. Despite some restrictive policies introduced,
Chancellor Merkel’s policies largely remained as liberal and generous. She successfully resisted
the securitization of Syrian refugees by the far-right AfD and her coalition partner, CSU. She
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achieved this through adopting a humanitarian discourse and shifting her policies when needed
within the constraints of humanitarianism to manage the intra-and-inter-party tensions as well as
the public disgruntlement with refugees. A new majority-left coalition government (SPD-FDPGreen) came to power after the 2021 elections in Germany with a promise of more liberal
asylum policies (Alkousaa, 2021). However, only time will tell whether Merkel’s humanitarian
approach will be maintained or replaced by a restrictive one. Overall, the country’s unique
coalition formation dynamics and Merkel’s principled leadership and high sense of responsibility
during the refugee crisis that prioritized humanitarianism over the immediate electoral interests,
brought generous policies toward Syrian refugees. The next section moves to France and
explains the changes and continuities in French policies and politics toward Syrian refugees and
their sources between 2011 and 2021.
France from Ambivalence to Inaction and Avoidance
French policies toward Syrian refugees might be best characterized by ambivalence,
inaction, and avoidance. The French media primarily focused on three issues throughout the
European refugee crisis: other countries’ Syrian refugee policies, religious extremism, and
treatment of minority groups in Iraq and Syria. There was limited coverage of the plight of
refugees. French politicians have strategically altered their refugee rhetoric in response to the
rising international and domestic pressures. They periodically pledged to admit refugees, but
rarely fulfilled these pledges. The country’s geographical advantage, not bordering any of
Eastern European countries and therefore not being on a primary migration route, also mitigated
the need and pressures for an immediate French response to the refugee crisis.
French politicians mostly focused their efforts on humanitarian aid and viewed it as a
strategic alternative to hosting refugees. Reflective of this logic, for example President Hollande
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contended that France cannot channel the monetary aid dedicated to Syrian refugees on
something else because if refugees decided to come to France, this would likely have greater
financial implications for the country (“France’s Macron wants”, 2019). Humanitarianism
sometimes can act as a facade that projects a compassionate approach while obscuring how, in
practice, state authorities are dehumanizing and excluding asylum-seekers (Gabiam, 2021).
President Hollande also demanded the formation of control centers in EU border
countries like Greece, Italy, and Hungary while Germany admitted thousands of refugees in
September 2015 (Mevel, 2015). Likewise, praising Chancellor Merkel’s decision to keep her
country’s borders open to refugees in 2015, President Macron exclaimed that Merkel saved
Europe’s collective identity. However, the same President Macron reversed his rhetoric later and
maintained that France needs to adopt a stricter approach to migration to appeal to far-right
voters (“France’s Macron wants”, 2015). Prime Minister Valls even went as far as asserting that
keeping the door open to Syrians was Merkel’s choice and France never told refugees to come
(Mevel, 2015). The current state of French politics, where political competition primarily takes
place between the centrist Macron and the far-right Le Pen as observed in the second-round of
2017 elections, incentivized President Macron to brand himself as a national conservative.
Although he had presented himself as a centrist and reformist political leader initially, he
switched to nativist rhetoric toward refugees over time (Onishi and Meheut, 2020).
In line with this logic, strict policies were adopted toward refugees in Calais. Makeshift
camps and containers were destroyed by local authorities. These actions made the country less
attractive for refugees. These made the country less attractive for refugees. The difficulties that
refugees faced in navigating the French bureaucracy once they were admitted into the country
also contributed to the country’s overall unattractiveness as a refugee destination. French media
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and government hardly mentioned the issues that made France an unattractive refugee
destination. There was not much discontentment about this negative perception on the country’s
refugee policies. The underlying logic perhaps was that the less liberal the policies are, the fewer
migrants they would attract.
The most important incident that undermined the prospects for any kind of pro-refugee
policy was the November 2015 Paris Attacks. The attacks emboldened nativist sentiments and
political voices within the French society. Some politicians claimed that the Schengen
agreement, which allows for the free movement of people within Europe, was a cause of the
terrorist attack. “Schengen is dead,” said Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of the Republicans and “the
absence of national borders is criminal folly,” said Marine Le Pen of the Front National. In
addition, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan of France Arise demanded the reintroduction of national
borders to stop terrorists getting in (Breville, 2016).
Local reactions toward the idea of admitting refugees were also different in France than
in Germany from the very beginning. When a group of two-hundred refugees arrived from
Germany in September 2015, two French mayors openly announced that they only wanted to
take in Christian refugees fearing that they could be terrorists in disguise (“First 200 refugees”,
2015). The following section provides a detailed account of these attitudes toward Syrian
refugees between 2011 and 2021.
2011-2015, Ambivalence. In principle, French presidents, politicians, and the general
public acknowledged that France had an obligation to help those fleeing war and persecution.
However, anxieties about immigration, economic decline, and terrorism combined to create
doubts about whether France had the capacity to take in refugees during the early years of the
Syrian refugee crisis (SCI, 2017). Unlike Germany, a majority of both right-wing and left-wing
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political parties were either ambivalent or opposed to admitting a large number of refugees in
France.
The primary response of President Hollande at the height of the refugee crisis was to
demand setting up detention centers or border guard corps to stem the refugee flows (“France to
insist”, 2015). President Hollande’s Syrian refugee policy involved two strategies. First,
pressuring neighbors of Syria such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan through international
institutions to ensure that they keep Syrian refugees on their soil (“Hollande calls on”, 2015).
French support for a Turkey – EU deal might largely be attributed to this strategy. Second,
providing international aid to the same group of countries to externalize the humanitarian
protection (France’s Holland”, 2016). As stated, both Hollande and Macron viewed humanitarian
aid as an alternative to admitting them into the country (“France to stump up”, 2015).
Other right-wing parties were even more restrictive and parochial in their approaches to
immigration. For instance, Le Pen claimed that admission of refugees would present a danger to
the French welfare state and mean less housing and resources for the French (“Welcoming
refugees”, 2015). Nicholas Sarkozy, Former French President and leader of the right-wing
Republicans, likened the migration crisis to a pipeline that explodes dehumanizing refugees (De
Boissieu, 2015). He also claimed that the Schengen area was a threat to the diversity of migration
policies in European countries and asylum centers should be set up on the margins of Europe to
process asylum applications (“Reception of refugees”, 2015). In 2021, Sarkozy was found guilty
of campaign fraud. Sarkozy’s claims and other discursive evidence indicate that French elites
and policymakers did not believe that their country had an independent responsibility for
providing asylum to Syrian refugees. Contrarily, they believed that it was morally justified to
demand action from the international community, the EU, the UN, and Syria’s neighbors.
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Some of the right-wing mayors’ reactions to the resettlement of 200 refugees in 2015
were even more alarming. For instance, Robert Menard, Mayor of Béziers, a politician linked to
Le Pen’s National Rally tried to evict refugees from the town telling them that they were not
welcome (“French mayor tries”, 2015). Menard also declared that he would block the opening of
kabab restaurants because they were not compatible with the ethos of being a Judeo-Christian
nation (Taylor, 2015). Another mayor of a small French town, Yves Nicolin, stated that he would
only admit Christian refugees because other refugees could be terrorists in disguise (“French
mayor will only”, 2015). The association of refugees with terrorism found support among highlevel French politicians as well. Prime Minister Manuel Valls maintained that terrorists may
easily blend into refugee flows, and thus pose a security threat (“French PM calls on Gulf”,
2015).
Right-wing actors were also quick to blame refugees for environmental pollution.
Refugees were not passive recipients of these accusations and actively responded to them
through social engagement. For example, as a response to such accusations, a group of Syrian
refugees gathered and cleaned the streets of their neighborhood in a southern French town. In
response, the far-right mayor of the town slammed the move as propaganda (“Syrian refugees
clean up”, 2015).
A series of terrorist incidents beginning with the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015
and escalating with the Paris attacks in November 2015 helped stoke more fears and legitimized
linking refugee admission to terrorism. The Paris attacks were a turning point, and the intensity
and gravity of their impact were no less than the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the American
psyche. Although these attacks were not carried out by refugees, they caused the French public
to view asylum increasingly through the lens of national security. For instance, polls conducted
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in France by the Social Science Initiative in 2017 showed that 53% of French people agreed with
the proposition that it is too dangerous to let refugees in because they are a major source of
terrorism (SCI 2017). Popular views on refugees were intertwined with their views on Islam.
France has historically had a difficult time reconciling Islam with its culture and strict form of
secularism. These attacks worsened the already fragile perception of Islam in the country. The
same poll also showed that a sizeable minority, 38 percent of the respondents, thought that Islam
was incompatible with the French identity. The heightened sense of insecurity in the aftermath of
the Paris attacks brought France from ambivalence to inaction and avoidance toward Syrian
refugees.
Among the few actors who sympathized with refugees and urged authorities to do more
to help refugees during these years were NGOs and the Green Party. Green Party leaders called
on the government in April 2014 to open an emergency facility for 160 Syrians from Homs,
Aleppo, and Latakia who had been camping out for several weeks in a square in a suburb of
Saint-Ouen, Paris (“Hollande facing mounting”, 2014). Among the refugees in Saint-Ouen, there
were many women and children suffering from health complications. Rights groups such as
France, Land of Asylum (France Terre d’Asile), called on the government to provide legal and
social services to refugees. The President of the Protestant Federation of France (FPF)
denounced “the gap between the speech and action” of the government concerning the reception
and treatment of migrants (Malzac, 2018). These calls proved to be insufficient in bridging the
gap between rhetorical commitment and policymaking toward refugees in France. Rather, the
gap seemed to be a deliberate strategic choice made by French presidents whose immediate
electoral interests dictated a different set of policies than what humanitarianism entailed.
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French statesmen, pressured by concurrent domestic and international demands, chose a
specific set of policies and rhetoric that would satisfy these varying demands to the utmost
degree possible. As such, providing aid and diplomatic support for Syrian refugees at the
international level was relatively conventional and uncomplicated although not completely free
for both President Hollande and President Macron. However, turning this rhetorical and financial
support into an admission policy could risk the loss of significant political support to their
opponents. The voters who were dissatisfied with their pro-refugee policies would switch to the
National Rally leading to fragmentation of the vote. Connecting these with the main argument of
this study, the electoral competition dynamics (i.e., close competition of the centrist parties with
the far-right) and risk averse-leadership of Hollande and Macron motivated inaction and
ambivalence toward Syrian refugees during these years. In the post-Paris attacks era, this
ambivalence transformed into inaction and avoidance. Through a new type of humanitarian visa,
France put its commitments under the Refugee Convention on hold and conferred refugee status
only to a select group of people. The following section focuses on this transformation in France’s
Syrian refugee policies and politics between 2015 and 2021.
2015-Present, Inaction and Avoidance. Although French policies toward Syrian
refugees prior to the Paris attacks were not entirely generous, admitting refugees in large
numbers was still a policy option along with providing humanitarian and diplomatic support.
However, the attacks amplified the sense of insecurity and created a political environment where
French politicians chose to shun this policy option altogether. Admitting a large number of
refugees like Germany was no longer on the table. Considering the total number, of 5.6 million,
France today hosts only a tiny fraction, 0.004% (22,000) of the Syrian refugee population.
Therefore, the French approach from 2016 to present toward Syrian refugees might be best
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characterized as avoidance and lack of a massive humanitarian engagement with and
commitment to Syrian refugees.
In the absence of an extensive asylum policy, a form of subsidiary protection
“humanitarian visa” was introduced in 2017. The humanitarian visa was designed with the
objective of helping Syrians travel to France and apply for asylum (“In France, the
humanitarian”, 2017). The asylum visa falls within the parameters of humanitarian protection
and takes “vulnerability” as its main criterion (Gabiam, 2021). Beneficiaries of humanitarian
protection receive diminished rights in comparison to refugees under the Refugee Convention
(Demetriou 2019). The humanitarian visa approach was not in line with the obligations of France
under the Refugee Convention and rather perceived as an effort to sideline the Convention and
confer refugee status to a small and selective group of people. Based on the convention, all
member countries have an obligation not to actively take non-entry measures. Requiring de facto
refugees to obtain a visa to apply for asylum is a legal non-entry measure. Overall, the
humanitarian visa policy only contributed to the project of “Fortress Europe,” making its
physical borders inaccessible to migrants (Gabiam, 2021).
This shift from a convention-based approach to a visa-based approach to asylum was also
reflected in leaders’ rhetoric. For example, President Macron, in reference to France's refugeeconvention-based asylum laws, claimed that refugee laws were too liberal and being manipulated
by smugglers and other people (“Macron presses a harder line”, 2022). Seeing far-right National
Rally leader Marine Le Pen as his main opponent prior to the 2022 Presidential elections who
bases her politics on an anti-immigration agenda, President Macron wanted to appeal to the
centrist and far-right voters.
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The attitudes toward refugees in France increasingly correlated with class identity rather
than political ideology. Not the bourgeoisie but the working class who felt dislocated in an
economic sense opposed the reception of refugees and immigrants. This often made centrist leftwing parties unsuitable alternatives to the right-wing parties as far as immigration was
concerned. The policy that largely remained intact during these years was foreign aid. President
Macron announced that France would allocate one billion euros in aid to help Jordan mitigate the
impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the kingdom’s worsening economy. This aligned with the
country’s policy of inaction and avoidance as massive aid packages were provided to help
countries shoulder the burden on their own and limit the refugee movements into Europe.
President Macron’s refugee rhetoric was largely a part of his revisionist politics
motivated by the objective of leading Europe and carving out an autonomous strategic role for
France in world politics. He had a different mission and vision for the EU in mind and tried to
model it as a strategic powerhouse as opposed to solely an economic one. Especially in response
to President Trump’s ambivalence over U.S. commitments to defend Europe, he maintained that
European countries can no longer rely on America to defend NATO allies and called the alliance
brain dead (“Emmanuel Macron warns”, 2019).
Macron’s efforts to reinvent or restore a type of strategic European sovereignty to foster a
common agenda on defense, economy and technology complemented his rhetoric of tougher
immigration policies and avoidance of Syrian refugees (“Macron takes on the U.S., 2021). In the
wake of the 2022 presidential elections, the electoral competition dynamics continue to
incentivize avoidance of refugees and a stringent approach toward immigration. As noted, the
entire electoral campaign has markedly shifted to the right, with all front-runners (Macron, Le
Pen, and Zemmour) taking a tough line to varying degrees on immigration (Amaro, 2021). All of

168
these provide support for the argument proposed in this study that French policies and politics
toward Syrian refugees were shaped by the current electoral dynamics of the country and risk
averse leadership of recent French presidents. They reinforced the restrictive turn in France’s
approach to immigration.
Conclusions
The Syrian refugee crisis has restructured the priorities of the electorate as well as the
political parties across Europe. Some political leaders motivated by reelection have tried to
adjust their political campaigning strategies to the emerging public sensitivities about refugees
which often emboldened and normalized xenophobic and anti-refugee sentiments. Prioritizing
humanitarian responsibility, others have adopted rather liberal and generous policies on refugees.
Puzzled by this great divergence behind meaning and policymaking toward refugees, this paper
comparatively analyzed the domestic sources of Syrian refugee politics in Germany and France.
Based on the qualitative analysis of a large media dataset and an in-depth study of
political contexts, this study found that three factors: electoral dynamics, coalition formation
dynamics, and leadership style shaped the politics and policies toward Syrian refugees in
Germany and France. The electoral competition primarily taking place between President
Macron’s centrist LREM and Le Pen’s far-right RN incentivized political actors to favor more
stringent approaches to immigration in France. Although French Presidents employed
humanitarian rhetoric and periodically pledged to admit refugees in large numbers during the
early stages of the Syrian refugee crisis (2011-2015), their reluctant humanitarianism was
replaced by inaction and avoidance in the aftermath of the Paris attacks.
Additionally, providing massive aid packages to neighboring countries hosting Syrian
refugees was viewed as an alternative to admitting refugees. Alternatives to providing asylum
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were amplified when a new legal category, humanitarian visa, was introduced in 2017 to sideline
France’s obligations toward asylum seekers under the 1951 Refugee Convention and grant
asylum only to a select group of people.
This study also argued that unique coalition formation dynamics resulting from
Germany’s World War II and Holocaust experiences motivated the systemic exclusion of the farright, AfD, from coalitions, and eased the risk posed by the centrist right-wing voters’ shift to the
far-right due to the enactment of pro-refugee policies. Although AfD increased its vote share in
elections, no coalitions have been formed with the party. This study also elucidated how German
politics toward Syrian refugees was largely shaped by Chancellor Merkel’s exceptional
leadership. Not complying with her usual pragmatic, cautious, and diplomatic leadership style,
Merkel did not consult with her sister party, CSU, and its leader Horst Seehofer in the process
leading up to the September 4 decision. Contrary to President Hollande and Macron, Chancellor
Merkel’s policies were not risk-averse and led to the loss of significant political support for CDU
in the 2017 and 2021 federal elections.
Despite the enactment of some restrictive measures (i.e. granting subsidiary protection as
opposed to refugee status and suspending family reunification) in the aftermath of Merkel’s
September 4 decision, Syrian refugee issues were not treated as a security matter and were
resolved within the boundaries of politics and policymaking in Germany. This constituted a stark
contradiction with the French approach that rested on a view of Syrian refugees primarily as a
threat to European borders and France’s national security. Taking a broad historical perspective,
the refugee crisis caught these two countries at different junctures. On the one hand, it coincided
with Germany coming to terms with its immigration history and identifying integration as the
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primary immigration policy under the Merkel administration. 42 On the other hand, it coincided
with the emergence of a political consensus that privileged a restrictive approach toward
immigration in France.43

42

This was the process started with the new Citizenship Law passed in 1999 by which the birth-right citizenship (jus
soli) replaced the ethnocultural citizenship model (jus sanguinis) and “the foreigner problem” (Auslanderproblem)
took an inclusive turn.
43
After implementing a series of worker recruitment programs in the 1970s, France has focused on stemming and
deterring immigration. One quarter of the foreigners who have entered France since 1990 have since left the country
(220,000 out of 850,000 entries since 1990).
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We suffer more often in imagination than in reality.
Seneca

Chapter 7
Conclusion
The Syrian Civil War (2011–present) and ensuing instability in the Middle East have
brought about the largest population displacement since the Second World War. As of March
2021, around 6.7 million Syrians have fled to other provinces within Syria and an additional 6.6
million have crossed international borders and become refugees. (UNHCR, 2021). State
responses to the worst humanitarian crisis of the twenty-first century have varied significantly.
While some governments have responded in humanitarian ways by opening their borders and
providing safety and assistance for refugees, others have introduced a wide range of restrictive
measures including closing their borders treating refugees harshly and trying to shift the
responsibility for the protection of refugees to other states often in an egregious violation of their
commitments under the international refugee regime.
Most of the governments that have enacted stringent measures justified these measures by
presenting Syrian refugees primarily as a security threat inciting fears of loss of safety on a
variety of grounds. Sometimes refugees have been depicted as posing an existential threat to the
state, sometimes as detrimental to the dominant cultural identity, and sometimes as both straining
the country’s welfare system and aggravating the competition in the low-wage job market. All
these responses were reflections and indicators of a larger social process: “the securitization of
forced migration,” positioning forced migration primarily as a matter of security and justifying
actions outside the normal boundaries of policy.
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Securitization is fundamental to the analysis of states’ forced migration policies for
several reasons. First, it transforms an ordinary situation into an urgent one and causes a state to
suspend its regular policies. States do not hesitate to implement extreme measures when they feel
their security is threatened. Second, securitization frames states’ concerns as a zero-sum game, in
which an actor can gain benefits only at the cost of other actors. Third, securitization silences
opposition and gives policymakers opportunities to exploit threat perceptions for domestic
purposes and handle issues with fewer democratic constraints. Fourth, securitization legitimizes
the diversion of resources to preferred issues.
Although the securitization trend is easy to call attention to, we have a limited
understanding of the factors driving the securitization of forced migration within and across
countries. Under what conditions do governments view and respond to the arrival of refugees
primarily as a security threat? The literature provides a wide range of accounts on state responses
to forced migrants. One stream of theorizing (Loescher and Scanlan 1986) associates the
attitudes toward forced migrants with the relations with the sending country. Another stream of
theorizing (Gordenker 1987) focuses on the role of and pressures from the international
community and institutions operating around forced migration. On the supply side, some
(Tsourapas 2019) highlight the impact of “refugee rentierism,” the phenomenon of using host
status and refugee policy as primary mechanisms of international rent-seeking. Finally, a group
of scholars (Jacobsen 1996; Bourbeau 2011; Abdelaaty 2021) examine the effect of contextual or
domestic factors such as political shocks, audience preferences, local absorption capacity, ethnic
identity, party ideology, and political elite relations on refugee politics.
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This dissertation aimed to build on this last group of studies that assess how contextual
factors facilitate or constrain the securitization of forced migration. It undertook a comparative
analysis of the securitization of Syrian refugees in two pairs of countries: Turkey and Lebanon
and Germany and France. It made five important contributions to the securitization literature.
First, it advanced our understanding of the sources and processes of securitization by proposing a
domestic political context-based theory. Securitization theory has identified conditions for
successful securitization but has overlooked contextual factors that shape the securitization
process (Bourbeau 2011, 3).
Second, it operationalized both linguistic and non-linguistic manifestations of
securitization and offered a coding scheme that allows for a systematic analysis of the actors and
components of the process of securitization. Third, based on quantitative and qualitative content
analysis, it differentiated between different levels of securitization and offered a typology. The
combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis strengthens the internal and external
validity of the study’s findings.
Fourth, this research broadened the empirical scope of the securitization theory by
exploring European as well as non-European contexts. Securitization theory has been criticized
for having little relevance outside Europe and failing to propose context-specific metrics (Ilgit
and Klotz 2014). This dissertation provided context-specific securitization narratives on Middle
Eastern and European countries and explains how securitization emerges and evolves in different
contexts. Fifth, reflecting the increasing relevance and strength of the securitization theory, it
showed how the securitization of forced migration is a multi-actor, multisectoral, contextual, and
power-dependent phenomenon.
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To account for the variation in the securitization of Syrian refugees across countries, I
proposed a domestic political context-based theory of securitization. The theory consisted of five
components. The first component was the nature of political elite relations. I asserted that
whether political elite relations were stable or unstable meaning whether elites were extremely
polarized or divided along ethnic or sectarian lines in a country impacted the securitization of
refugees. I hypothesized that the more divided the political elites were, the more securitized the
treatment of refugees would be in a country. Political elites referred to those who occupied
important political posts and had social or institutional power to influence policymaking in a
country. The second component of the theory was incumbent party ideology. I argued that while
inclusive party ideology constrained the securitized treatment of refugees, exclusive party
ideology facilitated it.
The third component of theory was electoral competition dynamics. With electoral
competition dynamics, I referred to two factors: the issue salience, primary issues on which the
parties with the highest number of members or parliament seats or probability of winning the
elections differed, and the level of electoral volatility, the degree of change in vote shares
obtained by individual political parties across consecutive elections. I hypothesized that the more
salient immigration as a political issue was the higher the risk of securitization would be.
Similarly, I theorized that electoral volatility would increase the risks involved in adopting any
refugee policy that might upset the targeted group of voters.
The fourth component of the theory was coalition formation dynamics. Coalition
formation dynamics referred to the factors that impacted the joining together of different political
parties for a particular purpose and time in a country, specifically the probability of a coalition
formed with far-right parties. I hypothesized that the higher the probability the more securitized

175
Syrian refugee policies would be. The last component of the theory was the history of relations
with other refugee and immigrant communities. I contend that whether violent or non-violent
tensions have occasionally arisen between existing refugee groups and the state influenced the
securitization of a new group of refugees. I hypothesized that the more amicable a country’s
relations with existing refugee communities were, the less securitized the treatment of Syrian
refugees would be.
The domestic political context characterized in this research rested on a comprehensive
view of politics. It involved the most pertinent dimensions of a political environment that
provide incentives and disincentives for politicians to frame refugee issues in certain ways and
introduce measures in response. It was underlined by the assumption that meaning and
policymaking on forced migration is an outcome of the strategic interactions between these
different dimensions of a domestic political context. Contingent upon the nature of a political
system, the salience of each of these dimensions differed. In other words, they influenced the
securitization of refugees in varying levels and ways. For instance, in more authoritarian regimes
electoral volatility did not have as much explanatory power as party ideology or elite divisions
over the securitization of refugee communities. Similarly, elite divisions in some countries were
not as influential as they were in other countries. Through an in-depth study of the cases, this
research demonstrated how much influence different dimensions of a domestic context exerted
on the securitization of Syrian refugees.
Starting with Turkey, I argued that a low level of securitization in the country is an
outcome of the inclusive party ideology. AKP as an Islamist political party has been strongly
motivated by transnational religious solidarity that induced a pro-active foreign policy toward
Syria as well as generous policies toward refugees. Had a conservative party with transnational
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religious sensitivities not been in power during the refugee crisis, Turkey’s policies toward Syria
and its refugees could have taken an entirely different direction. As a matter of fact, isolationism
had been the hallmark of foreign policymaking toward the Middle East in the pre-AKP era. I also
found support for this argument in the current attitudes of opposition parties toward Syrian
refugees in the country. Most of the opposition parties (CHP, MHP, and IYI Party) have been
extremely critical of the AKP’s pro-refugee policies. The most important implication of the
partisan divide concerning refugees in Turkey is that a government change may lead to
fundamental changes in refugees’ status and conditions.
For Lebanon, I maintain that a high level of securitization is driven by elite divisions and
historical relations with other refugee communities and Syria. There are two types of elite
divides characterizing, if not paralyzing Lebanese politics: the sectarian divide and the pro versus
the anti-Syria divide. The sectarian divide deeply shapes the political actors’ stances on Syrian
refugees. While Christian political parties often demand refugees’ immediate return, Sunni
political actors denounce such requests. Situated between these two positions, Shi’a political
powers desire the country to engage in direct negotiations with the Syrian regime to return the
refugees but do not call for their immediate return. The deep divide between the March 8 and
March 14 alliances regarding Syria also complicates the refugee issues. On the one hand,
members of the March 14 alliance assure the international community that Syrian refugees will
not be subject to involuntary repatriation. On the other hand, members of the March 8 alliance
want to negotiate the conditions of Syrian refugees’ return with Damascus.
Finally, historical experiences with Palestinian refugees influence the political actors’
approaches toward Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Turkey had not been a major refugee-hosting
country until the influx of Syrian refugees with a few exceptions and refugees do not conjure up
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unpleasant collective memories. Conversely, refugee flows have deeply shaped Lebanon. Within
the early years of its independence, the country had porous borders and a large number of
Palestinian refugees entered during and after the 1948 Arab Israeli War. The refugee camps in
which Palestinians were resettled became instrumental to recruitment for Al-Fatah and PLO
particularly throughout the Lebanese Civil War.
Against this historical background, a range of Lebanese attitudes toward Syrian refugees
materialized. Lebanese politicians, especially members of the March 8 alliance, instrumentalized
their perspective on Palestinians refugees to oppose the presence and resettlement of Syrian
refugees. These politicians claimed that Lebanon might experience another civil war and it
would be very unlikely for a refugee community to return home as the conflict that motivates
their displacement often remains unsettled or becomes even more intractable over time. Again,
manipulating the country’s experiences with Palestinian refugees, they opposed the creation of
formal refugee camps. They suggested that refugee camps might facilitate the armament of
extremist groups, the spread of transnational terrorism, and threaten national security. These
deep-seated fears and biases set in motion the unequal treatment of Palestinian refugees 44 as well
as the demands of the pro-Syrian regime political forces for Syrian refugees’ immediate return.
Electoral volatility has been low in both countries during these years and therefore its impacts
over the government policies toward refugees have been limited. AKP has remained in power in
Turkey and sectarian elites have continued to dominate politics in Lebanon.

44

There are several degrees of citizenship as well as refugeehood. Palestinian refugees, who have been living in the refugee
camps for many decades, are not only viewed as second-class citizens but also as second-class refugees in Lebanon. They only
benefit from UNRWA services. UNHCR lists three durable solutions for refugees as a part of its core mandate such as voluntary
repatriation, resettlement in another country, and integration within the host community. Unlike UNHCR, UNRWA is not
mandated to promote durable solutions for Palestinian refugees and it is designed for the exclusive purpose of providing
assistance. Confronted and incapacitated with structural and institutional discrimination and lack of international aid, Palestinian
refugees condemn the inaction and indifference of the Lebanese government and international humanitarian institutions toward
their plight (El-Yassir, 2013).
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Insofar as Germany and France are concerned, I argued that the overall low level of
securitization in Germany and high level of securitization in France were directly related with
electoral competition dynamics and coalition formation dynamics. Starting with the electoral
competition dynamics, the elections are primarily competed between Christian and Social
Democrats under Germany’s federal parliamentary democracy and proportional representation
system, and immigration has not been an issue of great divergence between these parties
throughout the Syrian refugee crisis. Contrarily, these parties’ approaches toward immigration
and many other issues have converged through their coalition partnerships. On the other hand, in
France under a semi-presidential democracy and winner-take-all system, the presidential
elections of 2017 were competed between Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Republic on the Move
(LREM) and Le Pen’s Far-right National Rally (RN). Immigration was an issue on which these
parties differed significantly and constituted the basis of Le Pen’s electoral campaigning.
Electoral volatility has also historically been higher in France compared to Germany.
This meant that, all other things being equal, French voters were more likely than German voters
to shift their party preferences in response to their parties’ perceived competence in resolving the
issues to which they attach great importance. Electoral volatility is important because it shows
voters’ tendency for dealignment: whether they might continue to strongly identify with the
parties they always supported or change their voting preferences based on the issues of the day.
High electoral volatility is caused by as well as causes economic and political instability (Powell
& Tucker 2013; Mainwaring & Zoco 2007). Expectedly, with high electoral volatility came high
probability of voters switching between parties due to their refugee policies. Therefore, electoral
volatility increased the risks involved in adopting any refugee policy that might upset a targeted
group of voters.
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As far as the coalition dynamics are concerned, AfD is systematically excluded from
coalitions in Germany due to the country’s unique historical experiences of World War II and the
Holocaust. Although Chancellor Merkel’s pro-refugee policies resulted in a decrease in CDU’s
popular support in 2017 and 2021 elections and an overall increase in AfD’s vote share, no
coalition has been formed with AfD and the probability of one being formed with AfD in the
future still seems very low. Conversely, the far-right party has traditionally not been excluded
from alliances by other right-wing parties in France (Shields, 2007). For example, the Rally for
the Republic (RPR) and the Union for French Democracy (UDF) – formed an alliance, under the
Union for France (UPF) banner, and fielded a common candidate in most of the single-member
electoral districts to challenge François Mitterrand’s Socialist Party in the 1993 National
Assembly elections (France Parliamentary Chamber, 1993).
The National Rally has become the main contender of President Macron’s Republic on
the Move in recent years as observed in the second round of presidential elections in 2017 which
was held between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen. As a result of this, French Presidents,
both Socialist Francois Hollande and Liberal Emmanuel Macron, have been constrained by a
higher electoral risk in adopting any generous policy toward Syrian refugees. In other words,
resettling refugees in large numbers or making bold moves could lead to the loss of significant
political support to their primary opponents for these politicians. This is not to say that these
politicians had genuine humanitarian agendas in the first place that became impossible to
implement after a while but to elucidate that electoral politics provided an additional set of
disincentives for generous policies. In the wake of the 2022 presidential elections, the electoral
competition dynamics continue to incentivize avoidance of refugees and a stringent approach
toward immigration. The entire electoral campaign has markedly shifted to the right, with all
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front-runners (Macron, Le Pen, and Zemmour) taking a tough line to varying degrees on
immigration (Amaro, 2021).
Despite the enactment of some restrictive measures (i.e., granting subsidiary protection as
opposed to refugee status and suspending family reunification) in the aftermath of Merkel’s
September 4 decision, Syrian refugee issues were not treated as matters of security and rather
resolved within the boundaries of politics and policymaking in Germany. This constituted a stark
contrast with the French approach that rested on a view of Syrian refugees primarily as a threat
to European borders and France’s national security.
From a historical perspective, the refugee crisis caught these two countries at different
historical junctures. On the one hand, it coincided with Germany coming to terms with its
immigration history and identifying integration as the primary immigration policy under the
Merkel administration. This was the process started with the new Citizenship Law passed in
1999 by which the birth-right citizenship (jus soli) replaced the ethnocultural citizenship model
(jus sanguinis) and “the foreigner problem” (Auslanderproblem) took an inclusive turn. On the
other hand, France has primarily focused on stemming and deterring immigration after
implementing a series of worker recruitment programs in the 1970s. One-quarter of the
foreigners who have entered France since 1990 have since left the country (220,000 out of
850,000 entries since 1990) (Guiraudon, 2001). The refugee crisis rather coincided with the
emergence of a political consensus that privileged a restrictive approach toward immigration in
France.
In lieu of a conclusion, forced migration is an outcome of global security inequities. A
just treatment of forced migration would require the international community and host
governments to form alternative narratives, listen to refugees’ stories, and respond to their
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situations more ethically and effectively. Despite the liberal pride in the universality of human
rights, the perception of “human” and “culture” is still highly territorialized and rooted in the
nation-state order (Zeno 2017). It is impossible to conceptualize the moral responsibilities of
human communities and their political practices toward refugees in any other way under the
strict logic of sovereignty. States hold on to the right to regulate entry as a fundamental
concomitant of their sovereignty (Zolberg 1983) and, either explicitly or implicitly, recognize
homogeneity as a prerequisite for peace, law, and order (Bigo 2002, 67). Absolute justice would
require that one’s life chances not be dependent on arbitrary facts, so the freedom to move across
borders would be regarded as a basic right. However, this is only agreeable in theory, for it is a
political non-starter within the nation-state system (Price 2009, 2). Refugees, hence, provide a
sobering reminder of the limits of liberal solidarist change within the international society
(Hurrell 2007).
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